Are we morally free to decide our own fate?

It's like the anti suicide laws. You aren't allowed to decide your own fate, in his argument, I take it. I say we are the captain of our own ship, if we choose to be. Why should society decide for me that I should be kept breathing if I have forged a living will? How to justify the waste of resources? A few living cells in a largely dead body are no argument to cancel that will.

I find the entire concept of morality disgusting. For whatever the intent of the concept--and i consider the Roman concept of mores to have been a socially self-serving idea--it has been abused mightily.

From a viewpoint of justice--yes, i believe everyone should have the right to decide their personal fate in advance, should they take cognizance and so choose. As the author of the piece you quote is at pains to point out, however, this cannot always pragmatically be accomplished. Cohen's position is a fine example of why the concept of morality disgusts me. The inescapable practical consequences of how our society works means that we may fail of accomplishment of our desires in such regards--that this is so in no way authorizes Cohen's contention that there is a greater moral issue. Basically, i see Cohen alleging in this case that absent written proof of the previously expressed desires of Miss Schiavo, Mr. Schiavo can be assumed automatically not to be a reliable witness to what those desires were. Much of the rest of the piece then descends into invidious political comment. That is the final reason why i find the concept of morality disgusting--as is the case with the Roman concept of mores, morality is most often enlisted and publicly paraded in aid of political agendae. I don't think Mr. Cohen has made his case. I do think he had tipped his ideological hand quite glaringly, however.

How do we define human life? This is a question that needs to be answered when dealing with this issue. In this context, 'life' requires nothing more than the continued operation of the heart and, perhaps, some of the other vital organs. However, it's the higher functioning portions of the brain that make us human and give us dignity. When the part of the brain responsible for 'self' and 'will' is rendered permanently inoperative, then we cease to exist as people. Permanently Robbed of will and self, the human body is nothing but a mass of cells. This is life only in the most biological of senses, but it's no longer human life. If your body becomes permanently devoid of will and self, then you have no moral obligation to continue living and no one has a moral obligation to keep your corpse functioning. Indeed, as edgarblythe pointed out, it's an unjustifiable waste of resources to keep such body operative.

Re: Are we morally free to decide our own fate?
joe from chicago

The problem here is in the fact that Cohen does not justify his statement. Why does he think that we still possess dignity and rights when our capacity to make free choices is gone? Of course, juridic systems give protection and rights to human beings totally or partially deprived of the capacity of making free choices: the begotten, the mental deficients. But in this thread the problem is to find a moral justification to that protection.

Cohen position is a view from the perspective of the society or the community and not from the perspective of the individual. But that puts a serious problem: if we don't respect the individual choice how can we say that we are preserving his dignity? Who decides what is dignity in each case?
I am not talking about dignity as a juridical person, subjected to rights and obligations. I am talking about the representation that any human being has of what his dignity is. Dignity as the way he choses to be present in the world, the image that he wants to be perceived by other men.
The composer Robert Schumann, when he become certain that madness was inevitable and he could no longer fight against it, made the choice of killing himself. I think he wanted to preserve the unity of his personality, his dignity. But they didn't let him to die. So he spent 3 more long years in a clinic, in terrible suffering, physical and mental, unable to recognize his wife and children.
If I chose to die when life is not my life as Val but only a mechanical process where all that I considered to be "myself" is gone for ever, what right have the society to preserve life in that thing that is not me anymore? Surely not the moral right of preserving my dignity: in those conditions, my dignity is gone with my personality.

I don't know, but I feel that behind Cohen perspective is something else he did not mentioned. Religion. The perspective of man as a creature of God.
Since I am not religious I reject that perspective.

If this is not Cohen perspective, then I think he should justify and also make clear what does he mean by "dignity".

