How should the EU be governed? Eur Council vs Eur Commission

At least those people who don't/didn't die in another war between European nations.

olk

Just thinking about it:

I've heard of EURO-sceptics, but you (and some more British) are the only persons I know, being EU-sceptics.

oak, Seems like you and I are in the same camp; can't seem to see the benefits vs the disadvantages. c.i.

c.i.

Since you are American, that's quite understandable.

The EU is a common market in which goods, services, labour and capital can circulate freely.
Since Jan. 1st 1993 there are no more restrictions to the circulation of goods, services, money, workers and tourists within the Union.

Just a few points, which seem in my eyes and those of continental Europeans to be a great advantage compared to the times before.

Walter, All well and good. There needs to be 'some' benefits for the participants. As a American, I'm able to travel to most countries in this world without a visa. The American dollar is exchanged freely in most countries. Many come to our country to work, and our citizens go to many parts of this world to work. Just a few points, my friend. c.i.

Walter, I understand the intended MO for the European Union. It's all very laudable, but Chaos in Waiting I feel. The reasons I've already laid out.
Brits as Euro Sceptics. As you realise, I'm sure, a great many Brits travel to Europe on business and on holiday. The reason being it's an adventure, something different or new. We see and meet people who live in a culture unlike our own. I've always enjoyed crossing the English Channel and have had great holidays.
Yes geographicaly we are European, the mainland is only 20 or so miles away. For all of that, Britain's culture, society, life style is very different from Scandanavia, Germany, France, Italy and so on. Our culture is much closer to North America than Euroland. We tend to look west rather than north, east or south.
Given the choice Walter, I'd rather be American than European Union.

Owi --- your comment about war in europe. yes we've recently had the Balkans up in arms but they've been at each others throats for hundreds of years.
As far as I know, nobody is planning an invasion of the UK.
I was thinking more along the lines of everyday life. Work, tax, family, shopping, entertainment and so on. How is that improved.
There was a European rule introduced a few years ago saying people should not be allowed to work more than 48 hours a week. Well I for one am quite capable of deciding for myself how many hours I'll work. Before I retired my working day was never less than 10 hours, that's my choice.

PREAMBLE
'K, i marked other, and offered no explanation (a habit left over from filling in far too many forms in my life, and taking the line that they'll get no more out of me than is absolutely necessary for me to get what iwant). So I will take the plunge.

Above all other considerations, Europe should not play the games of monarchy and oligarchy, and rely upon contentions about precedence, customary usage and natural law. Europe will never get this pudding to gel without a written constitution, ratified by each participating member. Referenda held to date could form the basis of such a constitution, but without an acknowledged supreme basis for law, written clearly and ratified universally, the potential for mischief would remain too great to admit of anything but a weak confederation; weakened by childish fears of the member nations, and eternally subject to enervation through the venality, cupidity or simple pig-headedness of any given member or cabal. So now i will flog you all with what i would offer as the heads of discussion for the writing of such a constitution. Who started this thread? Whoever, you asked for it.

On a totally wry not, given that i'm an atheist as most who know me are aware--so don't fear that i've gone all religious on you, i'm just indulging my penchant for irony and inappropriate humor. Bishop Burnet wrote to a friend once, in speaking of Charles Stuart, Charles II of England (don't protest, our British Friends, this was before the Act of Union, there was no United Kingdom yet), that " . . . the king has a strange notion of God's love. He told me that: 'The only things that God hates are that we be evil and that we design mischief." (Apparently, Burnet believed that God has a much more extensive list of likes and dislikes.) So, i would warn Europe, that in making a union, if they wish to avoid the wrath of God, they should look to it that they do not design mischief, or they will lose Her favor, and may suffer Her retribution.

Hmm, c.i.

We don't need passports or ID-cards at all (well, 'yes' in the UK), can work in all 15 states without any regulation (in the UK too, e.g. many construction work, road work etc is done in Germany by Irish or UK firms), I don't need to change my money (in 12 countries), can thus compare prices without calculation, can buy and sell what I want where I want ...

