Re: There are no objective moral truths.
joefromchicago wrote:No doubt books have been written around the argument that there is no such thing as morality, but I doubt that they've been written from your perspective.
The particular book I mentioned makes a similar argument to the one I intend to make.
Quote:And what sort of dissertation is 7,500 words? Sounds more like a senior thesis than any kind of post-graduate dissertation.
It's not a post-graduate dissertation. It's a third-year undergraduate dissertation - possibly similar to what would be called a 'senior thesis' in America?
Quote:agrote wrote:I don't know very much about Platonic forms. Please explain what you are saying.
You plan on writing a "dissertation" on a philosophic topic and you don't know what Platonic forms are? Excuse my mild astonishment here, but what exactly are they teaching you at your school?
I'm doing a joint-honours course with Psychology, so only half of my course has been Philosophy classes. And I just haven't selected any modules that mention Platonic forms, or anything else to do with Plato, so I've never been taught anything about him. I think I've heard of Platonic forms from a couple of introductory books, but that's all.
Quote:Now, from what I can gather here (and correct me if I am mistaken), you seem to think that the two statements ["this table is brown" and "killing is wrong" do assert the same kind of fact, i.e. that there are "moral facts" that are ascertainable in the same way that the color of a desk is ascertainable. I think that's impossible, and that you're setting up a strawman argument if you think that other people make take that position. But I'm willing to be convinced otherwise.
I didn't say anything about "killing is wrong" implying that
the wrongness of killing is a fact that can be percieved through the senses. Some people do talk of conscience being a 'sense' of right and wrong, but that isn't something that I have mentioned so far.
You imply that there are different kinds of facts. What are these different kinds of facts? Do you just mean facts that we can percieve, and facts that we can't percieve?
I am not arguing that saying "killing is wrong" implies that we can percieve some fact that killing is wrong. I am arguing that it implies that there
is some fact that killing is wrong (just as there is some fact that "philosophy is an academic subject") - some fact that exists whether or not we percieve in it or believe in it.
For example, a Christian might believe that "God says that it is wrong to kill, and therefore it is wrong even for an atheist to kill" or something like that. They seem to be making an assertion that "it is factually true that it is objectively wrong to kill". It looks to me like such people believe in moral facts, or hold beliefs that imply the existence of moral facts. Such people are not made of straw.
Quote:If by "moral facts" you mean a statement based on a deductive argument, like "killing is wrong, then I think you're right -- there are such "moral facts." But if that's the case, then you're going to have to make a much more convincing argument than simply saying "there are no such facts," since, as I pointed out above, such an argument would also suggest that there are no deductive facts at all. And I'm not sure if you're willing to sacrifice the truth of "2 plus 2 equals 4" so that you can eliminate the truth of "killing is wrong."
You're right that I don't want to reject all deductive facts. And I know that a more convincing argument is required. I'll have to come back to this point.
Quote:agrote wrote:Lots of people believe in moral facts, or they at least use language which implies that there are moral facts. So my argument that there are no moral facts is not a case of strawman bashing.
People believe a lot of silly things.
So you admit that lots of people do believe in moral facts, then. So you no longer think I am strawman bashing?
Quote:Why people believe those things, however, is a matter for psychologists, not philosophers.
I'm not asking why people believe in moral facts. I'm just saying that they do, and that the believe is incorrect. And I am a Psychologist (sort of). AND plenty of philosophers have adressed questions of why people believe what they do, such as Hume in his
Treatise of Human Nature, and Dennet in
Darwin's Dangerous Idea, who actually adresses the question of how morality may have evolved.
Quote: If, then, you think that "moral facts" are perceptible in the same way that the color of a desk is perceptible, then one is entitled to ask whether you espousing something like Platonic forms.
Okay. I don't think I am espousing something like Platonic forms. See above.
Quote:agrote wrote:If a behaviour is neither right nor wrong, what is it? Can't I use the word "okay"? I don't think that "it is okay to do x" is the same as "it is right to do x".
If a behavior is neither right nor wrong, then it is morally indifferent. A morally indifferent act would be just as ok to do as not to do, so saying that it is ok to do something that is morally indifferent is telling us nothing that we did not already know. You can still say it, but I don't understand why you'd bother.
Okay, I'm happy to use the term "morally indifferent" if it makes things clearer.