fresco wrote:Joe,
I use the word "interested" both as a peace gesture and as a preamble to an invitation to comment on the relationship between "reality" and "truth".
"Reality" is "true" to the extent that it conforms to our accepted notions of "reality."
fresco wrote:Polkinghorne's "knowledge" is experiential. He did his Ph.D under Dirac ( a major contributor to QM) The QM position on "locality" is in terms of probability functions. Despite Einstein's chagrin, this is the only "successful" account of the experimental data for the wave properties of matter. Large objects have a probability close to "1" of "being where we think they are" but this is not the case for subatomic objects. Hence the oblique reference to "fuzzy sets"......and non-locality goes even further in that it undermines the very idea of "where" itself .
That's fine, I have no problem with that. But when Polkinghorne says "There is not one single, simple way in which we can know everything; there is no universal epistemology," he appears to be positing at least
one universal epistemology: i.e. that epistemology that permits him to say that there is no universal epistemology. Or, to put it another way, Polkinghorne "knows" that there is no one way of "knowing" anything, yet he certainly seems to be saying that he knows
that.
And that, to my mind, is an obvious (and irresolvable) contradiction.
fresco wrote:Philosophically, the circular question "how do we know what knowledge is" requires an examination of all contexts in which "know" is used. "Experience" is one such context.
No, it doesn't require us to examine all the contexts in which "know" is used. That is, at most, an interesting grammatical or linguistic or even sociological question, but it bears little philosophic weight.