Rove was the source of the Plame leak... so it appears

Lash wrote:

Found it elswhere:

(U) Problems with the Intelligence Community's HUMINT efforts were also evident in the Intelligence Community's handling of Iraq's alleged efforts to acquire uranium from Niger. The Committee does not fault the CIA for exploiting the access enjoyed by the spouse of a CIA employee traveling to Niger. The Committee believes, however, that it is unfortunate, considering the significant resources available to the CIA, that this was the only option available. Given the nature of rapidly evolving global threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons and weapons technology, the Intelligence Community must develop means to quickly respond to fleeting collection opportunities outside the Community's established operating areas. The Committee also found other problems with the Intelligence Community's follow-up on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue, including a half-hearted investigation of the reported storage of uranium in a warehouse in Benin, and a failure, to this day, to call a telephone number, provided by the Navy, of an individual who claimed to have information about Iraq's alleged efforts to acquire uranium from Niger.

It was Wilson who screwed that up. He didn't use the phone number and this issue was one of the things he was given to do.

He didn't want to find it.

This entire section bashes the CIA for using such an idiot and not making sure he did the bare minimum he should have done.

Actually, if you read the report it says that the Navy gave a phone number of a businessman to the CIA, NOT WILSON.

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Lash wrote:

Bush wasn't lying.

The 911 Commission found that--the Butler Report found that. I don't know why people insist on perpetuating that lie.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butler_Inquiry

The committee
Lord Butler of Brockwell headed the five-member committee which included senior parliamentarians and civil servants with military and intelligence links:

The Lord Butler of Brockwell, career civil servant who served five prime ministers as Cabinet Secretary.

Sir John Chilcot, a career diplomat and top civil servant.

Field Marshal The Lord Inge, a crossbencher who was Chief of the Defence Staff from 1994 to 1997.

Ann Taylor, Labour MP who supported the invasion of Iraq, chair of the Commons Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), and former chief whip of the Labour Party.

Michael Mates Conservative MP, chair of the Northern Ireland select committee. He is also a member of the ISC.

The Butler Review followed procedures similar to the Franks Committee inquiry into the Falklands War. The inquiry had access to all intelligence reports and other government papers, and it could call witnesses to give oral evidence. It worked closely with the US inquiry and the Iraq Survey Group. The committee met in secret and only its conclusions were published on 14 July 2004.

Background
The British government followed US President George W. Bush who had created a similar commission one day earlier. Although Tony Blair had always insisted it was not necessary to set up an inquiry, he was forced to do so because of pressure from comments made by former leader of the Iraq Survey Group David Kay, as well as the political fall-out of the Hutton inquiry which was regarded as a whitewash by many.

The Butler Inquiry's remit did not extend to an examination of the political decision making process. Ministers believed that any question of wrongdoing on their part had been dealt with by the Hutton Inquiry which reported on January 28 2004 - Tony Blair said: "The issue of good faith was determined by the Hutton Inquiry". However, the Hutton Inquiry's terms of reference were limited to the circumstances leading to the death of Dr David Kelly. In the course of his investigations Lord Hutton cleared the Government of deliberately inserting false intelligence into their published dossier on Iraqi WMD. The Hutton Report left the wider questions about the Government's propriety in its handling of intelligence unanswered. For instance, questions remain regarding the possibility that the Government and Intelligence Services "cherry-picked" intelligence that tended to support the case for war, and/or that the public presentation of this intelligence was misleading. (See Hutton Report.)

Controversy
The Liberal Democrats opted not to take part, because the role of politicians had been excluded from the Inquiry's remit. (Senior Lib Dem MP Alan Beith was to have been the sixth member of the panel). Explaining their position Foreign Affairs spokesman Sir Menzies Campbell asked the prime minister:

"Don't you understand ... that following the public response to the Hutton report that an inquiry that excludes politicians from scrutiny is unlikely to command public confidence..."

