1
   

Sentencing Standards No Longer Mandatory

 
 
Reply Thu 13 Jan, 2005 08:48 am
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that federal judges are no longer bound by mandatory sentencing guidelines but need only consult them when they punish federal criminals.

Under the ruling, federal judges will be free to decide for themselves whether defendants deserve sentences longer or shorter than the ranges prescribed by the guidelines, but their decisions will be subject to reversal if appeals courts find them unreasonable.

The guidelines were established in the 1980s as part of a bipartisan effort to ensure that the same crime would receive about the same punishment nationwide. But since then, they have become the source of intense controversy in the federal courts, subject to criticism across the ideological spectrum. Conservatives and prosecutors have said that some judges have tried to coddle criminals by eluding the guidelines. Defense lawyers and some judges have said they have resulted in excessive sentences for some defendants.

The divided outcome emerged from unusual twin majority opinions in United States v. Booker, No. 04-104, and United States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105. One group of five justices said the current administration of the guidelines violates defendants' right to a jury trial because judges impose sentences under them based on facts that a jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt.

Another group of five justices explained why the guidelines must nevertheless continue to shape sentencing decisions even if judges are no longer legally bound to follow them.

The modified system, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote on behalf of the five justices who supported it, will help "avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where necessary."

While Breyer wrote the crucial opinion, the pivotal player in the case was Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the only one of the nine justices who voted both to hold the current sentencing system unconstitutional and to preserve the guidelines in voluntary form.

Joining Breyer and Ginsburg were Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony M. Kennedy.

The other majority consisted of Ginsburg and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter and Clarence Thomas.

Stevens sharply criticized the court's split decision, calling Breyer's solution a "gross impropriety." Scalia labeled it a recipe for "havoc" in the federal criminal justice system.

While the decision will preserve at least some role for the sentencing guidelines, the precise practical impact beyond that remains to be worked out.

Like a twist of a gigantic Rubik's Cube, the court's decision changed the entire structure of criteria facing thousands of federal criminal defendants, the lawyers who represent them, the prosecutors who charge them and the judges who sentence them.

As one example of the Breyer opinion's wide impact, the new appellate standard it introduces for sentences, "reasonableness," effectively strikes down the Feeney Amendment, a 2003 law that had further restricted federal trial judges' latitude in sentencing by giving appeals courts more power to overturn their decisions.

The federal courts issue more than 60,000 criminal sentences each year, according to the Justice Department.

The likeliest short-term outcome, legal analysts said yesterday, is more litigation, as defendants seek to challenge sentences imposed under the previous system, and as some judges who have criticized the guidelines as too harsh test their new freedom by imposing lesser sentences where they think they are justified.

Critics who regard the sentencing guidelines as too harsh said the court had cheated criminal defendants of an expected victory.

"This is actually a bittersweet day for the criminal defendants. On one hand, the right to a jury trial is vindicated, but on the other hand, in the remedy, it is undercut," said Jon Sands, a federal public defender in Arizona and chairman of the Federal Defender Sentencing Guidelines Committee.

For its part, the Bush administration reacted warily to the court's ruling, with Assistant Attorney General Christopher A. Wray declaring that the Justice Department was "disappointed that the decision made the guidelines advisory in nature," but noting that "federal sentencing guidelines remain a critical part of the process to achieve justice."

The split decision was a surprise ending to a long-running drama within the court that seemed to reach a turning point last June, when the court ruled, 5 to 4, that a state sentencing guideline system that permitted a judge to "enhance" a defendant's sentence based on his own fact-finding violated the constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury. The decision, Blakely v. Washington, was the latest result of the legal revolution set in motion in 2000 by the court's 5 to 4 decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey.

In Apprendi, the court ruled that a judge could not add two years to a 10-year sentence for a weapons crime because he had found that it was motivated by racial bias. A sentence could only be enhanced, the court ruled, based on facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, lest the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial be violated.