ARTICLE I, ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY
Europe should have Sovereignty Council, with an equality of representation. The provision of the United States Senate that there be two members was an acutely percipient provision by the framers, and multiple members, even just two, in a State's delegation offers a hedge against majoritarian tyranny in that it is by no means certain that both members of the delegation will vote the same way. I would suggest that, as, for even the foreseeable future, there would be considerably fewer than fifty nations subscribing to such an expedient, three or more members be empanelled from each nation. This would also allow some latitude for member states to make provision for the systems they have in which a faction (a political party--which term has such unsavory connotations in the modern American language, that i revert to the late eighteenth century term) is accorded representation within a parliamentary system based upon having garnered a percentage of the vote at least in excess of what is viewed in that nation as an acceptably small degree (i.e., so small as not to exclude those with a valid claim to represent a legitimate, popular agenda, but not so small as to admit representation of only putative--lunatic fringe, if you will--agendae). To put that more briefly, you can pass out the internal electoral spoils by award of a seat in the Sovereignty Council. Which leads to the other significant aspect of the issue of the selection of representation within such a council--which is the method. The framers of the United States constitution were in fact, dealing with independent sovereign states in the sense of nation states, rather than what those states have become as a result of natural evolution toward greater central control--extraordinary administrative districts with plenary powers of internal sovereignty, subject to centralized juridical modification (federal judges can enjoin or void state legislation, subject, of course to further appeal). But the situation in contemporary Europe is not analogous to the thirteen states of the pre-federal confederation. Contemporary Europe is made up of nation-states of a greater degree of competence of sovereignty than was the case with our original thirteen. Partly this arose from the relative economic and military weakness of the American States of 1783, but it also arose from a consensually-perceived necessity to concert the formation of an effective greater structure with the power of independent survival (the power to tax, to levy imposts, to regulate interstate commerce, to provide for communications and public works which are extraterritorial to the constituent members--which will lead to the next consideration of the nature of a Sovereignty Council, after completing a consideration of the selection method). Given that modern European nations are accustomed, some within the same constitutional context for centuries, to the exercise of the rights of sovereignty in complete independence, and by main force, when the government so constituted alleged the necessity--nothing can be more important that leaving the method of selection of national delegations to the discretion of each participating member.

The perceived necessity in the United States in the 1780's to which i earlier referred resulted in large part from apprehension about the possibility of internal imposts (paying duty to bring Massachusetts' fish into Connecticutt for sale, as an hyothetical example), and the inability of the several states to manage the financial burdens then crushing both the individual internal economies of the states, and the greater, national economy. However, before very long, and definitely by 1785, the concept of issues of sovereignty in which the several states were not competent was the topic os discussion when the state of the Union was considered, and not simply economic considerations. Europe, for whatever dissatisfaction it's populations might feel at the relative degree of their properity, does not face an enormous collective debt, nor suffer from the circulation of nearly worthless scrip, which scrip carries the collective equity resources of a myriad of smallholders--the economic crippling of 1780's American i've mentioned. In view of Europe's relative economic health, she is freed to a more leisurely consideration of issues of Sovereignty, and i feel has avoided what promises to be an annoying wrangle. The justifiable fears of small nations (i.e., those with less population and less "economic muscle" than the French, Germans, Italians, Spanish and British) must be palliated, which is why i would propose a Sovereignty Council for which the representation of national delegation is based upon equality, and is not proportional to population nor economic contribution. However, as soon as any such measure is under serious discussion, whether intended or admitted at the outset, those whose influence is greatest for exactly these reasons--France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Britain--are very likely to maneouvre to preserve that influence. This must not happen. It would make the smaller states into clients of the larger states, and it would, sooner or later, engender potentially destructive resentment.

Therefore, Europe needs a written constitution, and it must honestly and fairly address the issue of sovereignty before all else. The most difficult issue of the nature of the powers of such a Sovereignty Council will be to decide in which matters the several constituent nations are to be considered incompetent. For if it were decided, for example, that the several nations were not competent to independently levy war, then there must be provision made for, not simple mutual defense, but a comprehensive and competent universal military authority within the Union. And this just one of the considerations which arise in the consideration of those areas in which the several nations are not to be considered individually competent, necessitating referral to a Union Council of Sovereignty. I hesitate to examine the varous issues of the powers which would be accorded to such a Council, not simply because of a daunting scope, but because this is one of those areas in which i think it appropriate for any European to say to any foreigner (as am i), that this is not the foreigners business. Such a Council Europe must have, it's powers and it's enforcement authority is no damned business of mine.

(I would like to draw your attention to how exhausting, both mentally and physically, undertaking such a discursus is for me. I beg your patience, and promise to continue what i've started here. For those with any interest, that is, in what i have to write--this is a promise. For those who are annoyed by me, that's a threat, Bubba.)

