Different in Degree or Kind?

coberst,

Similarity and difference are just two sides of a coin. To put an extreme and trivial case, any two items like "an elephant" and "my visa card" are similar (they are both objects of my attention) and different (because there are two of them). Poets make a living from "simularity". The terms have no objective basis and are entirely relative to the purpose in hand. One man's "freedom fighter" is merely another man's "terrorist". The classic from philosophy is one generation's separation of "morning star" and "evening star" are both this generations "planet Venus"

The argument about "difference in degree" (the ordinal level of measurement) is contingent on the prior negotation (you use the term manipulation) of a name" (the nominal level of mesurement). The ordinal level subsumes the nominal level. They are not separate distinctive properties although it may be meangless talk about ordination for some concepts. (NB The complete scale runs nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio and statisticians have be careful about making assumptions as to the level of their data when testing for "significant events")

Fresco

Does this mean that the terms 'different in degree' and 'different in kind' have no importance? Does your response indicate that what I said about the terrorist and freedom fighter is vacuous?

They are vacuous out of context. Context is"importance".
(Consider also ....Wittgenstein: "meaning is use".....Capra: "Words are co-ordinators of action") Whether you call a suicide bomber "a terrorist" or " a freedom fighter" is making a statement about the nature of the perceived social context and the appropriate response to such bombers.

Fresco

Thanks. I was doing the same thing Marx talks so much about. Removing the idea from the historical context.

But my experience of phenomena is: "a suicide bomber" or "a freedom fighter"?
That is curious.
Because there are different levels of experience.
I can only see a man with some objects attached to his chest, entering a bus, if I don't know what a bomb is or what a terrorist is.

But in both cases I will be killed by the explosion.

It is obvious that experience is not passive. I experience facts or phenomena within my "circumvision" and those facts have the meaning - they are the meaning - allowed by the conditions of my experience.
A rock is only gold when I give a social meaning to the word gold. Then, I see gold, not a rock.

But facts - or phenomena - sometimes resist to my perception of them. Even if I don't know what a bomb is, I will be killed by it.
Language gives a meaning - but I doubt that a previous meaning condition is not previous to language - but the being of the thing is not necessarily accorded to that language meaning.
As I said, things resist.

Val,

In as much that we are all members of the same species, we could argue we have the same basic hardware for perception. Such hardware will interact with "the world" in a similar manner for all individuals. It is sets of these interactions or the predictions thereof NOT "the world itself" which becomes associated with language.

To take the word "bomb" for example, its meaning usually involves the expectancy of "an explosion" but the term has been used for other "things" like a primitive computer. Therefore it is the entire interactive context, not the word on its own which denotes meaning.

Wiitgenstein points out that much nonsense can occur when "language goes on holiday" i.e. words are abstracted for analysis outside their normal contexts. For example in the question "Do machines think" the word "machine" normally implies (sets up the expectancy of) a non-biological device, but reductionists then might argue that organisms are "machines".

The mind tends toward a symbolic representation of what the senses perceive. In my opinion, abstract thought is such a symbolic representation of apparently fundamental natural laws, which we encounter in our experience of consciousness.

1+1+2 (mathematics) is a good example. The law of conservation of matter and energy does this in real life, so the mind is likely to see this as a abstract law. This representation in the mind is a quality (more of a conception) apart from the object itself. The tricky part is that our mind derives new concepts from more fundamental ideas making their origin hard to determine.

So, abstract ideas are in the natural world around us because real natural laws of existence exist. However, the abstract idea derived is in our minds. (Of course this does have many materialistic -spirituality get away- assumptions about reality, I only posted this to give a plausible explanation for discussion)

Adeist

I have been working on something to post and I thought you might find it interesting. It speaks to this question.

I scan many books in a year's time. I study bits and pieces of scores of books over that time period. At most I will study one book from beginning to end during a twelve-month period. (By the way, I am retired and have time for such things.) There is one book now that I am studying from beginning to end. That is "Philosophy in the Flesh" by Lakoff and Johnson. Lakoff is a linguist and Johnson the head of the philosophy department at the University of Oregon.

The book is an explanation of metaphor theory that I predict will become the first paradigm of cognitive science some day. Most books have less than twenty- percent new material. This book I would guess has more than eighty- percent new stuff. What this means for the reader is that there are many new concepts to understand. In my opinion this book is revolutionary and a must read for anyone interested in the human condition. You can probably find it in the library of your local community library. Go there, get a card, borrow the book, and if you don't give up too soon you will agree with me. (I hope!).

I shall try to explain very briefly the heart of metaphor theory. I cannot give this in a scientific manner because this forum would not allow it and I am not capable of doing so anyway. I shall try to use a library analogy to explain metaphor theory.

Let me take some liberties and ask you to assume the mind to be a library with shelves that are mostly, but not completely, empty at birth.

An infant is born and is held for the first time. A book goes on the shelf and is labeled ?'warmth'. A little later the infant is held by its mother and is fed. Several books go on the shelf next to warmth?-?'hunger-satisfied', ?'affection', ?'warmth', and others.

Now move forward a brief time and something happens to these books. Affection is a different kind of concept than warmth and hunger-satisfied. Affection is an abstract concept. In the beginning these different kinds of experiences are conflated but later in time the abstract subjective concept separates itself from the emotional concepts. A new shelf begins that contains these abstract concepts.

Because of the conflation when affection goes to the new shelf it takes with it much of the contents of the other books. Affection becomes an abstract concept that carries much of the structure contained in warmth. We see this association when it seems perfectly correct to use the metaphor love is a warm cuddley feeling.

What I am trying to say here is that primary experiences, and we have many so qualified, become primary metaphors. A primary experience-become-primary-metaphor is carried forward in futhure experiences to become part of the structure of later experiences.

After a period of time we would have a whole section of the library that might be called ?'primary experiences-become-primary-metaphors'. These books would be destined to become part of the contents of all or many later experiences or abstract concepts. As we go through life the structures of these primary metaphors become integrated within all books in the library. Everything in the library is grounded in these primary metaphors.

Cognitive science, which seems to consist primarily of linguists, philosophers and neural scientists, has in the last three decades compiled much empirical evidence to support this theory. One part of this evidence is contained in the fact that there are many commonly used metaphors used in all languages that are the same. This indicates that we have innately connected some things with some other things. An expample of such metaphors are:
Affection is Warmth
Important is Big
Happy is Up
Intimacy is Closeness
Bad is Stinky
Difficulties are Burdens
More is Up
Categories are Containers
Help is Support
Change is Motion
Purposes are Destinations
Knowing is Seeing
Understanding is Grasping
Seeing is Touching

This theory takes the dichotomy out of mind and body and places mind radically (without compromise) in the body. All of the mystical a priors of Western philosophy are trashed. I may overspeak in some places here due to ignorance. I reserve the right to make some statements inoperative later.

coberst,

This theory seems very logical to me. I will read it when time allows.

Coberst,

This doesn't seem like a very radical concept to me. You're basically saying that we can make associations between abstract concepts that are corellated. I would say that this is obvious.

It seems to me that almost everything I understand is a simple thing. It seems to me that everything I try to understand but am not successful is a difficult thing. I think that many things need to be understood before other things can be understood. I am trying make sure that I share a common pool of knowledge with the reader before I move on to a subject that depends on this knowledge.

Ask the hard question first, and if people need clarification, they will ask. Not many people will have the patience to wade through pages of clarifications before seeing what your point is!

505

They need to know that anyway. Its all free anyway.