On 1 March 2004 the Conservative Party announced that they would not be taking part in the inquiry either. Conservative leader Michael Howard said that this was because Lord Butler of Brockwell's interpretation of the terms of reference were "unacceptably restrictive". Conservative member Michael Mates stated that he would remain on the committee.

Conclusions of the Review
The review was published on 14 July 2004. Its main conclusion was that key intelligence used to justify the war with Iraq has been shown to be unreliable. It claims that the Secret Intelligence Service did not check its sources well enough and sometimes relied on third hand reports. It criticises the use of the 45 minute claim in the 2002 dossier as "unsubstantiated", and says that there was an over-reliance on Iraqi dissident sources. It also comments that warnings from the Joint Intelligence Committee on the limitations of the intelligence were not made clear. Overall it said that "more weight was placed on the intelligence than it could bear", and that judgements had stretched available intelligence "to the outer limits".

It says that information from another country's intelligence service on Iraqi production of chemical and biological weapons was "seriously flawed", without naming the country. It says that there was no recent intelligence to demonstrate that Iraq was a greater threat than other countries, and that the lack of any success in the UNMOVIC finding WMDs should have prompted a re-think. It states that Tony Blair's policy towards Iraq shifted because of the attacks of September 11, 2001, not because of Iraq's weapons programme, and that the government's language left the impression that there was "fuller and firmer intelligence" than was the case.

The report indicated that there was enough intelligence to make a "well-founded" judgment that Saddam Hussein was seeking, perhaps as late as 2002, to obtain uranium illegally from Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo (6.4 para. 499). In particular, referring to a 1999 visit of Iraqi officials to Niger, the report states (6.4 para. 503): "The British government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger's exports, the intelligence was credible."

This intelligence (which had controversially found its way into George W. Bush's 2003 State of the Union speech) had previously (before September 2003 [C. May, 2004]) been thought to rely on forged documents. The Butler Review stated that "the forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made." (6.4 para. 503) Taking into account the American intelligence community's findings on the matter, it is true that in December 2003, then CIA director George Tenet conceded that the inclusion of the claim in the State of the Union address was a mistake. (CNN.com, 2003) However, Tenet believed so, not due to any compelling evidence to the contrary, but rather because the CIA (criticized concerning this matter by the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq [Schmidt, 2004]) had failed to investigate the claim thoroughly; however again, the Butler Review states (6.4 para. 497) in 2002 the CIA "agreed that there was evidence that [uranium from Africa] had been sought." In the run-up to war in Iraq, the British Intelligence Services apparently believed that Iraq had been trying to obtain uranium from Africa; however, no evidence has been passed on to the IAEA apart from the forged documents (6.4 Para. 502). (Times Online, 2003)

The report did not blame any specific individuals. It specifically stated that John Scarlett, the head of the JIC should not resign, and indeed should take up his new post as head of MI6.

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Finally found a way to copy the paragraph:

Quote:

On November 25, 2002, The Naval DELETED issued a very brief report (Alleged Storage of Uranium Destined for Iraq )that a large quantity of uranium from Niger was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin. The uranium was reportedly sold to Iraq by Niger's President. The report provided the name and telephone numbers for the individual, a West African businessman, who was responsible for coordinating the alleged uranium transaction and indicated that he was willing to provide information about the transaction. CIA's DO told Committee staff that the businessman has never been contacted and the DO has not made an effort to determine whether this individual had any useful information. The DO told Committee staff that they saw no reason to contact him and noted that "no one even thought to do that." The Defense Humint Service (DHS) and the Navy also told Committee staff that they did not try to contact the businessman. The Navy told the Committee that because they were not further tasked regarding their report, they did not pursue the matter further. The DHS told Committee staff that because the DHS examined the warehouse on December 17, 2002 and saw only what appeared to be bales of cotton in the warehouse, they did not see a reason to contact the businessman. The report on the DHS's findings was not published until February 10, 2003.

The Naval DELETED (whatever section of the Navy that may be) would not have provided a report to Wilson. Wilson did not fail to follow up.

