Morals & Ethics, Nature of Actions

djbt wrote:

But then Russell described Kant as 'a mere misfortune' which seems eminently sensible to me...

Well, ol' Bertie was certainly full of himself, wasn't he?

djbt wrote:

I'm honestly not certain. If we define 'a morality' as 'a system of beliefs about how one ought to behave', then clearly morality is subjective. If we define morality (or perhaps, for clarity, Morality) as 'the system of laws about how one ought to behave', then we have something objective, which may or may not exist.

I am content with the first definition, although I'm not sure if there is any significant difference between the two.

djbt wrote:

Morality (capitalised or otherwise) is certainly worth talking about, whether it exists or not, since it affects, or belief that it exists affects, things (like my own experience) which I am confident do exist.

It might be worthwhile to discuss, but it wouldn't be a philosophical discussion. It would be psychology or sociology or anthropology or religion, perhaps, but not philosophy.

djbt wrote:

You say that morality can be discovered by reason.

I would say that morality, if it can be discovered at all, can be discovered only by reason.

djbt wrote:

This implies that morality is something separate, or external, to us. So would morality exist if there were no people? No living things at all? Are there universal moral laws which, applied in the context of humans become human moral laws? Or were moral laws created with humanity? If so, how?

Asking whether morality would exist without humans is somewhat akin to asking whether mathematics would exist without numbers. Without humans, there is no need for morality, and thus no cause to ask if morality exists or not.

joefromchicago wrote:

Seeing none, however, I am left with the conclusion that the fault is entirely yours.

Exactly. The fault is entirely mine, and your morality and ethics are utterly flawless. How simple!

Morality is easy! If anyone wonders what is moral, just ask you. Yay!

This is a central part of my point: Who defines reason? You?

Plato was a master of reason and found slavery reasonable.

The Nazis argued they were reasonable to practice genocide.

Some slave owners thought they were quite reasonable in owning slaves.

What is reason? Who defines it?

Ask 100 people what is reason, and you may get 100 different answers.

Seeing none, however, I am left with the conclusion that the fault is entirely yours.

The problem, as I see it, is that while reason is tool which can be used once certain initial premises are accepted, I don't think it can create initial premises. Therefore, it can be used to show a morality is wrong (self-contradictory, or reliant on fallacies, etc.) but not show that a morality is right.

The problem, as I see it, is that while reason is tool which can be used once certain initial premises are accepted, I don't think it can create initial premises. Therefore, it can be used to show a morality is wrong (self-contradictory, or reliant on fallacies, etc.) but not show that a morality is right.

What I am saying is: we must always be aware of the weaknesses of reason and morality, and be looking to improve them.

Reason cannot create initial premises.

Is the individual the only legitimate judge of ethics? Are there any acts that are definitely right or definitely wrong?

I believe moral judgements are more akin to traffic laws than they are to laws of nature. We can, for example, demonstrate that people are safer when we all stop at red lights. What we cannot demonstrate is why we wouldn't be as well off if we stopped on green lights instead.

What I am saying is: we must always be aware of the weaknesses of reason and morality, and be looking to improve them.

Otherwise, we end up in an Orwellian world where the leaders "know the best Morality for All of Us" and it is all supported by their "Impeccable Reason."

It seems to me the difference between the two is highly significant. The first implies that morality is arbitrary, the second that it is universal.

I agree with you to the extent that I can't see how anything other than reason would have a chance. But how? How do you go about discovering morality by reason? We'll argue around in circle with abstracts, so could you give me an example of a moral principle defensible by reason?

So the moral laws relate to/are shaped by the specific qualities of the human brain.

Lying is wrong only because we can lie. But why? Why not lying is right because we can lie? To what end does morality aspire? What is it for? Or is my consequentialist thinking clouding my judgement?

The problem, as I see it, is that while reason is tool which can be used once certain initial premises are accepted, I don't think it can create initial premises. Therefore, it can be used to show a morality is wrong (self-contradictory, or reliant on fallacies, etc.) but not show that a morality is right.

djbt wrote:

It seems to me the difference between the two is highly significant. The first implies that morality is arbitrary, the second that it is universal.