Walter, In most of my travels, and I'm talking most of the countries in this world, and not limited to 15 states, currency exchange is only necessary for pocket change to buy coffee or small trinkets. Otherwise, I use plastic. No problem. c.i.

That's exactly what I mean c.i.: buying a salad on the market, having a coffee at the local bar, giving a beggar 50 cent - exactly with the same money as at home.
And my "plastic money banc account" shows the same currency as well - without any charges for exchange rates.

CI, I feel that Walter in his quiet, if not crafty way, is trying to seduce us into the New Mega Nest run by a great big buxom State Nanny who keeps singing a nice plate of Brussels helps the medicine go down.

:wink:

I'm beginning to feel that way - too! LOL c.i.

Article II, AN ECONOMIC COUNCIL
When Edward I created Parliament, he was continuing the tradition of his great-grandfather, Henry II, of putting all of the "strings" of the nation into his own hands. Edward had seen his father, Henry III fight "overmighty lords," (Llewellyn the Great, Guy de Monfort, and those who allied with anyone against the son of King John, the man who had warred on the baronage), had seen his father made hostage, and had particpated in one bloody war with Wales, and lead one such war, and then overcome a bloody rebellion of the Scots lead by Wallace, which entailed the invasion of Yorkshire. I believe that his object in the foundation of Parliament was to free himself from the strictures necessarily entailed in relying upon one's own, personal estates for revenue, and a fickle baronage and peerage for the sinews of war in the form of the feudal levy. He was also far too canny to rely upon contributions, whether coerced or not, impressment by receipt, or outright seizure of the resources he wanted; and too canny to effect general discontent by conscription, which would yield green and unreliable troops in any event--he was militarily competent. He was canny enough to see how an alliance of the King with the people throught a concept of the King in Parliament could yield a host of advantages. (For an even more effective use of the alliance of a monarch to "the people," the history of Gustav Vasa's dynasty through his alliance with the "Bonde," the Swedish fourth estate--the peasants--is recommended.) He first issued an edict that all able-bodied freemen must practice at the butts--which is to say, learn and perfect the use of the long-bow, which had been so devasting in the hands of the peasant militia of South Wales. He forbad the sports then popular, including football, and doubtless enjoyed little success in the enforcement, but the edict to send the men to the butts was very popular, and being so canny, he took the lesson, and he wrote it very large indeed.

His vision of the Commons was of a body to which he could apply for tax and impost revenue, "in the free gift" of the Commons (recall that this was still a rather small and select body, in an age of near universal serfdom), a formulation which i doubt the sanguinary and self-willed Edward took very seriously. And he had judged his constituency well: the Commons assembled in their "House," very flattered to be noticed by the King, and usually gave him what he wanted, through a mixture of vanity and an underlying fear of a powerful man of a lengendarily vindictive manner. He made no substantive provision for powers or resonsibilities of the House of Lords, and given his experience of the "overmighty" lords, and of the cupidity of the baronage, he likely was happy to have them sit in their finery and practice chin music--his motto here was basically: "Show me the money!" I will not rehearse the tragi-comic relationship between the Commons and the Lords which eventually resulted in the "emasculation" of the Lords with their "voluntary" surrender of their veto (1911?). I am concerned here with how the concept of taxes and imposts "in the free gift" of the people evolved. For all his canniness, Edward did not forsee the evil (in the estimation of monrachists) which would ensue, or perhaps was so canny, as well as selfish, as not to care. Whatever that case may be, subsequent monarchs, beginning with his grandson, Edward III, were to find themselves, hat in hand, among the Commons to ask for support of their continental efforts. Elsewhere in these fora, I have gone in brief detail into the dreaming of the English monarchy as it continued to try to consolidate it's feudal power while Parliament was making hay in the sunshine of representative governmental power, and don't consider such a rehearsal as germaine here. Rather, suffice it to say that both in the Commons extracting powers and priveleges (and, unwittingly, responsibilities) from needy monrachs, and in the Lords attempting to enhance their posistions of authority by dickering over support to the Commons in these efforts--the temporary flotsam of privelege and right accumulated around the ankles of the Common as they waded into the increasingly familiar mire of politics, with it's ramifications for and from continental diplomacy and militarism. In like kind, municipal corporations extracted charters of rights and priveleges when certain monarchs were "locally embarrassed." I will leave that topic aside, as well, as my drive is toward the consideration of revenue.