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Actually, if you think about what you're saying, the Navy gave it to the CIA, WHO GAVE IT TO WILSON TO USE AS A CONTACT WHILE HE WAS FAKING AN INVESTIGATION IN NIGER and he didn't make the call.

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Duelling ridiculously long cut and pastes.

The famous "16 words" in President Bush's Jan. 28, 2003 State of the Union address turn out to have a basis in fact after all, according to two recently released investigations in the US and Britain.

Bush said then, "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa ." Some of his critics called that a lie, but the new evidence shows Bush had reason to say what he did.

A British intelligence review released July 14 calls Bush's 16 words "well founded."
A separate report by the US Senate Intelligence Committee said July 7 that the US also had similar information from "a number of intelligence reports," a fact that was classified at the time Bush spoke.
Ironically, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who later called Bush's 16 words a "lie", supplied information that the Central Intelligence Agency took as confirmation that Iraq may indeed have been seeking uranium from Niger .
Both the US and British investigations make clear that some forged Italian documents, exposed as fakes soon after Bush spoke, were not the basis for the British intelligence Bush cited, or the CIA's conclusion that Iraq was trying to get uranium.
None of the new information suggests Iraq ever nailed down a deal to buy uranium, and the Senate report makes clear that US intelligence analysts have come to doubt whether Iraq was even trying to buy the stuff. In fact, both the White House and the CIA long ago conceded that the 16 words shouldn't have been part of Bush's speech.

But what he said - that Iraq sought uranium - is just what both British and US intelligence were telling him at the time. So Bush may indeed have been misinformed, but that's not the same as lying.

The "16 words" in Bush's State of the Union Address on Jan. 28, 2003 have been offered as evidence that the President led the US into war using false information intentionally. The new reports show Bush accurately stated what British intelligence was saying, and that CIA analysts believed the same thing.

The "16 Words"

During the State the Union Address on January 28, 2003, President Bush said:

Bush: The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

The Butler Report
After nearly a six-month investigation, a special panel reported to the British Parliament July 14 that British intelligence had indeed concluded back in 2002 that Saddam Hussein was seeking to buy uranium. The review panel was headed by Lord Butler of Brockwell, who had been a cabinet secretary under five different Prime Ministers and who is currently master of University College, Oxford.

The Butler report said British intelligence had "credible" information -- from several sources -- that a 1999 visit by Iraqi officials to Niger was for the purpose of buying uranium:

Butler Report: It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger's exports, the intelligence was credible.

The Butler Report affirmed what the British government had said about the Niger uranium story back in 2003, and specifically endorsed what Bush said as well.

Butler Report: By extension, we conclude also that the statement in President Bush's State of the Union Address of 28 January 2003 that "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" was well-founded.

The Senate Intelligence Committee Report

The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported July 7, 2004 that the CIA had received reports from a foreign government (not named, but probably Britain) that Iraq had actually concluded a deal with Niger to supply 500 tons a year of partially processed uranium ore, or "yellowcake." That is potentially enough to produce 50 nuclear warheads.

Wilson: Bush's Words "The Lie"

(From a web chat sponsored by Kerry for President Oct. 29, 2003)

*** Joe Wilson (Oct 29, 2003 11:24:53 AM)
I would remind you that had Mr.. Cheney taken into consideration my report as well as 2 others submitted on this subject, rather than the forgeries

*** Joe Wilson (Oct 29, 2003 11:25:06 AM)
the lie would never have been in President Bush's State of the Union address

*** Joe Wilson (Oct 29, 2003 11:25:14 AM)
so when they ask, "Who betrayed the President?"

*** Joe Wilson (Oct 29, 2003 11:25:30 AM)
They need to point the finger at the person who inserted the 16 words, not at the person who found the truth of the matter

The Senate report said the CIA then asked a "former ambassador" to go to Niger and report. That is a reference to Joseph Wilson -- who later became a vocal critic of the President's 16 words. The Senate report said Wilson brought back denials of any Niger-Iraq uranium sale, and argued that such a sale wasn't likely to happen. But the Intelligence Committee report also reveals that Wilson brought back something else as well -- evidence that Iraq may well have wanted to buy uranium.
Wilson reported that he had met with Niger's former Prime Minister Ibrahim Mayaki, who said that in June 1999 he was asked to meet with a delegation from Iraq to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between the two countries.
Based on what Wilson told them, CIA analysts wrote an intelligence report saying former Prime Minister Mayki "interpreted 'expanding commercial relations' to mean that the (Iraqi) delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales." In fact, the Intelligence Committee report said that "for most analysts" Wilson's trip to Niger "lent more credibility to the original Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports on the uranium deal."