The logic of Apprendi and Blakely seemed to apply to -- and therefore threaten -- the federal sentencing guidelines, which are written by a commission Congress set up in 1984 to help smooth out what once were huge differences in sentences imposed by judges nationwide for the same criminal conduct.

The guidelines, which took effect in 1987 and are periodically updated, were the fruit of a sentencing-reform movement led by strange political bedfellows. Liberal Democrats who objected to wide inequality in sentencing were joined by conservative Republicans who wanted to force judges to give out stiffer sentences across the board.

As chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, and later as a federal appeals judge, Breyer played a key role in drafting the sentencing legislation and the guidelines.

Thick as a phone book, the guidelines supply the criteria judges are supposed to follow when they choose to increase a sentence above a certain range or drop it below that.

Freddie Booker's case was a fairly typical one. A jury convicted him of trafficking 92.5 grams of cocaine, a crime punishable by no more than 23 years and 10 months in prison under the guidelines. But at a post-trial sentencing hearing, the judge found that he had probably had 566 grams of cocaine, and had obstructed justice. That bumped Booker's sentence up to 30 years.

As the U.S. prison population has swelled, the guidelines have come under fire from critics who say that they are packing federal penitentiaries with nonviolent drug offenders.

But both Republican and Democratic presidents have credited the guidelines with helping to reduce the nation's violent-crime rate, which hit a 30-year low in 2003, according to the Justice Department.

Breyer himself remains deeply attached to the guidelines and has been fighting to preserve them at the court ever since Apprendi was decided.

His allies in the battle were Rehnquist and O'Connor and Kennedy.

Until yesterday, however, they were consistently outnumbered by a liberal-conservative alliance made up of Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg on the left and Scalia and Thomas on the right.

And during an oral argument on the Booker and Fanfan cases, which the court heard Oct. 4 on an expedited basis because of the uncertainty its Blakely ruling had created in the federal courts, there was no indication of any change in the 5 to 4 lineup that decided Blakely.

But Breyer apparently succeeded in convincing Ginsburg that it was possible to compromise.

"It is a remarkable act of judicial jujitsu that Breyer's managed to pull off," said Frank O. Bowman, a professor of law at Indiana University.

Sentencing Standards No Longer Mandatory
  • Topic Stats
  • Top Replies
  • Link to this Topic
Type: Discussion • Score: 1 • Views: 2,048 • Replies: 10
No top replies

 
panzade
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 Jan, 2005 08:54 am
Interesting stuff-thanks
0 Replies
 
graffiti
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 Jan, 2005 08:59 am
panzade wrote:
Interesting stuff-thanks


Welcome-it jumped out at me, so I definitely agree about it being interesting!

Gotta love that Breyer (makes great ice cream, too :wink: ).
0 Replies
 
panzade
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 Jan, 2005 09:01 am
I gotta know more about Breyer...where he came from...
0 Replies
 
graffiti
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 Jan, 2005 09:06 am
panzade wrote:
I gotta know more about Breyer...where he came from...


Here's a good start:

Biography of Supreme Court Justice Steven G. Breyer
0 Replies
 
panzade
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 Jan, 2005 09:12 am
Thanks, I was impressed with this speech...lengthy cut and paste, but interesting.

The Supreme Court And The New International Law

Stephen Breyer
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States

The American Society of International Law
97th Annual Meeting
Omni Shoreham Hotel
Washington, D.C.
April 4, 2003


"Nearly a century ago twenty-four Members of the Mohonk Conference on International
Arbitration founded the American Society of International Law. Elihu Root was the
Society's first President. Its vice presidents included three members of the Supreme Court
- Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brewer and Day - as well as William Howard Taft,
who would later become both President, and then Chief Justice, of the United States.
Their participation then made clear that the Court's members understood the importance
of international law and its direct relation to their work. Many members of the Supreme
Court continue to hold that view - a view that now extends beyond public international
law to embrace foreign law and legal institutions as well.