The upshot is that the power to initiate money bills came to reside soley in the Commons. In fact, the eventual fall from power of the Lords resulted from the unwise veto of a money bill. Although "in the free gift" of the people was very nearly a lie before 1832, and significantly disingenuous until nearly the end of that century, the concept that revenues can only be raised from the people by their consent was sufficiently ensconced in concepts of British constitutionality that the Americans drifted, actually very rapidly, into rebellion and war on the issue after 1763. The claim of the Americans that they could not be taxed "directly" (direct and indirect taxation as an issue then is a can of remarkably, politically gymnastic worms which we will have to suppress here) without representation, and their rejection of the patently specious claim that they were "virtually" represented in Parliament ought not to have surprised the English--and it did not surprise all of them. Sadly, it surprised, and made indignant, a sufficient number of those with power to have lead to tragic consequences.

Therefore, when the Americans came to write their own constitution, the strongest argument about representation of the "Big" states of Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania was that you cannot take the people's money without their consent, "in Congress assembled." The eventual "Great Compromise" which resulted in the establishment of the House and the Senate is not on topic here. But it is germaine that the House was vested with the sole power to initiate money bills. Majesterial authority in the United States has learned that withholding the disbursement of funds for purposes not supported by that executive is a workable tactic, but more about that later. I am suggesting, and believe i am supporting it with the strong authority of example, that a European Union would need to consider that needing funds to operate, they cannot hope to sustain themselves into an indefinite future on contribution, and must have a body empowered to levy taxes and imposts. I am further suggesting that such a body must have proportional representation on the basis, if of no other, that you cannot take the people's money without their consent, nor spend it in ways they will not tolerate. I would think it obvious, therefore, that the only way to obviate such a question of the people's money, would be for a proportionately represented body to be given the power to initiate, and decide upon the disbursement of, bills of revenue. What further powers they would possess, or in what matters of sovereignty their consultation and approval must be sought by a Sovereignty Council, would be one of the issues i've identified as being none of my business. But that such a--let us call it a Fiscal Council--must exist, i do not doubt.

In the United States, the dynamic of what all Americans know as "checks and balances," has lead executive authority to sidestep efforts of the legislative or defy restrictions by the legislative, through the disbursement of funds, or the refusal to do so. This leads to what was the throniest issue for our convention, and the issue most likely to "shipwreck" such a Union--and that is the issue of the Executive.

And i need to take a break again.

Set, I hadn't thought about that aspect of the United States of Europe. It brings in a whole new dynamics that must be resolved that seems at this point as unsolvable. It'll be interesting to watch. Taxation without representation; the Boston Tea Party, and the New Europe World War. c.i.

ARTICLE III, AN EXECUTIVE
Although, of course, all of our musings here qualify as exercises in speculations, and as such are free to roam to other lands, and examine whatever various ideas appeal to us--I would consider it inappropriate for a European to do more than comment upon the outline, but neither the forms nor the detail of, fundamental constitutional questions in North America. Certainly we all have opinions, and the right to express them. I consider in such a discussion as this, however, that the only relevant offering I can tender is to note that I chose "other" from the options listed, to explain why, and then offer what I believe to be observations which speak to the topic by listing those issues which are irreducible and inevitably confront Europe if it seeks to do more than maintain what it currently has--and which I see as little more than a glorified customs Union. I don't say this to disparage the direction of European political development. I see the establishment of a strong Union as having everything to give Europeans, and, if managed with consideration and mutual candor, offering few serious pitfalls. I also feel, however, that given the establishment of the Euro, and its success as a unifying currency, coupled with the admission of new members and the tradition of referenda, that Europe is embarked on a path from which the greatest danger to be apprehended is the abandonment of the effort. In reading history, it sometimes seems that events and processes are inevitable. I only believe this to the extent that certain conditions are arrived at--so, for example, Napoleon's invasion of Russia was inevitable, but only given that he was locked in economic warfare with Britain, that it depended upon the enforcement of the continental system, and the Russians were openly flouting the authority of his continental system. Not to have invaded Russia then would have meant the unraveling of his control, and the final condition for inevitability was met in Napoleon's character--his response to challenge was always to strike out. Europe now has in place most of the conditions which at least make closer Union desirable, if not actually necessary and inevitable. Abandonment is unthinkable, but by the same token, allowing the situation to languish in its present state would also have dire consequences for Europe--and most especially for the former Warsaw Pact nations, who have correctly identified this process and their participation therein as their main chance. Not to move forward risks leaving in place the current European Parliament, a largely powerless body, which makes no substantive decisions regarding finance, and no decisions whatsoever regarding sovereignty. This is why I have made my previous two posts regarding these two topics. I don't consider the present Parliament to be an effective body, and I consider it to be sufficiently contrived as an organization, and powerless as a body of governance, as to need replacement altogether. This may well be stepping on European toes as well, but this is a case in which I do consider that it is appropriate to point out what I consider "home truths," and that North America has a crucial stake in the success of European unity. As stated before, it would be arrogance for anyone from North America to think to dictate what detail must be embodied in a European constitution. There is no reason, however, not to point out what the consequences will be if better unity and centralization of authority is not achieved , and to suggest the broad outlines of what sorts of organization can be beneficial. That I would base such an outline on my reading of the parliamentary history of England, and the congressional history of the United States is not simply natural, it refers to the only two nations with long-standing, continuous constitutional history to which one can refer.

