Could a state form its own militia?

From National Guard Fact Sheet -- National Guard and Militias

The National Guard is the organized militia reserved to the states by the
Constitution of the United States under Article 1, Section 8. In peacetime,
the National Guard is commanded by the governor of each respective
state or territory. When ordered to active duty for mobilization or called
into federal service for emergencies, units of the Guard are under the
control of the appropriate service secretary. The militia clause reserves
the appointment of officers and the authority of training the militia
(according to Congressionally prescribed standards) to the states. In
1903, Congress officially designated the organized militia as the National
Guard and established procedures for training and equipping the Guard to
active duty military standards.

State Defense Force
The State Defense Force is a form of militia and is authorized to the
states by federal statute (Title 32 U.S. Code 109). State Defense Forces
are not entities of the federal government. They are organized, equipped,
trained, employed and funded according to state laws and are under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the governor. Should the National Guard be
mobilized for war, specialized operations such as humanitarian or
peacekeeping missions or called into federal service during national
emergencies, the State Defense Force will assume the National Guard's
mission for the state's security.

Stupid link won't show up as a title, rather than the actual link location....

Either way, MI has a militia.

The "Michigan Militia" is not an agency of the government of the State of Michigan.

Thanks George!

I've never heard of the State Defense Force - I'll have to do some reading on that.

I think I remember the Michigan Militia.

Weren't they the anti-government guys who were getting all the dough from the gov in the form of farm subsidies?

Do they need to be to try and overthrow the government?

I think it's scary enough that a bunch of guys get together with guns and spend hours "training" for combat.

Technically, MA still has a state militia. Most of the laws are ignored but there are still laws on the books that require the head of local governments within the state to hold militia drills at least annualy in every town.

Also also appreciate the fact that you use the word "dinking" boomer! It's one of my all time fav words and it doesn't get used enough! lol

Fishin'! You dink?

I am sllloooooowly infecting Oregon with that word. People here couldn't dink to save their lives.

Anyhoo...

Let me tell you - this State Defense Force stuff is weird. Its all over the map on how it's organized and who can join and how they're recognized.

Strange stuff.

Re: Could a state form its own militia?


In Ontario, if you work for any provincial government ministry, you are advised that you are on the fire fighting squad list - to be called on if the actual fire squads are overwhelmed.

It is a ranked scale, based on what ministry you work for, and where you live.

Interesting, eBeth.

The National Guard usually fills that capacity with their "one weekend a month, two weeks a year" deal unless they are called into service fighting fires or whatever. Now, most of them are gone fighting wars.

Are the government employees of Canada assigned specific tasks and trained in those task?

I know that in emergencies like forest fires there are a million things that have to happen other than putting out the fires. Roads need to be blocked, people need to be evacuated, fire-fighters need to be fed -- and on and on and on.

Government employees of all types should be able to fill those jobs.

I should be embarrassed to admit that I have no idea if there are any kinds of plans in place to help in those situations here.

As I read about the State Defense Forces, I'm almost a little alarmed to think some of those groups could be called out to help.

Oregon seems to have a fairly organized SDF, made up of ex-soldiers, but I think there are only something like 108 people involved.

On another thread Merry Andrew (where has he been?) had something interesting to say about citizen-soldiers. I'm going to have to try to find that....

Boomer, it's handled by individual provinces here. When I worked for the Ministry of the Environment in a high-risk area, I was told we (and Ministry of Natural Resources staff) were the first defence crew, after the real fire-fighters were used up. We were told we'd get 2 weeks notice and training if we were really going to be called into service.

I didn't find that at all encouraging.

Fishin - Weren't our minute men, effectively, state militia?

I'd think that with most of these that, just like the National Guard does, it's really a matter of having plans written up and lists of contacts. If there is a major emergency you get people volunteering all over the place - often more than can be used.

If they have 100+ people working it you can bet that they have the name of every Hosptial, Police Dept, Fire Dept, trucking company, Tow Truck operator and Resturant in the state or at least ways to get in contact with them if they need to.

Back during the depression a lot of that work was done by the Conservation Corps. Then it got picked up by the Civil Defense folks during WWII. I don't think it was really until the late 1960s when the Natiaonl Guard became major players in it.

Yup. The Minutemen were the MA milita at the time of the Lexington/Concord battles in 1775.

Wow, I know something about history!

lol You grew up a stones throw from Battle Road. You should know all that stuff! I bet you have one of those minuteman outfits hiding in your closet. :p

Until the various state militias were organized into the Army National Guard, and their standards of training, discipline and equipment were brought up to a minimum level of the Regulars, their history is mostly one of being useful so rarely, other than when shooting down civilians, as to have been distinctly embarrassing.

For the record, this is the record:

Before the American Revolution, colonial militias were most often volunteer forces, and were raised in response to emergencies, usually raids by the French and their Indian allies. These volunteer organizations performed well, as would prove the case during the American Civil War, when the bulk of Mr. Lincoln's armies were United States Volunteers. Notably, New England militia volunteers took the great French fortress of Louisburg in 1745, mounting their expedition, transporting their troops, landing them and investing the town and the fortress without the aid of the King.