Justice O'Connor, for example, has said that she thinks that "American judges and
lawyers can benefit from broadening our horizons" and that her own experience on the
Court has suggested that "we often have a lot to learn from other jurisdictions." Just last
year at this meeting she suggested that "conclusions reached by other countries and by
the international community should at times constitute persuasive authority." Similarly,
Justice Ginsburg has explained that, in her view, "comparative analysis emphatically is
relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights. We are the
losers if we neglect what others can tell us about endeavors to eradicate bias against
women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups. For irrational prejudice and rank
discrimination are infectious in our world." Justice Stevens and Justice Souter have
referred to comparative foreign experience in several important recent opinions. And I
have tried to explain, both in opinions and public remarks, why I believe foreign
experience is often important to our work.

This afternoon I should like to continue to explain why so many of us have taken this
position. It is neither that we are, in any political sense, "internationalists," nor are we
trying to move the law in a particular substantive direction. Rather, our perception of
need and of usefulness arises out of our daily experience - experience of the following
kinds:
First, we face an increasing number of domestic legal questions that directly implicate
foreign or international law. We recently had to decide whether the Constitution
permitted Congress to extend the term of copyright from the life of the author plus fifty
years to life plus seventy years. The briefs discussed European experience extensively, as
did our opinions. Why? Because Congress's legislative purposes included harmonization
of European and American laws. Obviously we had to understand the European system in
order to evaluate that American objective. The same is true when we interpret American jurisdictional provisions designed with foreign, state-owned, corporations in mind. The
growing number of such statutes reflects the commercial, technological, and political
changes that we often use the cliché "globalization" to describe.

Second, we find an increasing number of issues, including constitutional issues, where
the decisions of foreign courts help by offering points of comparison. This change
reflects the "globalization" of human rights, a phrase that refers to the ever-stronger
consensus (now near world-wide) as to the importance of protecting basic human rights,
the embodiment of that consensus in legal documents, such as national constitutions and
international treaties, and the related decision to enlist judges - i.e., independent
judiciaries - as instruments to help make that protection effective in practice. Judges in
different countries increasingly apply somewhat similar legal phrases to somewhat
similar circumstances, for example in respect to multi-racial populations, growing
immigration, economic demands, environmental concerns, modern technologies, and
instantaneous media communication. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the European
Court of Human Rights has issued decisions involving, for example, campaign finance
laws and free expression or that the Supreme Court of India has written extensively about
"affirmative action."

Several years ago a professor asked me to name one instance in which a constitutional
cross-country comparison had proved useful. After thinking about it, I eventually
mentioned a French example involving state schools and the wearing of the Muslim
chador. Today I would not have to hesitate. One or more of the current Justices has
considered comparative experience in Eighth Amendment death penalty cases, in
federalism cases, in cases involving right to die statutes, in such technical matters as the
"ancient title" of Massachusetts to Nantucket Sound, and various others.
I recognize that some of my colleagues believe that comparative analysis is
"inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite
relevant to the task of writing one." But comparative use of foreign constitutional
decisions will not lead us blindly to follow the foreign court. As I have said before - "[o]f
course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there
may be relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our own.
But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of
different solutions to a common legal problem;" for example, in a federalism case, "the
problem of reconciling central authority with the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing
autonomy of a smaller constituent governmental entity." Ultimately, I believe the
"comparativist" view that several of us have enunciated will carry the day - simply
because of the enormous value in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar
experience of others.

Third, I would not limit comparative materials to formal court decisions. We, for
example, are not the only democracy to face a terrorist threat that will likely require
courts to decide just when a constitutional phrase, protective of basic human liberty,
authorizes a restriction designed for reasons of security. It may well be valuable to
determine how other democracies have responded in similar circumstances. And relevant
descriptions and analysis may be found in documents readily available on the internet.
The Council of Europe, for example, has published guidelines describing application of
European Court precedent in such circumstances. That document does not bind the
United States, but it may help courts, or others, to understand the relevant problems.

