Does Philosophy Lead to Nihilism???

no

I'm with steve. No. I don't know where that extract comes from but I have major problems with it and I'm not a philosopher at all.

I support those 'no's'!

I'm not good at philosophy, but I still remember those philosophers like St. Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas, Josef Pieper etc from my philosophy classes at school and at university.

And they were definately pro-religion.

I'm in my usual position here.

I would agree with the quote yardsale puts up.But biology isn't mentioned.I don't know that philosophy can undermine that.I think that the quote is talking about meaning.Philosophy undermines the meanings we give to things but not the things.It couldn't undermine Shakespeare as a book in our hands or the Mona Lisa as a painting on the wall but it can undermine the meanings we give to such things.It undermines our idea that a nature scene is "beautiful" but it can't undermine the scene.
But I wouldn't call all that nihilism, which contains ideas of defeat and resignation.Philosophy doesn't undermine the self preservation instinct or the sex instinct.

I have warned people on this forum a few times that philosophy is not for the faint of heart.It is a tough business.Philosophy classes and philosophy departments are,fundamentally,a waste of time.They would be loath to engage with this quote for practical reasons and thus could be seen to be playing with it for money or status.I started the Cambridge Philosophy Budget Scoffers thread for this very reason and there were no takers.

Philosophy is personal and grows out of engagement with art.It is a long and slow process and,in my eyes,worthwhile for me.But I don't recommend it to people.

Well, it would be easy to go off a dirt road in philosophy and end up at the dead end of nihilism.

Still, I'd go with the 'no's'.

And for once I'm not completely averse to what spendius has to say. (no offence spendius). He has some good points.

flushed-

I think what the title post was getting at is that philosophy inevitably ends in nihilism.There is no question of choosing although one can choose to leave philosophy alone or at least only go on the easy rides.

PS.I never take offence.

spendius,
I understood what it was getting at. Hence, a 'no'.
I just think there is always a grey area. There is a grain of truth to it; and I'd be interested to explore that little grain of substance.

Why is it that philosophy is 'not for sissies' as you said?! What are the dangers of philosophy?

I would say that certain varieties of philosophy e.g. Wittgenstein are nihilistic with respect to many questions philosophers ask. W. points out the limits of language and makes the point that much so-called "philosophy" occurs when "language goes on holiday".

flushed-

I don't know whether fresco agrees that there are dangers in philosophy but if that is the case I would rather any explanation be fresco's and see where that takes us.

"The truth is obscure
Too profound and too pure
And to live it you have to explode."

Bob Dylan.Journey Through Dark Heat.aka Where Are You Tonight?

It would be nice to have an expert give us Wittgenstein nice and easy.

Further clarity to the def., just FYI

"Nihilism" comes from the Latin nihil, or nothing, which means not anything, that which does not exist. Nihilism is the belief that all values are baseless and that nothing can be known or communicated. It is often associated with extreme pessimism and a radical skepticism that condemns existence. A true nihilist would believe in nothing, have no loyalties, and no purpose other than, perhaps, an impulse to destroy. While few philosophers would claim to be nihilists, nihilism is most often associated with Friedrich Nietzsche who argued that its corrosive effects would eventually destroy all moral, religious, and metaphysical convictions and precipitate the greatest crisis in human history. In the 20th century, nihilistic themes--epistemological failure, value destruction, and cosmic purposelessness--have preoccupied artists, social critics, and philosophers. Mid-century, for example, the existentialists helped popularize tenets of nihilism in their attempts to blunt its destructive potential. By the end of the century, existential despair as a response to nihilism gave way to an attitude of indifference, often associated with antifoundationalism.

REF http://www.iep.utm.edu/n/nihilism.htm

Does philosophy lead to nihilism? Well, if it's really good philosophy it does.

I think that is a good point!

For example, blue could actually be gillot, dog could be hujmnu, and god could be your pet hamster.

It is potentially all a matter of linguistics as noted in Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" (the blue book ).

No joke! Reading and discussing Wittgenstein nearly gave me a brain hemorrage.

flushed-

I took one look at it and decided I'd pass on the bh.

Oh-and I didn't like the look of him either.

I don't think the main aspect of Wittgensteins language games is that difficult to understand

Without quoting directly he implies it is impossible to totally identify with a speakers personal semantic field because you would need to have had all that persons life experiences yourself. And when for example traditional philosophers discuss a question like "what does to know mean" we cannot discuss this outside common usage contexts (language games) like "knowing a mutual aquaintance will be late" or "knowing our name". Thus if we try to discuss fabricated philosophy seminar (=holiday) examples like "how do we know somebody else has a pain ?..."the detached conclusions are unlikely to be useful because in "real life" what matters if someone says they are in pain is what happens next, not what "truth" is ! Thus semantics cannot be divorced from its specific communicative contexts.

If this can be said about "knowledge" it can similarly be said about most semantic targets for traditional philosophers such as "belief" "truth" "rights" etc etc.

Perhaps I only scratch the surface of Wittgenstein here but I think it addresses the the question of nihilism.

I don't think the main aspect of Wittgensteins language games is that difficult to understand

Without quoting directly (or claiming any personal expertise) he implies it is impossible to totally identify with a speakers personal semantic field because you would need to have had all that persons life experiences yourself. And when for example traditional philosophers discuss a question like "what does to know mean" we cannot discuss this outside common usage contexts (language games) like "knowing a mutual aquaintance will be late" or "knowing our name". Thus if we try to discuss fabricated philosophy seminar (=holiday) examples like "how do we know somebody else has a pain ?..."the detached conclusions are unlikely to be useful because in "real life" what matters if someone says they are in pain is what happens next, not what "truth" is ! Thus semantics cannot be divorced from its specific communicative contexts.

If this can be said about "knowledge" it can similarly be said about most semantic targets for traditional philosophers such as "belief" "truth" "rights" etc etc.

Perhaps I only scratch the surface of Wittgenstein here but I think it addresses the the question of nihilism.

I don't think the main aspect of Wittgensteins language games is that difficult to understand

Without quoting directly (or claiming any personal expertise) he implies it is impossible to totally identify with a speakers personal semantic field because you would need to have had all that persons life experiences yourself. And when for example traditional philosophers discuss a question like "what does to know mean" we cannot discuss this outside common usage contexts (language games) like "knowing a mutual aquaintance will be late" or "knowing our name". Thus if we try to discuss fabricated philosophy seminar (=holiday) examples like "how do we know somebody else has a pain ?..."the detached conclusions are unlikely to be useful because in "real life" what matters if someone says they are in pain is knowing what to do next, not what "truth" is ! Thus semantics cannot be divorced from its specific communicative contexts.

If this can be said about "knowledge" it can similarly be said about most semantic targets for traditional philosophers such as "belief" "truth" "rights" etc etc.

Perhaps I only scratch the surface of Wittgenstein here but I think it addresses the question of nihilism.

Hmm....the edit facility has gone weird !

Please ignore the first two.