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Thu 3 Apr, 2008 06:06 pm
Debates on issues of philosophy are often protracted and often fail to reach a decisive resolution. What is it, then, that makes philosophy worthwhile?
When I was much younger, chicks really thought I was deep when I philosophised about the Pre Raphealites.
farmerman wrote:When I was much younger, chicks really thought I was deep when I philosophised about the Pre Raphealites.
I believe that is still an active part of spendi's bag of tricks.
Learning the rudiments of argument and logic is pretty indispensable. Philosophy isn't the only place where you can do that, but it's a good place to hone those skills.
In
The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell states that the value of philosophy lies in the fact that it does
not produce definite answers:
Quote:The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.
Philosophy is fun: it makes life a theoretical problem, and, as such, a source of joy and object of wonder.
In the introduction to
A History of Philosophy, Frederick Coplestone writes:
Quote:Even if intellectual speculation has at times led to bizarre doctrines and monstrous conclusions, we cannot but have a certain sympathy for and interest in the struggle of the human intellect to attain Truth. Kant, who denied that Metaphysics in the traditional sense were or could be a science, none the less allowed that we cannot remain indifferent to the objects with which Metaphysics professes to deal, God, the soul, freedom; and we may add that we cannot remain indifferent to the human intellect's search for the True and the Good.
Philosophy pales in the presence of science when it comes to pragmatism and empiricism........but funnily enough it seems both pragmatism and empiricism are claimed to be philosophical concepts.
Chumly, as usual, is on the mark. Insofar as the principal goal of inquiry is prediction and control, the "scientific method" is man's most efficient investigative tool. But we may add that Science generally pales in the presence of Philosophy, Art, and Religion, as a generator of meaning.
In the early 1960s, I read some of Will Durant's works and chose a few philosophers to read. I loved Bertrand Russell slavishly. Probably read more of Plato than any of the rest. But, realized I haven't the acumen to be a philosopher. I get lost and become disinterested, after a time.
I, too, realized in my younger days, that philosophy as a technical enterprise, was for the most part beyond my intellectual reach. But I enjoy it recreationally. By that I mean that I ponder the issues I can handle and ignore those I can't.
JLNobody wrote:But we may add that Science generally pales in the presence of Philosophy, Art, and Religion, as a generator of meaning.
I agree, but it does beg the question of innate meaning versus the presumption of meaning.
By the way, Edgar, I wish I had your poetic acumen.
Chumly: "I agree, but it does beg the question of innate meaning versus the presumption of meaning".
Right, Chumly, meaning is itself a philosophical--but not a scientific--problem. I see meaning as never "innate" or given. It is always a matter of human (cultural and personal) construction. And that's why it is at the heart of the humanistic disciplines: philosophy, art, and religion, principally forms of human creation. Science results from both construction and discovery (I'm thinking of its mathematical and empirical bents)
Thank you, jl. But, you already possess so many great qualities, surely you can spare that one.
JLNobody wrote:Chumly: "I agree, but it does beg the question of innate meaning versus the presumption of meaning".
Right, Chumly, meaning is itself a philosophical--but not a scientific--problem. I see meaning as never "innate" or given. It is always a matter of human (cultural and personal) construction. And that's why it is at the heart of the humanistic disciplines: philosophy, art, and religion, principally forms of human creation. Science results from both construction and discovery (I'm thinking of its mathematical and empirical bents)
Some Science Fiction stories speculate about more than one intelligent species.
If we are but one intelligent species (the jury is still out as to the potential of some of the higher terrestrial animals) it remains an open question as to how universal a given meaning might be.
Chumly and JLN,
This is how Karl Popper explained the importance of philosophy for science:
Quote:....in almost every phase of the development of science we are under the sway of metaphysical - that is, untestable - ideas; ideas which not only determine what problems of explanation we shall choose to attack, but also what kinds of answers we shall consider as fitting or satisfactory or acceptable, and as improvements of, or advances on, earlier answers.
Wandeljw,
Popper was, I think, a major "philosopher of science" (I'm thinking of the emphasis he gave to "falsification" as the raison d'etre of the scientific method and "systematic experimentalism"). His reference to the ubiquity of metaphysical ideas pertains more to the fact that they serve, consciously or not, as the foundational presuppositions of all thought (as opposed to their untestability). They remain untested because their purpose is served by the very fact of their necessarily IMPLICIT nature. It seems that in all thinking there must be some TACIT presumptions upon which to stand. If we make THEM explicit they will, then, have to stand upon other, deeper, presumptions. I'm seeing at this moment the classical image of elephants standing on elephants "all the way down". I think that it is in our interest, especially as scientists, to be at rest with this fact of the unacknowledged existence of presumed ideas. To deny ourselves this license is to behave as uncompromising philosophers who are more concerned with complete and absolute "Truth" than with the material benefits afforded by Science. Science must permit itself a degree of acceptable ignorance, a necessity not formally accepted or conciously enjoyed by philosophers.
In your quotation, Popper is talking about the role of paradigms in the sense that Kuhn referred to them.
Wandeljw,
Popper was, I think, a major "philosopher of science" (I'm thinking of the emphasis he gave to "falsification" as the raison d'etre of the scientific method and "systematic experimentalism").
His reference to the ubiquity of metaphysical ideas pertains more to the fact that they serve, consciously or not, as the foundational presuppositions of all thought (as opposed to their untestability). They remain untested because their purpose is served by the very fact of their necessarily IMPLICIT nature. It seems that in all thinking there must be some TACIT presumptions upon which to stand. If we make THEM explicit they will, then, have to stand upon other, deeper, presumptions. I'm seeing at this moment the classical image of elephants standing on elephants "all the way down".
I think that it is in our interest, especially as scientists, to be at rest with this fact of the unacknowledged existence of presumed ideas. To deny ourselves this license is to behave as uncompromising philosophers who are more concerned with complete and absolute "Truth" than with the material benefits afforded by Science. Science must permit itself a degree of acceptable ignorance, a necessity not formally accepted or conciously enjoyed by philosophers.
In your quotation, Popper is talking about the role of paradigms in the sense that Thomas Kuhn referred to them.