But the result of King William's War, Queen Anne's War, King George's War and the French and Indian War was that militia establishments became permanent in peace time, and the rot began very quickly to set in. Membership was restricted to men of property, and sometimes to members of the established church of a colony (hence the perceived need for the second amendment to the constitution in 1789). Internal organizations such as the Minute Men did not do badly, but once again, one has to do with volunteers, and not the ordinary run of militiamen. Washington's experience with the Virginia militia, who actually performed better than most militias, lead him to resign in disgust before the end of the French and Indian War.

Then came the Revolution. When a handful of militiamen assembled on the commons at Lexington, they had most of them been convinced, or had convinced themselves, that although there would be a show-down, there would be no shooting. When Major Pitcairn wheeled his Marines into line and opened fire, the survivors scattered pretty damned quick (and i don't blame them a bit, it was no fair fight). Arriving at Concord, Pitcairn sent the light infantry companies from two regiments over the north bridge. This would have been a body of men of from sixty to one hundred. About three hundred militiamen were already assembled there, and another two- to three hundred marching south toward Concord. The redcoated light infantry made a single charge with the bayonet, and scattered a force at least three times their number, and perhaps five or six times their number. The officers and other veterans of the French and Indian War managed to put an end to the panicked flight, and regroup their men in the woods. They then came running out and scattered the light infantry, who had not expected a repeat engagement. This body of men then resolutely guarded a bridge in which Pitcairn had no further interest, and personal accounts of those present strongly suggest that they could not be induced to enter the town--although the scattered redcoats who were looking for Adams and Hancock and the arsenal of powder and cannons would have been ripe for disaster.

The nightmare march endured by the Regulars and the Marines as they retreated to Boston was basically a prolonged mob action by a completely unorganized body of four to five thousand men, who took pot shots at the redcoats, and ran off again. Heroic stuff for elementary school textbooks, but hardly the material from which an army could reliably be formed.

Old Israel Putnam of Connecticutt was in command of the slightly more organized mob (but not much more organized) that surrounded Boston. Their salvation lay in the councils of war which Gage regularly conducted, confirming the old military saw that councils of war do not fight. So the British stayed in Boston, safe under the guns of the fleet, and wrung their collective hands, willing to be spooked by the reports of the thousands flocking to the city, and unwilling to do anything about it, despite the enthusiasm of George, Lord Cornwallis, to go out and scatter them--something he likely could have done in an afternoon.

Putnam had served with the Connecticutt militia in the French and Indian War, and had fought with Rogers Rangers. Once again, Robert Roger's irregulars were volunteers. Putnam was no idiot, but neither was he militarily up to the task before him. Setting up his headquarters on Plowed Hill north of Charlestown, it took him weeks to decide that he should occupy Bunker Hill, which would have made the harbor untenable for the British. He was constantly faced with the necessity to cater to the demands of dozens of militia officers for councils of war, and, as noted above, councils of war do not fight. When he finally made a decision, his efforts were hamstrung by the willful decision of both officers and militiamen to conduct the operation as they saw fit. Colonel Prescott lead the way, by building a field fortification on Breed's Hill, rather than Bunker Hill. The cloud of disorganized militiamen who did occupy Bunker Hill stood around all day and watched the fun without ever becoming involved. A handful of volunteers joined Prescott's Boston men on Breed's Hill and these volunteers fought with all the desparate courage that American volunteers have always shown. Only two regiments of militia behaved in a body like soldiers, and in both cases this was due to the power of leadership of their commanders. John Stark of New Hampshire had served in the militia since 1752, and he had all the hardheaded, no nonsense character of his Scots father; he held the position on Morton's Hill which faced the initial British landing. Knowing he would be overwhelmed if he stayed, he retreated in good order, and set up a position on the mud flats of the Mystic River to prevent a flanking movement by the Regulars. He was ably supported by John Glover and his Marblehead men. In the case of both of these units, they were unquestioningly loyal to their commanders, who expected nothing less of them than that they would fight to the death. When the ubiquitous Major Pitcairn lead an assault force of light infantry and Royal Marines in a "flying column" up the shore of the Mystic to outflank Bunker Hill, Stark and Glover were there to oppose them. It is told that many of the men began to waver, and looked like breaking ranks. Stark and Glover drew their swords, and paced the back of the lines, and Stark is reputed to have said: "By God, you'll stand, or Betty Stark will be a widow by nightfall." Of all of the militia assembled at Boston, only Stark's and Glover's men enlisted in the Continental army in a body after the arrival of Washington.

Washington was appalled by what he found, and lived each day in anxious fear that the British would screw their courage to the sticking point, and come out to scatter what passed for an army. The Massachusetts militia had been under the command of Artemas Ward, who didn't know from one day to the next whether or not he would cooperate with Putnam, whom he considered a political opportunist (it is true that Putnam was chosen to command the seige for political reasons--but Putnam at least did have the will and the courage to fight). It took Washington literally months to create something resembling an army. It was not until December, eight months after Lexington and Concord, that he had a plan and was ready to move. He held a council of war, and the militia commanders (Putnam, Stark and Glover excepted) grew very nervous and were certain his plan would fail. Washington never held another council of war.

