What is Metaphysics?

Can metaphysics still be considered an academic subject or has metaphysics merely evolved into some type of "new age" religion?

Metaphysics is the name given by scholars to a treatise of Aristotle.

Aristotle described the subject of his treatise in a number of different ways which he regarded as equivalent. He called it the study of the first principles of things. He said it was the science of existence in general, or of 'being as such', contrasting it in this respect with the various special sciences which each studied only one part or aspect of being. He described it also as the study of 'substance', a term which occupies a central position in the work of most of the great metaphysicians who came after him. Substance he declared to be what primarily existed, and was prior to all other things in respect not only of existence, but of explanation and of knowledge as well; that is to say, the explanation of anything else involved the idea of substance; knowledge of anything else involved knowledge of substance; and the existence of everything else depended on the existence of substance. Metaphysics, then, is regarded by Aristotle as a single, comprehensive study of what is fundamental to all existence, all knowledge and all explanation. It will at once be evident that different identifications of substance, i.e. of what has this fundamental character, will yield different systems of metaphysics.

The Physics and connected works contain discussion and analysis of such concepts as nature, change, chance, time, place, continuity, infinity, growth; proofs that movement is eternal and that there is an eternal Prime Mover; and much doctrine as to the actual constitution and workings of the universe.

The argument for a Prime Mover starts from Aristotle's conception of change and causation. There could not be an absolutely first (or last) change. For since change implies pre-existing matter (or potentiality) and a pre-existing efficient cause to impose form on the matter (to actualise the potentiality), there must have existed before a supposed first change something capable of being changed and something capable of causing change. But then to explain why these potentialities (for being changed and for causing change) were actualised at a certain time just priori to that time, that is, a change before the supposed first change. Change therefore, or movement, must be eternal ... This Prime Mover, eternal, changeless and containing no element of matter or unrealised potentiality, keeps the heavenly bodies moving and maintains the eternal life of the universe ... He recognized that theories must wait upon facts, and if at any future time they are ascertained, 'then credence must be given to the direct evidence of the senses more than to theories'.

The composite picture which these descriptions yield is not a very clear one. (1) Metaphysics is a comprehensive study of what is fundamental in the order of knowledge, explanation and existence; (2) it is the study of reality as opposed to mere appearance; (3) its subject is, or has been, what transcends experience; (4) it is, or ought to be, a study of the intellectual equipment and limitations of human beings; (5) its method is, or has been, a priori rather than empirical; (6) it proposes a revision of the set of ideas in terms of which we think about the world, a change in our conceptual scheme, a new way of talking.

It is certainly true that most of the great metaphysicians have proposed radically revised pictures of the world, bold, comprehensive and often startling; and that most of them have accorded a central place in the picture to some few key concepts, or to some specially favored type of entities given the title of 'substance'. It is also true that the choice of key concepts and entities, and the resultant picture of the world, have varied greatly from one metaphysician to another. Sometimes even 'substance' has been dethroned, e.g.. in favor of 'process'; and among candidates for the role of substance the choice has been wide. Besides God, the divine substance, who has a place in most systems, Descartes recognized two types of substance, matter and minds; Berkeley one only, minds or spirits; Leibniz a class of entities (monads) each of which, though non-spatial and non-temporal, was somehow a model of our entire universe. Spinoza recognized only one comprehensive substance, God or Nature, infinite and eternal, of which mind and matter were merely two aspects. Kant regarded substance as belonging to the world of our ordinary experience, yet set Reality itself, as totally unknowable, outside that world.


(Source: Western Philosophy and Philosophers Encyclopedia)

The essential problem will all of these is that, as I said, they seek the nature of being in beings. They do not explain the nature of being itself.

Over much of the philosophical world in this century the doctrine of the impossibility of metaphysics became almost an orthodoxy, and the adjective 'metaphysical' a pejorative word. Some of the reasons for this devaluation should now be clear. The conceptual distortions and final incoherence of systems, the abstract myths parading as Reality, the grandiose claims and the conflicting results - these seemed to many the essence of the metaphysical enterprise and sufficient reason for condemning it.

Having the avowed aim of arriving at profound truths about everything, it is sometimes held to result only in obscure nonsense about nothing.

(Stuart Brown, Twentieth Century Philosophers)

The subjects of metaphysics - such as substance, properties, causation and laws - are beyond our experience like the tree, yet we are able to speculate about them. And through reasoning we are able to determine which speculations are likely to be true.

agrote wrote:

The subjects of metaphysics - such as substance, properties, causation and laws - are beyond our experience like the tree, yet we are able to speculate about them. And through reasoning we are able to determine which speculations are likely to be true.

How?

If "ultimate reality" is not something that can be apprehended by the senses, and if it is not subject to deductive knowledge as a priori true, then how can we, through reasoning, determine which metaphysical speculations are true?

We have no criterion of truth but are nevertheless guided by the idea of truth as a regulative principle (as Kant or Peirce might have said). Though there are no general criteria by which we can recognize truth (except perhaps tautological truth), there are criteria of progress towards the truth.

agrote wrote:

The subjects of metaphysics - such as substance, properties, causation and laws - are beyond our experience like the tree, yet we are able to speculate about them. And through reasoning we are able to determine which speculations are likely to be true.

How?

If "ultimate reality" is not something that can be apprehended by the senses, and if it is not subject to deductive knowledge as a priori true, then how can we, through reasoning, determine which metaphysical speculations are true?