Therefore, having outlined necessary institutions to deal with questions of sovereignty and finance, the final consideration is magisterial authority. To those who would object that I am omitting the judicial, I would point out that this is the one area in European history where sufficient commonality of experience and tradition exist so as not to require much or any tinkering. A superior European appeals court would fill the bill nicely, and would not actually be a process of foundation which would do violence to the sensitivities and legitimate requirements of the constituent nations.

The executive, however, is a much more difficult issue, and one which I believe Europe has studiously avoided--it will deal the final death blow to local autonomy, at such time as any form of executive power is inaugurated. Beyond noting my belief that this will be a necessity for an effective Union to function, there is little to say on the topic actually, because it will provide the nastiest fight in the entire process, and not one in which outsiders should have any say, nor possess sufficient knowledge of the people and their representatives to make valuable contributions. I would only except from this some observations on effective executive structures. The most important is plurality. A European council writ large will not do, because an effective executive needs a hierarchical structure which would be hamstrung by too many chains of authority. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge just how much history, and the resultant suspicions and jealousies will make such a process very difficult, indeed. I think it unlikely, for the present at least, that a consensus could be reached on who to choose a single individual as the chief executive, with all the concomitant powers, especially of appointments of the apparatus of executive management. Surely, to have a single magistrate, and to appoint that magistrates officers and advisors without reference to the individual's preferences, is to invite disaster. One could potentially paralyze the institution, and such a tactic could be used (and historically has been used, such as in the composition of Andrew Jackson's first cabinet, chosen by Henry Clay, working from his personal agenda) for exactly that purpose. Additionally, and executive required to accept externally appointed officers and advisors might well have reference to the expedient Jackson used, a "kitchen cabinet," of officers and advisors answerable to no one in government. From this, I consider it necessary that the executive, whether plural or singular, will require the power of appointment, with the right of refusal reasonably embodied in the powers of a consultative body, such as one appointed or elected within the constituent nations, or as an adjunct power of a Sovereignty Council. As noted, the concerns and suspicions of the constituent nations make the establishment of an effective executive embodied in a single individual unlikely. But a plural executive cannot be effective if extended very far, because of the diffusion of the decision making responsibility, and the enervation of executive power in any case in which consensus is not readily achieved. A plural executive implies at least two office holders; the Roman example of the consulate is not necessarily a bad one, for whatever one might adduce from the corruption inherent in the senatorial class and its constant effort at self-aggrandizement at the expense of the people. The failure to sincerely and honestly implement a practice indicts those individuals for failure, not the concept. The best objection to a dual executive is that it can too easily deadlock, and power would flow away from the executive to the legislative of judicial from the need to resolve such conflict. However, a dual executive recommends itself if a means could be found to assure that there were a consonance of agenda between the two office holders. Believing as I do that a single executive would be unpalatable to Europeans as the situation stands today, my recommendation would be for the Russian concept of troika. There are three, an odd number which assures no deadlock vote in the decision making process, and is a small enough number not to dilute the powers which an executive must wield into ineffectiveness. More than three, and there will be little prospect of firm and consistent leadership. With a plural executive, the main caveat remains the necessity for assuring that the executive is not paralyzed from within by competing agendas. As noted at the outset, this will be the most difficult part.