Benedict Arnold and a band of volunteers, and Ethan Allen (the old humbug) and a few volunteers, had taken Fort Ticonderoga in upstate New York. A "weekend soldier" from Boston, Henry Knox, had displayed courage and initiative during the seige, and had lead a body of Massachusetts militiamen who were willing to ignore Ward, and they had protected Prescott's flank by filing in behind a long rail fence which stretched north from Breed's Hill. Knox was a book seller fascinated by war and "the art of war," and he readily found volunteers to join him in a march to Ticonderoga. With teams of oxen, they then dragged the artillery there back to Boston in the dead of winter, performing an incredible feat in the face of primitive logistics and without professional aid--once again, we speak of voluteers. With this artillery, and relying upon militiamen who had been enlisted for short terms (ninety days to one year), and a small core of newly enlisted Continentals, such as Stark's and Glover's men, Washington made another plan, and in March 1776, in the dead of a fiercely cold night, he sent his men up Dorchester Heights south of Boston, where they erected crude gun emplacements using wicker baskets filled with stone, and in the morning the British awoke to find powerful artillery emplaced and able to sweep the town and the harbor--they had the drummer boys beat the assembly, and put their men on board ship immediately. The next day, they sailed for Halifax, and Boston was taken without a shot fired, and no thanks to the militia, who had fumbled around for almost a year by that time.

On Long Island, Washington's officers, most new to command, and all to one day reach high rank because of their merit (Washington had a keen eye for natural leaders), stumbled very badly. Cornwallis lead a flanking march past Jamaica Inn, and Sullivan's unattached flank was quickly rolled up. The Americans retreated to the fortifications around Brooklyn, and Howe took his sweet time forming an assault party (the initial attempt by the Germans got a very nasty reception by Stark's men, and this probably convinced Howe to proceed in a "regular" manner). Overnight, Glover's Marbleheaders managed to evacuate the entire army without the British being aware.

Washington retreated north of New York (then a small town on the southern end of Manhattan Island), and prepared for the British landings. When the British did land at Kipp's Bay, the militia took one long look, threw down their guns and ran. Washington was enraged, and began to curse in the legendary fashion for which he was famous. He then drew his scimitar, and spurring his horse, charged the astonished redcoats, who were sufficiently non-plussed that they did not fire at him. His little staff were appalled, but they managed to overtake him and grab the reins of his horse and lead him off. (EDIT: His staff were only able to catch him because, in his frustration and rage, he first threw down his hat, and rode back and forth over it, before attempting to charge the redcoats--the world might have been a profoundly different place today had they not stopped him.)

In Pennsylvania in December 1776, with his army melting away, Washington convinced a few thousand of the short-term enlisted militia to stay on for two weeks, and launched his brilliant New Jersey campaign. Once again, Glover's Marbleheaders sprang into action, and ferried his little army across the Delaware River. Typically, the Pennsylvania militia under the command of an exasperated John Cadwalader managed to fiddle around and failed to cross the river. Cadwalader did finally get his men across the river after the battle of Trenton, and arranged to meet Washington's force before Princeton. Arriving before Washington, Cadwalader was joined by Virginia militia under the command of Colonel Macon, and the Continental Marines from Philadelphia, who were looking for something useful to do, as there was no navy for them to serve with. A regiment of regulars were marching southeast from Princeton toward Trenton, to join Cornwallis to crush Washington--the English were rather ill-informed about Washington and his whereabouts. Macon advanced his men into some grape arbors near the road, and they fired a ragged volley and then promptly turned and ran. The redcoats followed standard practice, and sent the light infantry with the bayonet to clear away the rebels. Seeing this, the Pennsylvania militia recalled pressing engagements elsewhere, and the Continental Marines adopted a "if they're not going to stand and fight, i'll be damned if i will" attitude. Washington rode up, and disgusted by the flight of his fellow Virginians, he managed to control his temper, and rode out in front, ignoring the redcoats, and eventually convincing the militia to return. Although they then managed to run off the Regulars, that regiment and another which decided not to attempt to hold Princeton managed to escape.

I could go on, which i'm sure none of you doubt. The times when militia--and not volunteers from the militia--actually stood and fought, and rendered good service, as so few as to be the exceptions which prove the rule--militia are only good for providing replacements in the Regular line. They have always proved useless as front line troops--Camden, Guilford Courthouse, Queenstown, Bladensburg--the list is seemingly endless.

None of this should be considered a slur against the National Guard, who have done yoeman service for this nation--and precisely because they were integrated into the Regular establishment.

No, no minute man outfit, but I did go to several re-enactments at the bridge.

Wow Setanta. Truly a fascinating post and I thank you for it.

I'm going to reread it and reslog my way through an article I read from the War College about how SDF are an "underused asset" while keeping your comments in mind.

While reading your post, I did recall a conversation I had with about a year ago with my brother, a historian and a soldier. We were talking about the possiblity of a draft and he said something like "Oh please god no", elaborating that war was complicated enough without a lot of barely trained people being thrown into a situation that was so foreign to them.