Lash wrote:If the EU foreign minister declares European opposition to a future war by America, the political costs of siding with the United States could be huge for a British prime minister. Even during the buildup to the Iraq war, Blair came close to losing his job by balking at the European consensus.
If Blair came close to losing his job through his obedience to the US line, it had preciously little to do with Chirac or the EU - and a whole deal more with the simple fact that the war he was supporting came to be tremendously impopular among his own British electorate and Labour Party. That simple.
Quote:Such foreign policy intransigence could possibly lead to marginalization within the European Union, with all the costs that could entail.
Look at the example of Poland. The Poles' decision not only to support the United States but to send troops and now peacekeepers to Iraq has clearly rankled the French and German governments. The Polish invitation to the Germans to join them in Iraq under the auspices of NATO was brusquely rejected. [..] There have been hints that the EU major powers may try to make sure that Poland bears a cost for being a "bad" European.
"May try", may try .. but I've seen no evidence of any concrete way Poland
has indeed suffered for its foreign policy choices on Iraq -
has indeed in any way been marginalised. In fact, Poland's actually credited with negotiating a better deal out of its accession process than its neighbouring new member states - which should come as no surprise considering Poland's population size-based weight in the new EU. It will be one of the bigger players.
Now Poland's stance may have "rankled" this or that national government, for sure - and why shouldn't it, that's no different from how German intransigence on the issue has in turn "rankled" the American government, after all. Every government has its right to feel "rankled" about whatever. But noone was forced to "toe" anyone's line, as you originally stated in
the posts you're continuing on in this thread. That Germany itself refused to
join Poland in its sending of troops to Iraq can hardly count as evidence that Germany made Poland toe
its line - at most it shows that it itself refused to toe America's line (or Poland's, if you wish) on the matter.
Quote:The same can be said even for Britain, Spain, and Italy. Could these European states outvote the Franco-German axis in a new, enlarged Europe? It's possible, but unlikely. The center of gravity in the European Union will always be the Paris-Berlin axis, together with the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg).
If anything (alas), that center of gravity has already lost a significant measure of its dominance with the entry of 10 new member states, and more acceding countries are to come. This will shift the center eastwards, which will make Germany more powerful and France less.
In any case, however understandable it is from an American point of view, it is striking that the article makes so much of the supposed foreign policy diktats of the EU upon its member states. If there is one policy area in which the EU has thus far been underdeveloped, it's that of a co-ordinated foreign policy. Even just appointing a kind of EU minister of foreign affairs (sorry, "High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy" - thats Javier Solana, former NATO chief) was something that could be realised only a few years ago, and if there's one EU functionary's position thats vigilantly delineated by the Member States in terms of primacy, its his.
Not that I personally wouldnt
want a stronger EU foreign policy, mind you - and Bush Jr's reelection happily makes it all the more likely. But it's an odd focus to choose, since foreign policy has basically been the weakest link in EU development thus far - as the total dividedness of the EU states in the Iraq crisis underlined once more.
A philosophical question is whether, if and when a common EU foreign policy does shape up, there is anything scandalous left about, say, Prodi's sucessor's pressure on a Member State to conform to it. I wholeheartedly agreed with you, Lash, that Chirac's remarks about the East European countries' support to the US in the Iraq crisis were scandalous. It was none of his business, none of his say, and he was being grotesquely rude and condescending. But Prodi/Barroso's position was/would be a different matter. It is not up to any large member state to prescribe to the smaller ones what to do. But if and when the EU Member States collectively
do agree on a common line (and thus far, unanimity was required), the European Commission (with its members appointed from all Member States)
does imho have a 'normal' right to apply some pressure to dissenting states - just like it should be allowed to pressure individual Member States who don't stick to the agreed upon budget deficit rules, say.
What Chirac did, telling Poland c.s. that they had missed a good chance to shut up (or what was it), was scandalous imho, but then again it was no different from the pressure the US was applying to
its allies, for example in Latin America, at the time, with Rumsfeld warning unspecified waverers about the "consequences" that would naturally follow their choice. Both of that falls in the category big-state-bullying. But suppose that the EU Member States
do all agree to further empower a budding common foreign policy , then yes, of course that means that they then henceforth wont be able anymore to dissent at will. Its their choice.
