negligent homicide
Negligent Homicide with a Motor Vehicle
Quote:Negligent Homicide with A Motor Vehicle
A. Applicable Statute
MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556 provides:
“Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon
any highway or upon any other property, public or
private, at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless,
reckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or
wantonly, shall cause the death of another, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison not more than 2 years or by a fine of
not more than $2,000.00, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.”
B. Elements of the Offense
CJI2d 16.14 states the elements of this offense as follows:
1. The defendant was operating a motor vehicle on or about [date], at [place].
2. The defendant was operating the vehicle [at an unreasonable speed / in a negligent manner].
3. The defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of an accident resulting in injuries to [name deceased].
4. Those injuries caused the death of [name deceased].
CJI2d 16.19 (Unreasonable Rate of Speed) and/or CJI2d 16.17 (Degrees of Negligence) may be given.
C. Criminal Penalties
MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556 provides the following penalties:
• Imprisonment for up to two years; or,
• Fine of up to $2,000.00; or,
• Both.
D. Licensing Sanctions
1. Six points. The conviction is reported to the Secretary of State. MCL
257.320a(1)(a); MSA 9.2020(1)(1)(a).
2. License revocation is mandatory upon one conviction of negligent
homicide. MCL 257.303(2)(e); MSA 9.2003(2)(e).
E. Issues
“The commonly-accepted definition of ‘immoderate’ is: ‘Not within
reasonable limits.’ If one drives at a rate of speed that is not reasonable, he is driving at an immoderate rate of speed and not within reasonable limits. If under those circumstances he kills a person, he is guilty of negligence. The term ‘immoderate speed’ constitutes a form of negligence, and may result in damage to person or property. If it causes death, it is negligent homicide.”
People v McMurchy, 249 Mich 147, 155 (1930).
Whether the defendant was driving at an immoderate rate of speed does not depend upon the rate of speed fixed by law for operating such vehicle. MCL 750.326; MSA 28.558, and People v Florida, 61 Mich App 653 (1975).
Michigan’s negligent homicide statute allows criminal liability to be premised on an act of ordinary negligence, permitting criminal sanctions without finding criminal intent. People v Olson, 181 Mich App 348 (1989).
Evidence of a violation of a penal statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence; the jury may infer negligence on the basis of the violation. The use of a statutory violation to establish negligence is a matter of judicial discretion.
A statutory violation should only be used if:
• The statute is intended to protect against the result of the violation;
• The plaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the statute;
and,
• The evidence will support a finding that the violation was a proximate
contributing cause of the occurrence.
Klanseck v Anderson, 426 Mich 78, 86 (1986), and Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117 (1976).
A decedent’s contributory negligence is not a defense to a negligent homicide charge, but the jury may consider the decedent’s or a third person’s conduct in deciding whether the defendant was negligent and whether the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the death. People v Burt, 173 Mich App 332 (1988), People v Richardson, 170 Mich App 470 (1988), and People v Clark, 171 Mich App 656 (1988) (evidence of the decedent's failure to wear a seat belt was inadmissible to prove contributory negligence).
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was negligent -- that the defendant possessed the requisite culpability of negligence to make him liable for the death. The state allows the jury to be instructed that there exists a rebuttable presumption that a violation of a statute, e.g., a speed limit statute, is negligence per se. This unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof concerning an essential element of the crime charged onto the defendant to rebut the presumption and prove that he was not negligent.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the use of conclusive or rebuttable presumptions to establish an essential element of the crime charged is a violation of the defendant's right to due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SANDSTROM v. MONTANA, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). The burden of proof must always remain with the State. The State may not be relieved of its burden to prove each and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The state must prove that the defendant's negligence CAUSED the decedent's death. If the victim would have survived the roll-over if the victim had been wearing a seatbelt, the victim's failure to wear a seatbelt is relevant to the issue of whether the defendant's conduct CAUSED the death. See
People v Moore, 630 NW2d 626 (Mich. 2001).
Quote:Crimes - Negligent Homicide - Elements - Causation
Causation is an element of negligent homicide, and is comprised of both cause in fact and proximate cause.
Crimes - Negligent Homicide - Proximate Cause - Intervening Act - Failure to Wear Seat Belt
As to a charge of negligent homicide, the victim’s failure to wear a seat belt is relevant to determining whether the defendant’s conduct caused the victim’s death through the negligent operation of a vehicle. In this case, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the victim had not been wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident. The prosecutor moved in limine to exclude the evidence, and the trial court excluded it on the basis that it was irrelevant. However, the defendant was prepared to present the testimony of expert witnesses that the victim would not have died if he had been wearing a seat belt, and that the victim would not have lost control of his vehicle upon striking the defendant’s vehicle if he had been wearing a seat belt. The victim’s use of a seat belt was relevant to whether the defendant’s negligence cause the victim’s death, and thus the trial court improperly excluded it.