I don't think the first definition you offered implies that morality is arbitrary. If morality is a system of beliefs regarding right and wrong conduct, there is no reason to conclude that the definition allows for many equally valid systems of beliefs regarding right and wrong conduct.

djbt wrote:

I agree with you to the extent that I can't see how anything other than reason would have a chance. But how? How do you go about discovering morality by reason? We'll argue around in circle with abstracts, so could you give me an example of a moral principle defensible by reason?

I can give you many: they're not difficult to find. Kant's categorical imperative is, perhaps, the most famous.

As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question suggested to this: Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only empirical, and which belongs to anthropology? for that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral law

It might be objected to me that I take refuge behind the word respect in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of reason

djbt wrote:

Lying is wrong only because we can lie. But why? Why not lying is right because we can lie? To what end does morality aspire? What is it for? Or is my consequentialist thinking clouding my judgement?

If you think that morality must serve some purpose apart from "the good," then your consequentialist thinking has indeed clouded your judgment.

djbt wrote:

The problem, as I see it, is that while reason is tool which can be used once certain initial premises are accepted, I don't think it can create initial premises. Therefore, it can be used to show a morality is wrong (self-contradictory, or reliant on fallacies, etc.) but not show that a morality is right.

I doubt even you believe this statement. But, in case you do, please provide the non-rational initial premise for the following assertion: "while reason is a tool which can be used once certain initial premises are accepted, I don't think it can create initial premises."

In any culture Good has no other definition as the ideal relation between individuals.

The validity of a moral depends on it's adequacy to the cultural, economical, historical bases of a society. When they enter in conflict, moral rules are no longer valid.

I don't think this is true. Kant thought of the Good being 'a Good Will', and acting according, whatever its affects (whether it leads to ideal relations between individuals or not). I'm sure other can think of moral positions which define Good other than 'the ideal relation between individuals'.

How do we judge its adequacy? What must it adequately achieve? An ideal relationship between individuals? But surely what is regarded as 'ideal' is equally variable, so every moral system would be equally valid and invalid.[/[/quote]

We don't judge it's adequacy. We live it.
See the case of "debts of blood". Homer's heroes believed in the debt of blood. Any murder must be followed by the death of the murder, no matter his motives were. This moral rule shows an adequacy with the greek world in Homer's time. Kings were, in fact, lords of war, in a agrarian society. Virtue (arete) in this case had to do with social status and bravery.
300 years later, greek societies, specially Athens were very different. Aeschylus show us the difference of moral rules in his tragedy "Oresteia". The debt of blood is no more a moral rule, the murderer must be given the possibility of explaining the reasons that lead him to the crime.

But Kant didn't set out to prove that morality was discoverable by reason, he started from that assumption:

Kant wrote:

As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question suggested to this: Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only empirical, and which belongs to anthropology? for that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral law

(My italics)
Here it seems to me that Kant is mistaken. As a point of fact, I do not think there is a common idea of moral law, and I suspect that socio-biologists and psychologists would have little difficulty in explaining the general feeling of 'duty' without reference to any metaphysic of ethics.

In fact, though he attempts to squeeze out of it, Kant recognises this himself:

Kant wrote:

It might be objected to me that I take refuge behind the word respect in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of reason

He goes on, I'm sure you know, to argue that the feelings of respect or duty is distinct from feeling such as fear or inclination, because it is 'self-wrought by rational concept". While I can agree that what we feel duty bound to do may be self-wrought by rational concept, it seems to me plain wrong to say that the feeling of duty is self-wrought by rational concept.

With weak foundations such as these, it seems to me that Kant's attempts at a rational morality are doomed to crumble.

Further, he asserts that, since reason is not a tool for bringing about the happiness of the reasoning individual, therefore "nature recognises the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination". Well, in my understanding of evolutionary theory, nature has no highest practical destination, it has no destination at all. Furthermore, the evolution of reason is rather better explained as a means for the survival of an organism's genes, rather than by happiness (where Kant is right) or a metaphysic of ethics (where Kant is wrong).

What do you mean by "the good"?

I was specifically talking about initial moral premises, so in this case: "We ought to use reason to tackle logical problems". Incidentally, it seems to be quite clear that reason is never used to create initial premises in physics, rather it is use to attempt to discover them.

I'm not sure we actually disagree here, since you are claiming moral premises can be discovered, I am saying they cannot be created. Although Kant seems to say they must be "constructed", but simultaneously pre-exist that construction in "the conceptions of pure reason", which seems contradictory to me.