What makes you think "ultimate reality" is not subject to deductive knowledge as a priori true?

Here is a partial answer from the lectures of Karl Popper:

Quote:

We have no criterion of truth but are nevertheless guided by the idea of truth as a regulative principle (as Kant or Peirce might have said). Though there are no general criteria by which we can recognize truth (except perhaps tautological truth), there are criteria of progress towards the truth.

agrote wrote:

What makes you think "ultimate reality" is not subject to deductive knowledge as a priori true?

Because it is logically demonstrable. For instance, mathematical propositions are often considered to be a priori true, because they are true by definition. 2+2=4 is true, given our definitions of "2," "4," "+," and "=." The same cannot be said about "ultimate reality" -- whatever that might be.

wandeljw wrote:

Here is a partial answer from the lectures of Karl Popper:

Quote:

We have no criterion of truth but are nevertheless guided by the idea of truth as a regulative principle (as Kant or Peirce might have said). Though there are no general criteria by which we can recognize truth (except perhaps tautological truth), there are criteria of progress towards the truth.

Well, I think that's rather different from what agrote was talking about. Popper was describing a pragmatic version of truth -- the notion that, if we can't get to the "truth," we can certainly get close enough to suit our purposes. But we still have to rely on either empirical data or logical deductions to bring us to that level of confidence. Those aren't available to us when we search for metaphysical truths, which means that Popper's "close enough" level of truth is not really an option.

In the realm of facts, we do not merely criticize our theories, we criticize them by an appeal to experimental and observational experience. It is a serious mistake, however, to believe that we can appeal to anything like an authority of experience, though philosophers, particularly empiricist philosophers, have depicted sense perception, and especially sight, as a source of knowledge which furnishes us with definite 'data' out of which our experience is composed. I believe that this picture is totally mistaken. For even our experimental and observation experience does not consist of 'data'. Rather, it consists of a web of guess - of conjectures, expectations, hypotheses, with which there are interwoven accepted, traditional, scientific, and unscientific, lore and prejudice. There simply is no such thing as pure experimental and observational experience - experience untainted by expectation and theory. There are no pure 'data' no empirically given 'sources of knowledge' to which we can appeal, in our criticism.

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'Intuitionism' is the name of a philosophical school which teaches that we have some faculty or capacity of intellectual intuition allowing us to 'see' the truth; so that what we have seen to be true must indeed be true. It is thus a theory of some authoritative source of knowledge. Anti-intuitionists have usually denied the existence of this source of knowledge while asserting as a rule, the existence of some other source such as sense-perception. My view is that both parties are mistaken, for two reasons. First, I assert that there exists something like an intellectual intuition which makes us feel, most convincingly, that we see the truth (a point denied by the opponents of intuitionism). Secondly, I assert that this intellectual intuition, though in a way indispensable, often leads us astray in the most dangerous manner. Thus we do not, in general, see the truth when we are most convinced that we see it; and we have to learn, through mistakes, to distrust these intuitions.

What, then, are we to trust? What are we to accept? The answer is: whatever we accept we should trust only tentatively, always remembering that we are in possession, at best, of partial truth (or rightness) and that we are bound to make at least some mistake or misjudgment somewhere - not only with respect to facts but also with respect to the adopted standards; secondly, we should trust (even tentatively) our intuition only if it has been arrived at as the result of many attempts to use our imagination; of many mistakes, of many tests, of many doubts, and of searching criticism.

Popper actually was defending metaphysics when he said this. Popper characterized many of his contemporaries (Carnap, Wittgenstein, etc.) as "anti-metaphysicians". I will try to find a link for the entire lecture, joe.

Curiously, Popper also said that scientific theories rely (in part) on metaphysics.

In the realm of facts, we do not merely criticize our theories, we criticize them by an appeal to experimental and observational experience. It is a serious mistake, however, to believe that we can appeal to anything like an authority of experience, though philosophers, particularly empiricist philosophers, have depicted sense perception, and especially sight, as a source of knowledge which furnishes us with definite 'data' out of which our experience is composed. I believe that this picture is totally mistaken. For even our experimental and observation experience does not consist of 'data'. Rather, it consists of a web of guess - of conjectures, expectations, hypotheses, with which there are interwoven accepted, traditional, scientific, and unscientific, lore and prejudice. There simply is no such thing as pure experimental and observational experience - experience untainted by expectation and theory. There are no pure 'data' no empirically given 'sources of knowledge' to which we can appeal, in our criticism.

First, I assert that there exists something like an intellectual intuition which makes us feel, most convincingly, that we see the truth (a point denied by the opponents of intuitionism). Secondly, I assert that this intellectual intuition, though in a way indispensable, often leads us astray in the most dangerous manner. Thus we do not, in general, see the truth when we are most convinced that we see it; and we have to learn, through mistakes, to distrust these intuitions.

What, then, are we to trust? What are we to accept? The answer is: whatever we accept we should trust only tentatively, always remembering that we are in possession, at best, of partial truth (or rightness) and that we are bound to make at least some mistake or misjudgment somewhere - not only with respect to facts but also with respect to the adopted standards; secondly, we should trust (even tentatively) our intuition only if it has been arrived at as the result of many attempts to use our imagination; of many mistakes, of many tests, of many doubts, and of searching criticism.