Too crazy to be executed?

"Mental illness is a fluid concept that could mean any­thing from being somewhat under par mentally through stark raving mad," says Georgetown Universi­ty law professor Paul Rothstein. "This case should help clarify where on the spectrum it becomes constitutionally impermissible to execute and what kind of mental illness will render a defendant unexecutable." (emphasis added)

Georgetown's Rothstein hopes the court sides with Panetti, although he concedes that such an outcome could lead to further complications.

It's cases like this that highlight the gruesome absurdities of the death penalty. Why should anyone care, after all, if the prisoner can understand why he is going to be put to death? If the goal of capital punishment is deterrence, then we need only worry about the effect of the execution on others, not on the prisoner. On the other hand, if the goal is retribution, then why not be satisfied with the prisoner's death? Why is it necessary that he also understand his punishment?

Must we presume that the goal is either/or?

Here and in the UK it around being unable to comprehend the nature of the act you are performing.

Of course, determining that is a complex bloody decision....we have had a lot of controversy around one such here recently, but normally it doesn't seem to raise too much drama, as people generally have to be floridly psychotic to qualify.

If he doesn't appreciate the potential consequences, how does he know how vigorously to prepare/pursue his defence?

It's cases like this that highlight the gruesome absurdities of the death penalty. Why should anyone care, after all, if the prisoner can understand why he is going to be put to death? If the goal of capital punishment is deterrence, then we need only worry about the effect of the execution on others, not on the prisoner. On the other hand, if the goal is retribution, then why not be satisfied with the prisoner's death? Why is it necessary that he also understand his punishment?

In light of these deficiencies, our death penalty jurisprudence provides two reasons consistent with the legislative consensus that the mentally retarded should be categorically excluded from execution. First, there is a serious question as to whether either justification that we have recognized as a basis for the death penalty applies to mentally retarded offenders. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183 (1976), identified "retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders" as the social purposes served by the death penalty. Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded person "measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it `is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment." Enmund, 458 U. S., at 798.

With respect to retribution--the interest in seeing that the offender gets his "just deserts"--the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender. Since Gregg, our jurisprudence has consistently confined the imposition of the death penalty to a narrow category of the most serious crimes. For example, in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980), we set aside a death sentence because the petitioner's crimes did not reflect "a consciousness materially more `depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder." Id., at 433. If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. Thus, pursuant to our narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to death, an exclusion for the mentally retarded is appropriate.

With respect to deterrence--the interest in preventing capital crimes by prospective offenders--"it seems likely that `capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation,' " Enmund, 458 U. S., at 799. Exempting the mentally retarded from that punishment will not affect the "cold calculus that precedes the decision" of other potential murderers. Gregg, 428 U. S., at 186. Indeed, that sort of calculus is at the opposite end of the spectrum from behavior of mentally retarded offenders. The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct. Yet it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these defendants less morally culpable--for example, the diminished ability to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses--that also make it less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information. Nor will exempting the mentally retarded from execution lessen the deterrent effect of the death penalty with respect to offenders who are not mentally retarded. Such individuals are unprotected by the exemption and will continue to face the threat of execution. Thus, executing the mentally retarded will not measurably further the goal of deterrence.

The reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders provides a second justification for a categorical rule making such offenders ineligible for the death penalty. The risk "that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty," Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 605 (1978), is enhanced, not only by the possibility of false confessions,25 but also by the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes. As Penry demonstrated, moreover, reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury. 492 U. S., at 323-325. Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.

Retribution is premised on the concept of "just deserts." This follows a subjective standard based on the convicted offender's point of view. Punishment as retribution is the suffering, pain, or loss that the offender is forced to endure because of his crime. Accordingly, the offender must be aware that the suffering society intends to inflict upon him is because of his crime. Otherwise, punishment as retribution makes no sense.

You appear to be applying an objective standard from a societal point of view. So long as society gets its "pound of flesh," what difference does it make if the offender understands why he is being put to death? The "pound of flesh" concept serves a different goal than the "just deserts" concept. The "pound of flesh" concept is punishment as vengence against the offender--not retribution.

But what is it about the retributive and deterrent aspects of capital punishment that require the prisoner to understand them? Why this emphasis on making the prisoner understand the nature of his punishment?

Oh, and as for Atkins v. Virginia, we're not talking about someone who was mentally ill at the time he committed his crimes and who, therefore, did not fully appreciate the criminality of his actions. As I understand the Panetti case, the defense is arguing only that Panetti is mentally ill now, and that fact alone (disregarding any evidence that he was insane at the time of the murders) exempts him from the death penalty.

I agree the insanity at the time of execution should be irrelevant.