Please read the cases
parados wrote:Debra writes:
Quote:In both the Quinlan case and the Cruzan case, the highest courts in their respective states agreed that hearsay evidence was insufficient to establish the patient's wishes. Thus, when family members disagree, the patient's right to life must be protected.
I'm sorry, I don't see where either decision reached this conclusion. This is your conclusion not the courts.
Then you didn't read the cases. Both the Quinlan case and Cruzan case found that hearsay testimony was insufficient to establish the patient's wishes. Both the Quinlan case and the Supreme Court's synopsis of the Quinlan case in Cruzan (the one you posted), both set forth the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding that the guardian and the family members must concur. It's not my fault that you can't read . . . or refuse to read.
I already provided you with a link to the Quinlan case plus I posted the final paragraph of Quinlan case.
Concerning hearsay . . . read it again:
Quote:It is also worth noting that most, if not all, States simply forbid oral testimony entirely in determining the wishes of parties in transactions which, while important, simply do not have the consequences that a decision to terminate a person's life does. . . .
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that, in this case, the testimony adduced at trial did not amount to clear and convincing proof of the patient's desire to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn. In so doing, it reversed a decision of the Missouri trial court, which had found that the evidence "suggest[ed]" Nancy Cruzan would not have desired to continue such measures, App. to Pet. for Cert. A98, but which had not adopted the standard of "clear and convincing evidence" enunciated by the Supreme Court. The testimony adduced at trial consisted primarily of Nancy Cruzan's statements, made to a housemate about a year before her accident, that she would not want to live should she face life as a "vegetable," and other observations to the same effect. The observations did not deal in terms with withdrawal of medical treatment or of hydration and nutrition.
parados wrote:The court said that the state may require clear and convincing evidence. That is NOT the same thing as the MUST keep the person alive if family members disagree. As a lawyer you should understand the legal meaning of the word "may". It is not a requirement.
Because your conclusion is YOUR conclusion and not the courts it makes your resulting argument not valid.
As I have said before. The state has an interest to keep the person alive. THe person has a 14th amendment right to refuse treatment. It is up to the court to weigh those 2 conflicting issues. The Florida courts did that. Because there is no requirement that the court has to meet your standard you have little argument here. Until you can present evidence that the court failed to meet the Florida standard you can be assured no appeals court will hear your argument. Is there a Florida law that requires "clear and convincing" evidence? Did the court violate that law? I see no evidence supporting your contention.
Again, you NEED TO READ and TRY to comprehend what the Supreme Court is stating.
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court said:
Quote:"The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to `instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.'" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). "This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof - `clear and convincing evidence' - when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both `particularly important' and `more substantial than mere loss of money.'" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington, supra, at 424). . . .
An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the administration of life-sustaining treatment, at least create the potential that a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction. In Santosky, one of the factors which led the Court to require proof by clear and convincing evidence in a proceeding to terminate parental rights was that a decision in such a case was final and irrevocable. Santosky, supra, at 759. The same must surely be said of the decision to discontinue hydration and nutrition of a patient such as Nancy Cruzan, which all agree will result in her death.
EXPLANATION:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individual fundamental rights. Among those rights are the right to life, liberty, and property. In
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Court acknowledged that parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and companionship of their own children and that the state may not deprive parents of that fundamental right unless it has a compelling reason to do so. Certainly, a state has a compelling interest in protecting children who are abused or neglected by their parents. However, if the State seeks to terminate parental rights, the state must prove the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. This is because the decision to terminate the fundamental right is PERMANENT and IRREVERSIBLE.
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court recognized the OBVIOUS:
An erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction. Death is permanent and irreversible.
In
Santosky, one of the factors which led the Court to require proof by clear and convincing evidence in a proceeding to terminate parental rights was that a decision in such a case was final and irrevocable. Santosky, supra, at 759.
The same must surely be said of the decision to discontinue hydration and nutrition of a patient such as Nancy Cruzan, which all agree will result in her death.
Therefore, to satisfy the due process clause when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both `particularly important' and `more substantial than mere loss of money (such as termination of parental rights cases or termination of hydration and nutrition cases), the clear and convincing standard of evidence applies.
The clear and convincing standard of evidence is REQUIRED.
How many times do you need to read Cruzan to figure that out?
And what about the word "may" in the decision. This means the state may terminate a patient's life support using the clear and convincing evidence standard, or the state may require the individual to execute an advance directive. But, anything less than clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes when there is no written advance directive VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
That's not my conclusion . . . that's the LAW as set forth by the United States Supreme Court that the due process clause requires a clear and convincing evidentiary standard in cases where the individual interests at stake are substantial and particularly important.
In the absence of an advance directive, the State of Florida requires clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes and the burden of proof is placed upon the person seeking to terminate life support. In both the Quinlan case and in the Cruzan case, hearsay evidence was deemed insufficient to meet the high evidentiary standard.
That's not my personal conclusion, that's what the cases actually require.
Read them.