The subject of uranium sales never actually came up in the meeting, according to what Wilson later told the Senate Intelligence Committee staff. He quoted Mayaki as saying that when he met with the Iraqis he was wary of discussing any trade issues at all because Iraq remained under United Nations sanctions. According to Wilson, Mayaki steered the conversation away from any discussion of trade.

For that reason, Wilson himself has publicly dismissed the significance of the 1999 meeting. He said on NBC's Meet the Press May 2, 2004:

Wilson: At that meeting, uranium was not discussed. It would be a tragedy to think that we went to war over a conversation in which uranium was not discussed because the Niger official was sufficiently sophisticated to think that perhaps he might have wanted to discuss uranium at some later date.

But that's not the way the CIA saw it at the time. In the CIA's view, Wilson's report bolstered suspicions that Iraq was indeed seeking uranium in Africa. The Senate report cited an intelligence officer who reviewed Wilson's report upon his return from Niger:

Committee Report: He (the intelligence officer) said he judged that the most important fact in the report was that the Nigerian officials admitted that the Iraqi delegation had traveled there in 1999, and that the Nigerian Prime Minister believed the Iraqis were interested in purchasing uranium, because this provided some confirmation of foreign government service reporting.

"Reasonable to Assess"

At this point the CIA also had received "several intelligence reports" alleging that Iraq wanted to buy uranium from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and from Somalia, as well as from Niger. The Intelligence Committee concluded that "it was reasonable for analysts to assess that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa based on Central Intelligence Agency reporting and other available intelligence."

Reasonable, that is, until documents from an Italian magazine journalist showed up that seemed to prove an Iraq-Niger deal had actually been signed. The Intelligence Committee said the CIA should have been quicker to investigate the authenticity of those documents, which had "obvious problems" and were soon exposed as fakes by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"We No Longer Believe"

Both the Butler report and the Senate Intelligence Committee report make clear that Bush's 16 words weren't based on the fake documents. The British didn't even see them until after issuing the reports -- based on other sources -- that Bush quoted in his 16 words. But discovery of the Italian fraud did trigger a belated reassessment of the Iraq/Niger story by the CIA.

Once the CIA was certain that the Italian documents were forgeries, it said in an internal memorandum that "we no longer believe that there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued uranium from abroad." But that wasn't until June 17, 2003 -- nearly five months after Bush's 16 words.

Soon after, on July 6, 2003, former ambassador Wilson went public in a New York Times opinion piece with his rebuttal of Bush's 16 words, saying that if the President was referring to Niger "his conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them," and that "I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat." Wilson has since used much stronger language, calling Bush's 16 words a "lie" in an Internet chat sponsored by the Kerry campaign.
On July 7, the day after Wilson's original Times article, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer took back the 16 words, calling them "incorrect:"

Fleischer: Now, we've long acknowledged -- and this is old news, we've said this repeatedly -- that the information on yellow cake did, indeed, turn out to be incorrect.

And soon after, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice acknowledged that the 16 words were, in retrospect, a mistake. She said during a July 11, 2003 White House press briefing :

Rice: What we've said subsequently is, knowing what we now know, that some of the Niger documents were apparently forged, we wouldn't have put this in the President's speech -- but that's knowing what we know now.

That same day, CIA Director George Tenet took personal responsibility for the appearance of the 16 words in Bush's speech:

Tenet: These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the President.

Tenet said the CIA had viewed the original British intelligence reports as "inconclusive," and had "expressed reservations" to the British.