I don't think that's Cohen's argument. Cohen isn't saying that, absent a living will or some other incontestible evidence of a patient's wishes, doctors should preserve the patient's life. Instead, he's saying that, regardless of a living will or some other incontestible evidence of a patient's wishes, doctors should still preserve the patient's life. As he states: "it is foolish to believe that the competent person I am now can establish, in advance, how I should be cared for if I become incapacitated and incompetent."

Actually, that is a rather interesting philosophical problem: how much claim do our "former selves" have on our "current selves" or "future selves?" Can I, for instance, make a demand on myself that I must fulfill several years hence? Cohen, I think, is arguing that we cannot make a decision under one set of circumstances (writing a living will while in perfect health) that will control our destiny at some uncertain point in the future (when unconscious and in extremis). That's an interesting question, although I'm not convinced that Cohen has arrived at the right answer.

Are we free to decide our own fate? It´d be the best question.

The fact I can agree oneself has the decision to go on living or not doesn´t make to be moral or inmoral.

If freedom implies something inmoraly wrong; what kind of freedom would it be?

Perhaps it´s as important to decide to live as to renounce life.

But is maintaining the bodily functions of someone who has permanently lost "will" and "self" a decision to "live" or a decision to keep a corpse functioning when it doesn't realize it's dead?

Actually, from the perspective of Christianity, particularly evangelical Christianity, former selves have no claim on present selves. To be "born again" is to be transformed. The previous self (sinful) has no claim on the present self (saved). In the segment you posted Cohen did not make his argument explicitly in that context, although to me it "smelled" of it. If he had however, it would at least been logical. He seems however to be reaching for a broader, less sectarian generality. Basically all of us, saved or otherwise are subject to the process of transformation. illness and incapacitation transform the self and the decisions of the former, healthy self, are no longer valid.

Why are the decisions of our 'former' selves no longer valid? Decisions I made in the past still affect my life today whether I want them to or not. Why should a decision I made with the intention of affecting me in the future under specific circumstances be any less valid?

I was unclear. That is not my argument, I was saying that is Cohen's argument. Personally I think this is mostly BS. But if that is the case, is the possibility of reform and a new beginning free of our former state denied to us?

This ties into the problem of when do we get to decide our fate. Cohen, while saying we don't always get to decide our own fate, implies that we shouldn't get to decide our own fate in the event that we are incapacitated (which seems to be his euphemism for brain dead or in a persistent vegetative state).

I admit that the issue of how much advance agency we should have over what might happen to us in the future gets pretty sticky in instances when there's a realistic chance of varying levels of recovery and cognition. We could confuse the issue more and talk about euthanasia or good old fashioned suicide. However, there really should be no confusion or debate in instances where the person is brain dead, in a persistent vegetative state, or some similar circumstances--the body might still be operational, but the 'self' it once belonged to is deceased and it will not play host to any new identity or transformed 'self'.

I see your point, Joe. In that case, i have even less regard for Mr. Cohen's thesis. My grandfather was the light of my boyhood. He was a giant in my eyes (and well above the average size in reality), and he was a genius. In 1959 he suffered a massive stroke. Absent today's medical emergency services, this condemned him to a hellish fate for his remaining years. He was whisked off to a veteran's hospital for therapy, and when returned to us, was confined to a wheelchair. He was also not the man i had known--he was become a stranger, and one whose grim demeanor and irrascibility made fearsome to me. In retrospect, i can see how mightily he struggled to regain "himself," to overcome his debilities, and to care for himself as much as possible--at the time i had only an inchoate understanding of what was going on.

Two days after Christmas, 1961, i awoke with the dawn, as i had habitually done all my young life. Once i would have gone downstairs to where my grandfather would have been shaving and preparing for work, and joined him at breakfast. That day, the house was still, but with a quiet which shouts at one's spirit. I went downstairs, and there were my grandmother and my mother and her twin sister, huddling in the center of the living room, weeping and mumbling incoherently, ignoring me totally. These women has always been the strongest, most fearsome people i knew. But now they recoiled at the sound of my voice, and looked at me as though "unseeing." I walked into the bedroom, and became very excited. I saw my grandfather lying in bed--not the frightful stranger who had come back from the veteran's hospital, but my real grandfather. On his lips was the faint smile which had always characterized his expression for me. His body was relaxed, and he simply resembled a sleeping version of the giant i had so long known and loved. He was stone dead.

