Quote:How so? The ethical merit of an action is often determined by the intention of the agent. For instance, if I hit you over the head with a two-by-four intending to injure you, but instead I cure you of your amnesia, is my action good or bad? I would expect that most people -- including utilitarians -- would judge it to be bad, even though it had beneficial consequences, solely because the motives were bad. When someone is slicing you open with a knife, it makes a morally significant difference whether the blade is wielded by a murderer or a surgeon.
To utilitarians such as Bentham, that would be an immoral action because hitting a person in the head reduced the amount of happiness, because the person felt the pain. His theory does not consider the intention of the person.
Let's say that the attacker's intention was to harm the person because that person had angered him the day before, and let's say that the hit on the head cured the person of an extreme migraine that he would have felt for weeks if the attacker hadn't hit him on the head. From what I gathered from reading Bentham's work, he would say that the action has moral value even though the intention of the attacker is wrong.
I'm not sure how Mill would think of this, but I was showing how consequences of an action is not the only thing that gives an action a moral value, and it would be absurd to think that it is.
Quote:That's merely a practical consideration, not an ethical one. If actions are judged by their reasonably foreseeable consequences, it's not necessary to take into consideration all of the potential long-range consequences.
Yeah, that was leading up to my rejection of pure consequentialism. It was also intended to show how it is impossible and ridiculous to judge the merit of an action purely by its consequences, because you would have to put a limit somewhere.