The Senate report doesn't make clear why discovery of the forged documents changed the CIA's thinking. Logically, that discovery should have made little difference since the documents weren't the basis for the CIA's original belief that Saddam was seeking uranium. However, the Senate report did note that even within the CIA the comments and assessments were "inconsistent and at times contradictory" on the Niger story.

Even after Tenet tried to take the blame, Bush's critics persisted in saying he lied with his 16 words -- for example, in an opinion column July 16, 2003 by Michael Kinsley in the Washington Post :

Kinsley: Who was the arch-fiend who told a lie in President Bush's State of the Union speech? . . .Linguists note that the question "Who lied in George Bush's State of the Union speech" bears a certain resemblance to the famous conundrum "Who is buried in Grant's Tomb?"

However, the Senate report confirmed that the CIA had reviewed Bush's State of the Union address, and -- whatever doubts it may have harbored -- cleared it for him.

Senate Report: When coordinating the State of the Union, no Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts or officials told the National Security Council (NSC) to remove the "16 words" or that there were concerns about the credibility of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting.

The final word on the 16 words may have to await history's judgment. The Butler report's conclusion that British intelligence was "credible" clearly doesn't square with what US intelligence now believes. But these new reports show Bush had plenty of reason to believe what he said, even if British intelligence is eventually shown to be mistaken.

Sources

President George W. Bush, " State of the Union ," 28 January 2003.

Chairman Lord Butler of Brockwell, "Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction," 14 July 2004.

"Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate, 7 July 2004.

Walter Pincus, " CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data; Bush Used Report Of Uranium Bid ," Washington Post, 12 June 2003.

Mohamed ElBaradei, " The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update ," Statement to the United Nations Security Council by International Atomic Energy Agency Director General, 7 March 2003.

Joseph Wilson, "What I Didn't Find in Africa," New York Times, 6 July 2003.

Joseph Wilson,The Official Kerry-Edwards BLOG: "Transcript of Chat with Ambassador Joe Wilson," 29 Oct 2003.

Michael Kinsley, "...Or More Lies From The Usual Suspects?," Washington Post, 16 July 2003: A23.

Ari Fleischer, " Press Gaggle ," 7 July 2003.

Ari Fleischer and Dr. Condoleeza Rice, " Press Gaggle ," 11 July 2003.

George Tenet, "Statement by George J. Tenet Director of Central Intelligence," Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 11 July 2003.

Related Articles
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Actually, if you think about what you are saying, you're jumping to conclusions. Wilson went to Niger in Feb. 2002. The Naval report wasn't until November 2002, and the DHS findings weren't published until Feb. 2003.

We have no information to indicate on what date the Navy was provided the number of the businessman, let alone anything that would indicate it was given to Wilson.

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I've seen it and I'll find it for you. I'm sure you'll believe it when you see it.

...yeah, right.

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I have an observation.

Many on the left are saying that Bush changed his position about firing anyone connected with this leak.
Many on the left are saying that Bush said he would fire the leaker,then he changed his mind and said that if someone "broke the law" they would be fired.
It seems to me that many on the left are saying Bush "moved the bar" on the matter,just to protect Rove.

BUT,if you go back to the press conference Bush gave on Sept 23,2003 you will see that Bush saud that if anyone "violated the law" they would be "taken care of".

He has been consistent on that score.
He has said if someone committed a crime,they would be fired.
His position has not changed.

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Nomonee for supreme court in a few minutes.

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In the immortal words of everyone's favorite talking dog, Scooby Doo:

"Ruh Roh!"

Quote:

An Unlikely Story
Karl Rove's alibi would be easier to believe if he hadn't hidden it from FBI investigators in 2003.
By Murray Waas
Web Exclusive: 07.19.05

Print Friendly | Email Article

White House deputy chief of staff Karl Rove did not disclose that he had ever discussed CIA officer Valerie Plame with Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper during Rove's first interview with the FBI, according to legal sources with firsthand knowledge of the matter.