As things stand now, Europe doesn't have to resolve these issues within the near term. But to not form a more effective and centralized government down the roads risks a train wreck with historical vicissitude, nothing of the future being certain but uncertainty.

And at long last, you can have your thread back, I've said all that I can think of which might to the point.

Yes, it does help if you speak in entire sentences, c.i.

In any case, I think your point was already responded to by Walter and me, perhaps that's why I was confused.

The small countries you are talking about already had hardly any control over the valuation of their currency. Such are the dynamics of monetary power. We here in the Netherlands could re-budget all we wanted, but considering the extent to which our economy was intertwined with the German economy, and considering the unequality in proportions there, the fate of "our" Guilder was inextricably tied up with that of the German Mark. If the Mark went up, so did the Guilder. If the Mark went down, so did the Guilder. I am sure the same went for countries like Denmark, Austria, etc.

It's all and fine for a country like Japan to try to shore up their Yen vis-a-vis the US Dollar (or whatever), but the small European countries you're talking of had nothing like the means for the kinds of "market interventions" that would have been needed to force our currency to go a different way from that of our neighbours. So the "control" you describe as having been lost wasn't there in the first place.

On the other hand, in the new situation, all the countries taking part in the Euro-zone are bound, by the agreements they signed, to stick to various rules and limits on their spending patterns. If they spend too much and thus endanger the common currency, they get sanctioned. Of course a whole lot of dealing and wheeling goes on when it comes to determining the exact when and how of those sanctions when that time comes. But at least there are actual rules, that we, as fellow member states, can use, to pressure those states, whose budgetary behaviour determines our economic fate, with. So our ability to influence what the neighbouring economies do to our currency have actually increased with the Euro, it seems to me.

Finally, the example you mention of deflation - yes, I know the figures, thanks for repeating them, but I think our earlier question was about how you argue these are actually tied up with the introduction of the Euro? As Walter has pointed out, there's been deflation before, in pre-Euro times. The suggestion's like, the Euro came, deflation came, ergo, the Euro caused deflation. That's not much of an argument - not every correlation is meaningful, as you know - and is there a correlation here at all? I'm not much of a financial expert, but I remember that just two or three years ago, in the run-up to introducing the Euro, all the hullaballoo was about how its precursor, the ECU, was falling against the dollar, and how the "weak Euro" would endanger the sturdy tradition of the strong German/Dutch/Etc currency.

Your response, nimh, reminds me of the high prices last year.

Everyone here in Germany (and in othe EU-countries as well) called the than new EURO as reason for it.
Just at that time I had been to the UK: there, the reason for exactly the same was the bad weather/the dollar/Europe/Labour Party ... .... .

Besides waht you said about the currency relations in EU and pre-EU (=ECU) times, of course the British Pound is regulated by EU-norms as well - most don't recall this!

The pocket change is the least of the practical advantages Walter is referring to. Take the free circulation of labour he mentions.

My girlfriend is American. She came to live and work here in the Netherlands. To be allowed to, she needed a residency permit. For her to get one, we both had to sign a contract, confirming that we had an exclusive relationship and that we lived together. With the contract, I made myself financially responsible for her for five years. As such, I had to earn at least a certain income and have a steady job contract, otherwise she wouldnt have been allowed in. After filing the application for residency, you have to wait some 6 months for it to be processed. In these months you are not allowed to work yet. The permit needs to be extended every year.

Was that the only way she could get in? No, she could also have tried through a job. An employer would have had to offer her a steady (non-temporary) job contract, beforehand. The employer would also have to credibly prove that for the position in question, no suitable candidate could be found in the countries of the EU.

This is the procedure for an American. If you are from Nigeria, say, things are worse - you might have to wait those 6 months in your own country, for one.

'K. Now, in the "New Europe". A friend of mine's boyfriend is from Spain. He wanted to be with her, here in Holland. What does he need to do in order to be allowed to live here, with or apart from her, doing whatever job he can find?

Buy a plane ticket.

That's one lengthy story to show that the benefits go a tiny bit further than not having to change pocket money for your beer across the border. The same goes for studying in another EU country. Same if you own your business: taking on a job in another country, sending in your best two men but hiring local staff otherwise, all of that - like it's one country. No lengthy customs procedures for your "exports". Actually, it's with the economic questions that the real impact comes in (no more tariffs, etc), but that would take me out of my depth.