Going overboard on computer security?

Now beyond a “few” mp3 files that might annoy the RIAA there is zero of a questionable nature on my drives and nothing either in my life or on my computers that would call for any kind of forensics examination by law enforcement let alone a NSA level examination.

So is my wife correct that I am the only one that is not a spy/terrorist/drug lord that would place security on his computers that would give the NSA a hard time?

Oh I can not be track by my ISP ID either you had hear of tor and other means of stopping such tracking I assume? No way for anyone to find that I had or had not google a search concerning killing my wife.

The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming out of the Tor network. That's because if you can see both flows, some simple statistics let you decide whether they match up.

Because we aim to let people browse the web, we can't afford the extra overhead and hours of additional delay that are used in high-latency mix networks like Mixmaster or Mixminion to slow this attack. That's why Tor's security is all about trying to decrease the chances that an adversary will end up in the right positions to see the traffic flows.

The way we generally explain it is that Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries to confirm a hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and then doing the math.

And the math is really effective. There are simple packet counting attacks (Passive Attack Analysis for Connection-Based Anonymity Systems) and moving window averages (Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix-Based Systems), but the more recent stuff is downright scary, like Steven Murdoch's PET 2007 paper about achieving high confidence in a correlation attack despite seeing only 1 in 2000 packets on each side (Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries).

What Fu is presenting in his talk is another instance of the confirmation attack, called the tagging attack. The basic idea is that an adversary who controls both the first (entry) and last (exit) relay that Alice picks can modify the data flow at one end of the circuit ("tag" it), and detect that modification at the other end " thus bridging the circuit and confirming that it really is Alice talking to Bob. This attack has some limitations compared to the above attacks. First, it involves modifying data, which in most cases will break the connection; so there's a lot more risk that he'll be noticed. Second, the attack relies on the adversary actually controlling both relays. The passive variants can be performed by an observer like an ISP or a telco.

So Robert what IP address is the local police and courts going to ask google to given them to check my search history?

So Robert what IP addresses is the local police and courts going to ask google to check for my search history?

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At issue in this case is whether forcing Boucher to type in that PGP passphrase--which would be shielded from and remain unknown to the government--is "testimonial," meaning that it triggers Fifth Amendment protections. The counterargument is that since defendants can be compelled to turn over a key to a safe filled with incriminating documents, or provide fingerprints, blood samples, or voice recordings, unlocking a partially-encrypted hard drive is no different.

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