The omission by Rove created doubt for federal investigators, almost from the inception of their criminal probe into who leaked Plame's name to columnist Robert Novak, as to whether Rove was withholding crucial information from them, and perhaps even misleading or lying to them, the sources said.

Also leading to the early skepticism of Rove's accounts was the claim that although he first heard that Plame worked for the CIA from a journalist, he said could not recall the name of the journalist. Later, the sources said, Rove wavered even further, saying he was not sure at all where he first heard the information.

Rove's attorney, Robert Luskin, has said that Rove never knew that Plame was a covert officer when he discussed her CIA employment with reporters, and that he only first learned of her clandestine status when he read about it in the newspaper. Luskin did not return a telephone call today seeking comment for this story.

If recently disclosed press accounts of conversations that Rove had with reporters are correct, Novak and Rove first spoke about Plame on July 8, 2003. It was three days later, on July 11, that Rove also spoke about Plame to Time magazine correspondent Matthew Cooper. Three days after that, on July 14, Novak's column appeared in which he identified Plame as an "agency operative." According to Novak's account, it was he, not Rove, who first broached the issue of Plame's employment with the CIA, and that Rove at most simply said that he, too, had heard much the same information.

Novak's column came during a period of time when senior White House officials were attempting to discredit Plame's husband, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who was then asserting that the Bush administration had relied on faulty intelligence to bolster its case to go to war with Iraq. Wilson had only recently led a CIA-sponsored mission to Niger to investigate claims that Saddam Hussein was covertly attempting to buy enriched uranium from the African nation to build a nuclear weapon. Wilson reported back that the claims were most likely the result of a hoax. But President Bush had still cited them during a State of the Union address as evidence that Hussein had an aggressive program to develop weapons of mass destruction.

In the column, Novak called Plame an "agency operative," thus identifying her as a covert CIA agent. But Novak has since claimed that his use of the phrase "agency operative" was a formulation of his own, and that he did not know, or mean to tell his readers, that she had a covert status with the agency.

Rove, too, has told federal investigators he did not know that Plame had a covert status with the CIA when he spoke with Novak, and Cooper, about Plame.

The distinction as to whether Rove specifically knew Plame's status has been central to the investigation of U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald; under the law, a government official can only be prosecuted if he or she knew of a person's covert status and "that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent."

But investigators were also skeptical of Novak's claim that his use of the term "operative" was a journalistic miscue because it appeared to provide legal protection for whoever his source or sources were. And although Novak's and Rove's accounts of their conversations regarding Plame were largely consistent, they appeared to be self-serving.

It has been, in large part, for all of these reasons that Fitzgerald so zealously sought the testimony of reporters Cooper and Judith Miller of The New York Times, according to sources sympathetic to Fitzgerald. Cooper testified to Fitzgerald's grand jury last week, after earlier having been found in civil contempt for refusing to do so. In contrast, Miller has refused to testify, and is currently serving a sentence in an Alexandria, Virginia, jail.

Finally, also driving Fitzgerald's investigation has been Rove's assertions that he only found out about Plame's status with the CIA from a journalist -- and one whose name he does not recall. But as The New York Times first disclosed on July 16, senior Bush administration officials first learned that Plame worked for the CIA from a classified briefing paper on July 7, 2003, exactly a week before Novak's column naming Plame appeared and at the time that senior Bush administration officials were devising a strategy to discredit Wilson.

The classified memorandum, dated June 10, 2003, was written by Marc Grossman, then the undersecretary of state for political affairs, and reportedly made claims similar to those made by Wilson: that the Bush administration had relied on faulty intelligence to exaggerate the threat posed by Hussein to make the case to go to war with Iraq. The report was circulated to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and a slew of other senior administration officials who were then traveling with President Bush to Africa.

Fitzgerald has focused on whether Rove might have learned of Plame's identity from one of the many senior White House officials who read the memo, according to the Times account and attorneys whose clients have testified before the federal grand jury.

Murray Waas is an investigative reporter. He will be reporting further about the Plame grand jury on his blog, Whatever Already.