You're confused. First of all, Kant showed that morality is discoverable by reason by using reason and rational methods to discover it. To require Kant to prove first that morality is discoverable by reason is unnecessary: his proof satisfies the requirement.

Second, when Kant talks of a "common" idea of morality (gemeinen Idee der Pflicht), he is not referring to a "universal" idea of morality. "Common," in this context, simply means "commonplace" or "widespread."

Third, the fact that sociobiologists or psychologists could explain the general feeling of "duty" in some other terms is completely irrelevant: scientific conclusions are inductive; Kant's conclusions are deductive. As Hume pointed out, you can't prove anything by induction, you can only disprove something by it.

Fourth, from the context of the quotation you cited, what Kant was clearly attempting to state is that the "common idea" of duty or moral law must give rise to a philosophy of morality because "law" implies a universal obligation (what Kant calls an "absolute necessity").

djbt wrote:

In fact, though he attempts to squeeze out of it, Kant recognises this himself:

Kant wrote:

It might be objected to me that I take refuge behind the word respect in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of reason

He goes on, I'm sure you know, to argue that the feelings of respect or duty is distinct from feeling such as fear or inclination, because it is 'self-wrought by rational concept". While I can agree that what we feel duty bound to do may be self-wrought by rational concept, it seems to me plain wrong to say that the feeling of duty is self-wrought by rational concept.

With weak foundations such as these, it seems to me that Kant's attempts at a rational morality are doomed to crumble.

I'm not sure what "weak foundations" you're talking about. Perhaps if you could give some references to your quotations, that might help.

djbt wrote:

Further, he asserts that, since reason is not a tool for bringing about the happiness of the reasoning individual, therefore "nature recognises the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination". Well, in my understanding of evolutionary theory, nature has no highest practical destination, it has no destination at all. Furthermore, the evolution of reason is rather better explained as a means for the survival of an organism's genes, rather than by happiness (where Kant is right) or a metaphysic of ethics (where Kant is wrong).

You're even more confused. Why bring "evolution" into a discussion of Kant at all? Kant's notion of "good will" as the "highest practical destination" isn't some teleological formula for mankind's evolution; it is not something that we move toward, it is something that is already there.

djbt wrote:

I was specifically talking about initial moral premises, so in this case: "We ought to use reason to tackle logical problems". Incidentally, it seems to be quite clear that reason is never used to create initial premises in physics, rather it is use to attempt to discover them.

Once again, you're confusing induction and deduction.

djbt wrote:

I'm not sure we actually disagree here, since you are claiming moral premises can be discovered, I am saying they cannot be created. Although Kant seems to say they must be "constructed", but simultaneously pre-exist that construction in "the conceptions of pure reason", which seems contradictory to me.

I'm not willing to concede that we may agree until I get a better sense of what you're talking about. I don't understand your distinction between "discovered" and "created" in this context. It seems to me that you think anything that is not already "discovered" is necessarily "created." With that I cannot agree.

This is the sense in which I was interpreting the word, and I still think he was mistaken. The reason this thread exists is because we are undecided on whether there is moral law, not what moral law is correct, so clearly the idea of moral law is not commonplace.

"for that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral law" - surely Kant is being inductive here? He is using empirical evidence, not deductive reasoning, to attempt to prove that a a 'pure moral philosophy' is possible. So surely it is legitimate to suggest alternative inductive explanations for Kant observations? (Preface to the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics).

Why must it? The common idea of the history of the Star Wars universe does not give rise to Star Wars universe really having a history, just because of the implications of the word 'history'.

He goes on, I'm sure you know, to argue that the feelings of respect or duty is distinct from feeling such as fear or inclination, because it is 'self-wrought by rational concept". While I can agree that what we feel duty bound to do may be self-wrought by rational concept, it seems to me plain wrong to say that the feeling of duty is self-wrought by rational concept.

First Section, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, footnotes. Kant seems to build his position on the assumption that feelings of 'duty' or 'respect' are created by reason, which seem to me to be mistaken, and is thus a weak foundation.

I think you are confused here. Reread the First Section of the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, paragraph beginning "In the physical constitution of an organized being..." onwards. Kant clearly states that there is a purpose to life, and that since reason does not lead to happiness, the purpose cannot be to obtain happiness, but instead must be the formation of a 'Good Will'.

The difference between us is that you are thinking deductively, and I inductively. I do not think that anything that is not already "discovered" is necessarily "created".