I have thought much on the subject of death and debility as a result. My oldest brother suffered a C-4 spinal fracture in 1968, and was one of only three people to survive that injury that year. It was a long and diffictult road which restored him some semblance of paraplegic normality. My relations with him were quite different, and not germane, but the debility had a significant influence on my thinking about this topic, and in fact, on my "world view" altogether. He is now dead as well.

Certainly i may be deluding myself, but i have strong feelings about the case of my grandfather. Raised by my grandparents, i spent more time with my grandfather than any other adult in my boyish existence. He was ever frank and forthright with me, and although neither crude nor indiscreet, i never knew him to lie or even hide the truth from me. His strongest form of self-censorship would be somethin to the effect of: "That's enough of that, we should speak of other things." I don't believe i am deluding myself when i say i knew him as well as i've known any man, up to and including the present. I have been convinced for many years that had he known what lay in store, he would have wished for that first stroke to kill him outright.

Cohen i have little regard for, based upon what you've provided us to read. I find his reasoning facile, and his political agenda transparent and pathetic. Certainly i am a physical coward, although unafraid of death, and foolhardy when angered. I might be inclined to wish to stay alive at all costs. But there is an aspect of the personality about which the religionist like to harp, although usually just paying lip-service. That is the unique character of every "soul," and its free will. I believe that those who are good men and women seek always to live up to their own personal standards. Although in the weakness and cowardice of illness and the eminent prospect of death, i might be inclined to beg for my life were i able--my highest personal ideal would be to have the plug pulled, and i would want that wish respected. The man who came back from the Veteran's Hospital did not seem to be my grandfather. I now understand that he was man trying to regain what he had been. I believe the look of peaceful repose, the characteristic faint smile, were evidence that in death, he found what he had struggled for.

Alright, i'll say it--Cohen's a hack; interesting idea to explore, and Cohen's done a shite job of that.

Setanta: Amazing. I had nearly the same experience when my grandfather suffered a stroke in 1984. Even at 64, he was a powerful and vibrant man. The stroke turned him into a feeble old man practically overnight. My mother didn't tell me this until after his death in 1989, but during the first two weeks in the hospital after the stroke he had to be restrained because he kept ripping out the IVs; he even pulled out his catheter--twice. He wanted to die. He spent most of the next five years sitting in a wheelchair and watching TV until lung cancer finally killed him. They discovered a small tumor after the stroke, but my grandfather scrawled his 'x' on a form refusing any treatment for it. He also signed his mark on a 'Do Not Resuscitate' order.

We are handicapped here because we are left to guess at Eric Cohen's position, but I'll attempt to provide one explanation:

Suppose A makes a bargain with B: A will mow B's lawn every week for a year, and in exchange B will pay A $10 every week. Six months into the contractual term, however, B moves into a high-rise apartment building. A shows up at B's apartment with his lawnmower and says: "I'm here to mow your lawn, where's my $10?" B argues that, since he no longer has a lawn to mow, the deal's off. A counters that he has fulfilled his part of the bargain (he showed up, ready to mow a lawn), and B is reneging on his end of the bargain. Who wins?

Under the law, the outcome is doubtful (much would depend on whether A and B live in the US or in some civil law jurisdiction). The same could be said for the ethical outcome. Is B morally obliged to pay A, even though the subject of the bargain (i.e. the lawn) no longer exists and the circumstances of the agreement have entirely changed? In the same way, we can look at a bargain made by a "former self" that is to be carried out by (or on behalf of) a "future self."

