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Sun 22 Oct, 2006 07:12 am
"We think this has never really been about contraception, we think it was to target the church and open the door for coverage of abortion," said Dennis Poust, spokesman for the Catholic conference.
Catholic and other religious social service groups must provide contraceptive coverage through their workplace-sponsored medical insurance programs even if they consider contraception a sin, according to Thursday's ruling by New York state's highest court.
The 6-0 decision by the state Court of Appeals hinged on defining Catholic Charities and the other nine religious groups suing the state to be social service agencies, rather than only operating as churches.
The organizations "believe contraception to be sinful," the decision states. "We must weigh against (their) interests in adhering to the tenets of their faith the state's substantial interest in fostering equality between the sexes, and in providing women with better health care."
The New York Catholic Conference is considering an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. "We think this has never really been about contraception, we think it was to target the church and open the door for coverage of abortion," said Dennis Poust, spokesman for the Catholic conference.
"Today's ruling shows that no one is above the law, including the Catholic bishops," said Kelli Conlin, president of NARAL Pro-Choice New York, part of the national abortion rights organization. "No employer should be able to force their beliefs upon their employees, especially given that 97 percent of Catholics report using birth control."
here
That a religious group can be considered a "social service agency" seems pretty ridiculous all by itself.
Well I am new here and so I say hello to all of you.
The case which immediately comes to my mind, without the benefit of any additional research, is the U.S. Supreme Court case of Employment Division vs. Smith 494 U.S. 872. It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of "statues that are to be used [*878] for worship purposes," or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.......
They assert, in other words, that "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires). It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for example, as "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" by those citizens who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to regard the same tax as "abridging the freedom . . . of the press" of [**1600] those publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in business. HN3
It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.......... Subsequent decisions have consistently held that HN6the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, supra, at 595 (collecting cases).
I know this can prose can be construed as a lot to read and perhaps dense, dull, and boring and so I will just summarize the main point, the legal holding/rule, to be extrapolated. If the law is neutral and of general applicability, then it is constitutional although it may burden a "religious" exercise, i.e. in this case the exercise of not dispensing contraceptive as a result of religious belief (known as abstention as a result of religious belief).
Or as the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS from here forward) said in the case of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 , " In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, supra.
The Lukumi Babalu decision expounded upon "neutrality," in the context of Employment Division vs. Smith, by stating, "At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607, 6 L. Ed. 2d 563, 81 S. Ct. 1144 (1961) (plurality opinion); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. at 69-70. Indeed, it was "historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703, 90 L. Ed. 2d 735, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C. J.). See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States ยงยง 991-992 (abridged ed. 1833) (reprint 1987); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 467 (1868) (reprint 1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 81 S. Ct. 1101, and n.2 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179, 87 L. Ed. 1324, 63 S. Ct. 877 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in result); [*533] Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 33 L. Ed. 637, 10 S. Ct. 299 (1890). These principles, though not often at issue in our Free Exercise Clause cases, have played a role in some. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 55 L. Ed. 2d 593, 98 S. Ct. 1322 (1978), for example, we invalidated a state law that disqualified members of the clergy from holding certain public offices, because it "impose[d] special disabilities on the basis of . . . religious status," Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. On the same principle, in [**2227] Fowler v. Rhode Island, supra, we found that a municipal ordinance was applied in an unconstitutional manner when interpreted to prohibit preaching in a public park by a Jehovah's Witness but to permit preaching during the course of a Catholic mass or Protestant church service. See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-273, 95 L. Ed. 267, 71 S. Ct. 325 (1951). Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 72 L. Ed. 2d 33, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982) (state statute that treated some religious denominations more favorably than others violated the Establishment Clause).
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[***LEdHR9B] [9B]LEdHR(9B) [***LEdHR11] [11]LEdHR(11) [***LEdHR12A] [12A]LEdHR(12A) [***LEdHR13] [13]LEdHR(13) [***LEdHR14] [14]LEdHR(14)HN5Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, McDaniel v. Paty, supra, at 626 (plurality opinion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 303-304, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, see Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, supra, at 878-879; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. There are, of course, many ways of demonstrating that the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct. To determine the object of a law, we must begin with its text, for the minimum requirement of [***491] neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language or context. Petitioners contend that three of the ordinances fail this test of facial neutrality because they use the words [*534] "sacrifice" and "ritual," words with strong religious connotations. Brief for Petitioners 16-17. We agree that these words are consistent with the claim of facial discrimination, but the argument is not conclusive. The words "sacrifice" and "ritual" have a religious origin, but current use admits also of secular meanings. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1961, 1996 (1971). See also 12 Encyclopedia of Religion, at 556 ("The word sacrifice ultimately became very much a secular term in common usage"). The ordinances, furthermore, define "sacrifice" in secular terms, without referring to religious practices.
[***LEdHR15A] [15A]LEdHR(15A)We reject the contention advanced by the city, see Brief for Respondent 15, that our inquiry must end with the text of the laws at issue. HN6Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause "forbids subtle departures from neutrality," Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452, 28 L. Ed. 2d 168, 91 S. Ct. 828 (1971), and "covert suppression of particular religious beliefs," Bowen v. Roy, supra, at 703 (opinion of Burger, C. J.). Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt. "The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697, 90 S. Ct. 1409 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
I have not read the statute specifically but assuming it is neutral as defined by these decisions above in Lukumi (makes no religious references in the text of the statute) and was not passed to burden religious practices/beliefs, and is of general applicability, then the state of New York has does not have to justify its conduct under the very demanding strict scrutiny standard. In other words, the state of New York can probably win this case on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
After reading the article I wonder if the U.S. Supreme Court will even decide the case. The issue seems to be one of an interpretation of "state law." Whether or not these organizations qualify under the state statute as "an institution with a mainly religious mission that primarily serves followers of the religion" seems to be the issue in the case. Ordinarily, the U.S. Supreme Court will not construe or interpret state law or once the state law has been interpreted by the proper authorities of the state will not deny, negate, or refute such an interpretation. Hence, whether or not the organization needs to be exempted may no so much be a federal issue as much as a matter of an interpretation of state law, depending on how the appellant frames the issue in their briefs, assuming writ of certiori is granted.
Furthermore, the doctrine of "exemption" from a neutral and generally applicable standard has been treated disparingly thanks to Scalia in Employment Division vs. Smith.
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