Fourth, I have found discussions with foreign judges increasingly valuable in respect to
institutional matters. In the past few months, for example, several of us have met with
Members of the Supreme Court of India and discussed at some length the problem of
overcrowded dockets - too many cases. Many of the Indian judges believe they can
benefit from American methods for alternative dispute resolution. At the same time, I
thought we might have something to learn from a mediation program I saw in Gujarat.
The program, called the "womens' cell" of a legal aid clinic, puts teams of three
professionals (a lawyer, a clinical psychologist, and a social worker) to work dealing with
the underlying problem that likely led the woman in question to seek legal aid. Judging
from the lines outside the clinic, the twenty-four hours per day work schedule, and the
settlement rate, the program seemed to work well. And I could not help but wonder if we,
in the United States, did not have something to learn from the cross-disciplinary,
problem-based, approach.

Fifth, I have not seen many traditional public international law issues arise in the course
of my daily work. But I know that there are such issues, for example, in "death penalty"
cases, where international treaties and decisions of international courts may eventually
prove relevant. In one recent death penalty case, for example, the Court rejected a treatybased
defense on procedural grounds, leaving open the possibility of such a defense in a
case that did not involve a procedural default. The number of treaties relevant to
particular domestic legal disputes seems to be growing.
The five different ways in which foreign or international law has a growing impact on my
professional life lead to several more general observations. For one thing, my description
blurs the differences between what my law professors used to call comparative law and
public international law. That refusal to distinguish (at least for present purposes) may
simply reflect reality. The commercial law of various States, for example, has become
close to a single, unified body of law, in part through the work of uniform state law
commissioners, in part through a pattern of similar judicial responses to similar problems,
in part because of the work of intermediate judicial institutions such as federal
bankruptcy courts, in part because the interstate nature of commercial contracts means
that judges in different states apply each other's law. Formally speaking, state law is state
law. But practically speaking, much of that law is national, if not international in scope.
Analogous developments internationally, including the development of regional or
specialized international legal bodies, also tend to produce cross-country results that
resemble each other more and more, exhibiting common, if not universal, principles in
various legal areas.

These growing institutional and substantive similarities are important, for to a degree
they reflect a common aspiration. They reflect a near universal desire for judicial
institutions that, through guarantees of fair treatment, help to provide the security
necessary for investment and, in turn, economic prosperity. And through their respect for
basic human liberty may help to make that liberty a reality. The force of this aspiration, I
hope and believe, is virtually irresistible.

For another thing, the personal experiences that I have described suggest an agenda for
many in this organization. Neither I nor my law clerks can easily find relevant
comparative material on our own. The lawyers must do the basic work, finding,
analyzing, and referring us to, that material. I know there is a chicken and egg problem.
The lawyers will do so only if they believe the courts are receptive. By now, however, it should be clear that the chicken has broken out of the egg. The demand is there. To
supply that demand, the law professors, who teach the law students, who will become the
lawyers, who will brief the courts, must themselves help to break down barriers - barriers
that exist between disciplines, so that the criminal law professor as well as the
international law professor understands the international dimension of the subject;
barriers that exist between the academy and the bar; barriers that exist between the
international specialist and the trial or appellate lawyer.

Neither can international institutional issues be treated as if they were exotic hot house
flowers, rarely of relevance to domestic courts. Those issues, when relevant, must be
briefed fully with the legal relationships between our Court, and say the International
Court of Justice, comprehensively explained.

Finally, the trans-national law that is being created is not simply a product of treatywriters,
legislatures, or courts. We in America know full well that in a democracy, law,
perhaps the majority of all law, is not decreed from on high, but bubbles up, out of
interactions among the interested publics, affected groups, specialists, legislatures, and
others, who interact through meetings, journal articles, the popular press, legislative
hearings, and in many other ways. That is the democratic process in action. Legislation
typically comes after this process has long been underway. And judicial decisions work
best, particularly decisions from our Court, when they come last, after experience makes
the consequences of legislation apparent.