Parties to a bargain often take into account the possibility of changed circumstances and build that possibility into the agreement. When the parties, however, are faced with circumstances that they did not contemplate, the law (or the tenets of morality) determines whether the bargain is valid or not. I'm guessing that Cohen is arguing that a healthy person can never take into account what it's like to be an incapacitated person; thus, it is not in the present healthy person's power unilaterally to bind the future sick person to a bargain, the conditions of which neither could have reasonably contemplated. As such, the law is required to step in and determine if the bargain is valid or if the conditions have changed so drastically that it would be unfair to hold either party to the terms of the agreement. And, under Cohen's position, the law always favors life, so the healthy person could not force the incapacitated person to fulfill the terms of any agreement that calls for the latter to refuse medical treatment or lifesaving measures.

joefromchicago: Yours is an interesting point, though I would argue B is obliged to pay A since the agreement was for a year of employment; however, I agree that the legal outcome of such a case would be a coin toss (it sounds a little like a case one might see on Judge Judy).

It seems that Cohen's conclusion is that the bedside caregivers should have the final say over whether or not to "pull the plug." My take on his argument is that your future 'self' shouldn't be held to the decisions of your present 'self' (even though every other aspect of reality disagrees), and since there are too many shortcomings with leaving the decision to the state/court or placing too much significance on autonomy, the final decision should rest with the "truly loving" caregivers.

My questions are: what if those "truly loving" caregivers don't share my values and what makes them better qualified then me to determine under what conditions my material form continues to function?

joefromchicago





In West European legislation, and assuming that B changed his domicile by his free decision, the bargain is no more possible due to the absence of it's subject. But, he must compensate A, for breaking the agreement, making it impossible.

What I don't understand is the relevance of your example regarding Cohens statement. Are we facing a legal issue or a moral one?
In my last reply, I assumed it was a moral issue. But perhaps I was wrong.

I am looking at this as a moral issue. That's why I posted this thread in the philosophy forum rather than the law forum. I mentioned the legal aspect of my hypothetical only for the sake of completeness.

Morally free? Not if you believe in a God who decides our fate for us and demands that we suffer whatever he chooses to bestow on us until the time he appoints for our death.

Why is it that people believe they have the right to thwart God's Will by intervening to prolong life, but no right to end it (except for wars, executions, and greed-driven poverty, of course)?

Ethically free? Yes, with due consideration for the impact our death will have on others. We have a right to refuse procedures that will not improve our quality of life, even if they will increase its length. We have a right to die with dignity when and how we choose, if we feel that death is preferable to life for any reason.

Since our mind may be incapacitated before we can make that choice and we cannot know in advance what we would want in every possible circumstance, we might have to rely on law or loved ones to choose for us. Unfortunately the hope for a miracle (either medical or divine) gives people an excuse to put the final decision off without regard to the costs of prolonging death.

It is ironic that those who should rejoice each time a soul is freed from suffering to eternal peace/paradise are most reluctant to let them go. Perhaps they don't really believe what they profess.

joefromchicago



I am sorry, Joe, but Cohen arguments doesn't seem very solid. If we accept that perspective, then, no testament would be valid. The person who made it was alive when it was made and certainly could not know what being dead is.
Cohen says that law always favor life, but, since the problem is moral, why should law always favor life? And what kind of life?

The fact that I give instructions, when not sick, that in case of serious disease - like in Schiavo's case - with no reasonable hope of recovering, they let me die, is a decision made by experience. Not my inner experience, of course, but the experience of seing other cases in other persons. I have an idea what is to be in Schiavo situation, so I make a decision for the possibility that, one day, I am in the same situation.

I was never robbed. I didn't have, until today the inner experience, of that. But I know what a robbery is, I know people that have suffered that kind of experience. So I make an insurance with a company, regarding my house. Does that mean the contract is invalid?

As I said in my previous reply Cohen does not give a rational explanation to his position. Dignity of human beings, life, seem to be values that he thinks not disputable. But they are, specially in a case like "schiavo".