State of Washington v. Oliver C. Christensen
Some excerpts from the court's opinion (references to statutes and cases omitted: jumps indicated by asterisks: Lacey is the daughter, Christensen the boyfriend/defendant):
We must decide whether this state's privacy act was violated when Mrs. Dixon listened to the conversation between Christensen and Lacey on the base unit of the cordless telephone without their permission. The act provides that it is unlawful for any individual to 'intercept, or record any:'
{p}rivate communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device between two or more individuals between points within or without the state by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or transmit said communication regardless how such device is powered or actuated, without first obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication.
Evidence obtained in violation of the act is inadmissible for any purpose at trial.
There are essentially four prongs in analyzing alleged violations of the privacy act. There must have been (1) a private communication transmitted by a device, which was (2) intercepted by use of (3) a device designed to record and/or transmit, (4) without the consent of all parties to the private communication.
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The State also suggests that there should be an implied exception to the act in the case of minor children, arguing that children have a reduced expectation of privacy because parents have an absolute right to monitor
all telephone calls coming into the family home. The federal wiretap statute, which makes interception of communications legal where one party consents, has been interpreted to permit parents acting to protect the welfare of a child, to consent vicariously for their child to the recording of their child's conversations. The Washington act, with its all-party consent requirement, contains no such parental exception and no Washington court has ever implied such an exception. We decline to do so now.
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While the statute itself is unambiguous, a survey of the legislative history only serves to buttress this conclusion. Since 1909, the privacy act has protected sealed messages, letters, and telegrams from being opened or read by someone other than the intended recipient. In 1967, the legislature amended the act in order to keep pace with the changing nature of electronic communications and in recognition of the fact that there was no law that prevented eavesdropping. In doing so, Washington's privacy statute became 'one of the most restrictive in the nation.'
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CONCLUSION
The Washington privacy statute puts a high value on the privacy of communications. In light of its strong wording, the act must be interpreted to effectuate the legislative intent. Based on the subjective intentions and reasonable expectations of Christensen and Lacey, their conversation was a private one. Based on the plain meaning of the term 'transmit,' we hold that the speakerphone component of the base unit of a cordless telephone is a device designed to transmit under the privacy act. It was error to admit Mrs. Dixon's testimony regarding what she heard over the speakerphone and that error was not harmless.