When I can, I like to remind audiences that I love the American bar associations, with
their 600,000 members and 800,000 committees because it is in those committee
meetings, through discussion and debate that law is created. The same, I should add, is
true today of much international, or trans-national, law. Is it not? Look at the agenda for
this meeting, focusing in part upon criminal law, economic law, regional trade, natural
resources, human rights, and terrorism. The content of these topics - as their labels
suggest - is not uniquely international. And the discussions here will have an impact on
the shape of institutions as well as the content of the law that will in fact affect people in
many democratic societies.

As my comments indicate, I believe that there is much fundamental legal and institutional
work to be done. It is important that you are undertaking that work. I encourage you to
continue. And I want particularly to encourage the younger among you, including the
students who are here. After all, what could be more exciting for an academic,
practitioner, or judge, than the global legal enterprise that is now upon us? Wordsworth's
words, written about the French Revolution, will, I hope, still ring true:
"Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive
But to be young was very heaven."
0 Replies
 
graffiti
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 Jan, 2005 09:17 am
Wonderful speech!

Do you ever watch 'America & The Courts' on C-Span? They show many events, panel discussions and speeches which include Justice Breyer. He is just amazing in 3D as well.
0 Replies
 
panzade
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 Jan, 2005 10:30 am
I'm afraid I don't watch much law except Law & Order...lol Thanks for turning me on to Breyer, he's absolutely brilliant...and I think his gaze at International Law is timely.
0 Replies
 
graffiti
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 Jan, 2005 02:40 am
I understand completely. Law & Order is rather addictive: what are there now? Law & Order, L&O Sexual Victims Unit and L&O Criminal Intent?

Anyway, I did catch a dialog on C-SPAN earlier today. It had, get this, Scalia and Breyer. You missed a doozy!

:wink:
0 Replies
 
panzade
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 Jan, 2005 07:43 am
High Court Justice Shows Up for Jury Duty

By GINA HOLLAND
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- No one took any notice of the tall, slim man who appeared Tuesday for jury duty. Had he worn his black robe, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer no doubt would have drawn more attention.

Even Marlborough, Mass., District Court Judge Thomas Sullivan Jr. didn't recognize Breyer until he read the justice's name on a document listing potential jurors for cases he was hearing.

"When I looked at the slip I said, 'Oh, my God,'" Sullivan said in a telephone interview with The Associated Press.

Two cases were to be heard, one for drunken driving and another for assault. Enough jurors were picked for the assault case before Breyer's name was called, and the defense attorney in the drunken driving case excluded the justice from that jury.

According to Sullivan, the defense attorney said, "The last thing I need is two judges on the case."

Breyer, 66, said he felt it was important to do his civic duty and report to the courthouse, located about 30 miles west of Boston. He divides his time between Washington and Massachusetts.

"It proves that everyone can participate, and in a democracy that is important," Breyer said.

Sullivan was impressed.

"If anyone could have made a phone call and gotten out of it, he could have. He really wanted to sit on the case," Sullivan said. "That might put some other people to shame who were planning to try to get out of jury duty."

---
0 Replies
 
graffiti
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 Jan, 2005 07:52 am
Thank you! I love this:
Quote:
Breyer, 66, said he felt it was important to do his civic duty and report to the courthouse, located about 30 miles west of Boston. He divides his time between Washington and Massachusetts.

"It proves that everyone can participate, and in a democracy that is important," Breyer said.

Sullivan was impressed.

"If anyone could have made a phone call and gotten out of it, he could have. He really wanted to sit on the case," Sullivan said. "That might put some other people to shame who were planning to try to get out of jury duty."


The article is greatly appreciated. Very Happy
0 Replies
 
 

Related Topics

 
  1. Forums
  2. » Sentencing Standards No Longer Mandatory
Copyright © 2024 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.06 seconds on 05/03/2024 at 06:28:19