You seem to be saying that moral law has necessary existence, and working from that. If that is not what you are saying I cannot see how you can approached this deductively. If you are saying this, then please explain to me why you think moral law necessarily exists.

Of course the idea of moral law is commonplace: that's why people debate about morality.

djbt wrote:

"for that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral law" - surely Kant is being inductive here? He is using empirical evidence, not deductive reasoning, to attempt to prove that a a 'pure moral philosophy' is possible. So surely it is legitimate to suggest alternative inductive explanations for Kant observations? (Preface to the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics).

No, he's not being inductive, he's merely pointing out that the possibility of a universal morality is evidenced by common ideas of morality. In other words, if most people think there's something called "morality," then that's a good indication that a universal morality is thinkable.

Kant was clearly attempting to state is that the "common idea" of duty or moral law must give rise to a philosophy of morality because "law" implies a universal obligation (what Kant calls an "absolute necessity").

djbt wrote:

Why must it? The common idea of the history of the Star Wars universe does not give rise to Star Wars universe really having a history, just because of the implications of the word 'history'.

There's a difference between "history" and "law." A "law" must, by definition, be universal and prescriptive. A "history" is specific and descriptive.

djbt wrote:

He goes on, I'm sure you know, to argue that the feelings of respect or duty is distinct from feeling such as fear or inclination, because it is 'self-wrought by rational concept". While I can agree that what we feel duty bound to do may be self-wrought by rational concept, it seems to me plain wrong to say that the feeling of duty is self-wrought by rational concept.

Why?

djbt wrote:

First Section, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, footnotes. Kant seems to build his position on the assumption that feelings of 'duty' or 'respect' are created by reason, which seem to me to be mistaken, and is thus a weak foundation.

Explain.

djbt wrote:

I think you are confused here. Reread the First Section of the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, paragraph beginning "In the physical constitution of an organized being..." onwards. Kant clearly states that there is a purpose to life, and that since reason does not lead to happiness, the purpose cannot be to obtain happiness, but instead must be the formation of a 'Good Will'.

The "good will" isn't a purpose in life, in a teleological sense. The "good will" is the measure of morality, not the goal.

Do you think that any kind of morality can be founded on an empirical basis?

djbt wrote:

You seem to be saying that moral law has necessary existence, and working from that. If that is not what you are saying I cannot see how you can approached this deductively. If you are saying this, then please explain to me why you think moral law necessarily exists.

Because morality cannot be founded on any other basis.

This misses the point I was trying to make. Let me clarify; my point was that just because there is a common conception of the existence of something that, in order to actually exist, must be absolute, does not mean it actually does exist.

It seems to me that all our feelings (emotions/desires) are wrought by the form of our brains (which, in turn, are wrought by the process of evolution). The application of these feelings can be manipulated by reason (and culture, education, religious feeling, etc.) but the feeling itself was not wrought by reason.

I was not saying that Kant said that a 'good will' was the goal of morality, but rather that moral reasoning was the goal of nature when she/it endowed mankind with reason. Again, the above passage seems to be saying this pretty clearly.

I wish I had a reason to disagree with this, I really wish I could see a strong argument for a universal, absolute morality, but I do not. In the absence of this, I have formed what I perhaps inappropriately call my 'moral' position out of things which undeniably do exist, and are important. This is why, in the ethics/animals thread, I wasn't particularly worried about proving my position was 'morally important' once you had agreed it was 'important'.

I have in mind a goal; reducing pain and increasing pleasure. It is near impossible for me to convince someone who disagrees with this goal by use of reason. However, once the goal is assumed, reason can kick in, and do a lot of, er, 'good'.

Everyone must admit that if a law is to be morally valid, i.e. is to be valid as a ground of obligation, then it must carry with it absolute necessity. He must admit that the command, "Thou shalt not lie," does not hold only for men [i.e. adult males], as if other rational beings had no need to abide by it, and so with all other moral laws properly so called. And he must concede that the ground of obligation here must therefore be sought not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which man is placed, but must be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason; he must grant that every other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience -- even a precept that may in certain respects be universal -- insofar as it rests in the least on empirical grounds -- perhaps only in its motive -- can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law.[/list]Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, preface. In other words, because laws are not contingent but are, by definition, universal, any philosophy of morality must be universal as well.