Copyright © 2005 by The American Prospect, Inc.

And in the immortal words of Shaggy,

"Zoinks!"

There's the first brick falling out of the wall of lies. How long until more fall out?

Cycloptichorn

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Lash wrote:

I've seen it and I'll find it for you. I'm sure you'll believe it when you see it.

...yeah, right.

Yes, please provide the evidence that says Wilson got a phone number of a businessman and did not call it. so far, you 've shown the 911 Commission said the Navy gave the phone number to the CIA. We know the CIA sent Wilson. but nowhere have we seen mention that the CIA gave Wilson the phone number.

By the way, don't forget that the businessman with the phone number claimed that the uranium was in a certain warehouse, and the CIA checked the warehouse and found cotton. So maybe the number was never called by Wilson or anyone else because the businessman's info was already found to be false.

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Here's what Bush said:
Bush's Claim
Reality

Bush said:
"Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent."

Bush claim:
State of the Union Address 1/28/2003
Iraq has 500 tons of chemical weapons:

- Sarin gas

- Mustard gas

- VX Nerve agent

Reality:
Zero Chemical Weapons Found
Not a drop of any chemical weapons has been found anywhere in Iraq

Bush said:
"U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein
had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable
of delivering chemical agents."

Bush claim:
State of the Union Address 1/28/2003
Iraq has 30,000 weapons capable of dumping chemical weapons on people

Reality:
Zero Munitions Found
Not a single chemical weapon's munition has been found anywhere in Iraq

Bush said:
"We have also discovered through intelligence
that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas."

Bush claim:
State of the Union Address 1/28/2003
Iraq has a growing fleet of planes capable of dispersing chemical weapons almost anywhere in the world

Reality:
Zero Aerial Vehicles Found
Not a single aerial vehicle capable of dispersing chemical or biological weapons, has been found anywhere in Iraq

Bush said:
"Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications and statements by people
now in custody reveal that
Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaida."

Bush claim:
State of the Union Address 1/28/2003
Iraq aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda

And implied that Iraq was somehow behind 9/11

Reality:
Zero Al Qaeda Connection

To date, not a shred of evidence connecting Hussein with Al Qaida or any other known terrorist organizations have been revealed.
(besides certain Palestinian groups who represent no direct threat to the US)

Bush said:
"Our intelligence sources tell us that he (Saddam) has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production."

Bush claim:
State of the Union Address 1/28/2003
Iraq has attempted to purchase metal tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production

Reality:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as dozens of leading scientists declared said tubes unsuitable for nuclear weapons production -- months before the war.

Bush said:
"Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at [past nuclear] sites."

Bush claim:
Bush speech to the nation 10/7/2002
Iraq is rebuilding nuclear facilities at former sites.

Reality: (the actual period is much longer than two months)
Two months of inspections at these former Iraqi nuclear sites found zero evidence of prohibited nuclear activities there

IAEA report to UN Security Council 1/27/2003

Bush said:
"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

Bush claim:
State of the Union Address 1/28/2003
Iraq recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa

Reality:
The documents implied were known at the time by Bush to be forged and not credible.

Bush said:
"We know he's been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons, and we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons."

Bush claim:
VP Dick Cheney Meet the Press 3/16/2003
Iraq has Nuclear Weapons for a fact

Reality:
"The IAEA had found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq."

IAEA report to UN Security Council 3/7/2003

Bush said:
"We gave him a chance to allow the inspectors in, and he wouldn't let them in."

Bush claim:
Bush Press Conference 7/14/2003
Iraq's Saddam Hussein refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq

Reality:
UN inspectors went into Iraq to search for possible weapons violations from December 2002 into March 2003

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Lash wrote:

Found it elswhere:

(U) Problems with the Intelligence Community's HUMINT efforts were also evident in the Intelligence Community's handling of Iraq's alleged efforts to acquire uranium from Niger. The Committee does not fault the CIA for exploiting the access enjoyed by the spouse of a CIA employee traveling to Niger. The Committee believes, however, that it is unfortunate, considering the significant resources available to the CIA, that this was the only option available. Given the nature of rapidly evolving global threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons and weapons technology, the Intelligence Community must develop means to quickly respond to fleeting collection opportunities outside the Community's established operating areas. The Committee also found other problems with the Intelligence Community's follow-up on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue, including a half-hearted investigation of the reported storage of uranium in a warehouse in Benin, and a failure, to this day, to call a telephone number, provided by the Navy, of an individual who claimed to have information about Iraq's alleged efforts to acquire uranium from Niger.

It was Wilson who screwed that up. He didn't use the phone number and this issue was one of the things he was given to do.

He didn't want to find it.

This entire section bashes the CIA for using such an idiot and not making sure he did the bare minimum he should have done.

Wilson had NOTHING to do with that investigation.. Geez.. It was completely UNRELATED to Wilson. It was a seperate CIA investigation.

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Lash,

Quote:

On November 25, 2002, The Naval DELETED issued a very brief report (Alleged Storage of Uranium Destined for Iraq )that a large quantity of uranium from Niger was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin. The uranium was reportedly sold to Iraq by Niger's President. The report provided the name and telephone numbers for the individual, a West African businessman, who was responsible for coordinating the alleged uranium transaction and indicated that he was willing to provide information about the transaction. CIA's DO told Committee staff that the businessman has never been contacted and the DO has not made an effort to determine whether this individual had any useful information. The DO told Committee staff that they saw no reason to contact him and noted that "no one even thought to do that." The Defense Humint Service (DHS) and the Navy also told Committee staff that they did not try to contact the businessman. The Navy told the Committee that because they were not further tasked regarding their report, they did not pursue the matter further. The DHS told Committee staff that because the DHS examined the warehouse on December 17, 2002 and saw only what appeared to be bales of cotton in the warehouse, they did not see a reason to contact the businessman. The report on the DHS's findings was not published until February 10, 2003.

DO is The CIA Director of Operations. The CIA never thought to contact him so how and why would they have given the phone number to Wilson MONTHS after he already had gone to Niger? Benin is country in Africa that is NOT Niger. As was pointed out here earlier. Wilson went to Niger in February of 2002.

There is no way Wilson could have failed to call the number. There is no way for him to have the number to call based on CIA statements of failure to consider following up and the simple fact that Nov is 9 months AFTER Wilson went to Niger.

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Careful, Parados, you'll hurt their heads with all the facts...

Cycloptichorn

ps please read this which I posted a few pages ago and tell me what ya think (anyone)

http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=10016

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squinney wrote:

Wait a minute. If Rove didn't know he was leaking, why did he tell Cooper it was double super secret? (Or something to that effect that led to the super secret comment in Coopers notes?)

or that "it would be declassified soon" ?

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If it ain't secret, it doesn't need to be "declassified." They're trying to have it both ways, and got tripped up in their own shet. Only Bush supporters can't see it.

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Cycloptichorn wrote:

Careful, Parados, you'll hurt their heads with all the facts...

Cycloptichorn

ps please read this which I posted a few pages ago and tell me what ya think (anyone)

http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=10016

The link doesn't work.. Is this the article quoted between your Shaggy and Scooby comments?

If the facts come out this way, it is going to look bad for this administration. A conspiracy to attack a critic using classified information? And the RW got all in a huff over the FBI files in the Clinton WH that were never shown to be used.

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Lash wrote:

It is that you refuse to look at the link I've provided on the page where I told you it is.
edited for puncts

[/quote]

Just want to make sure you see this.[/quote]

not good enough. not gonna subscribe to a newspaper or whatever to read your evidence.

you were so adamant about it, i would think that there's more than one source of the info.

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Lash wrote:

Actually, if you think about what you're saying, the Navy gave it to the CIA, WHO GAVE IT TO WILSON TO USE AS A CONTACT WHILE HE WAS FAKING AN INVESTIGATION IN NIGER and he didn't make the call.

that's not what it says at all.

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Rove was the source of the Plame leak... so it appears

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