No. The difference is that you use 'reality' as though it were representational of some absolute state or set of states of 'being', rather than a word to denote agreement between interlocutors about what they hold 'is the case' for their common purpose.
Enter once more the celebrated philosopher Mick Dundee, in the attempted mugging scene in which the mugger pulls out a small stiletto.
GIRL: Watch out Mick...he's got a knife!
MICK: That's not a knife.....(produces his big bush knife)....That's a knife ! ....(mugger flees).
Forget about the naive neutral view that they were both 'knives' in the sense of 'cutting implements'. That's NOT how the word is contextually used here in which 'weapon' is implied. Note how the meaning of the word 'knife' is negotiated with respect to the communicative situation. By extrapolation, there are no human context independent words/concepts. There is NO 'state
of being a knife' separate from the behavioral contexts in which 'knife' sets up 'affordancies' (Merleau-Ponty) of behavioral expectation by language users. Concepts require conceptualizers and 'reality' is merely another concept.
...you conveniently forgot the 'other than....etc'.....which I was care to contextually relate to the OP. If you are running another contextual agenda, like 'Maths is the Key', that's your problem !
"Languaging", as Maturana occasionally explains, serves, among other things, to orient. By this he means directing the attention and, consequently, the individual experience of others, which is a way to foster the development of "consensual domains" which, in turn, are the prerequisite for the development of language. - Although the sentence (you might say, the languaging) with which I have here begun is at best a pale imitation of Maturana's style, it does perhaps represent one important aspect of Maturana's system: The circularity which, in one way or another, crops up again and again.
In my interpretation, it is absolutely indispensable that one diligently repeats to oneself, every time one notices circularity in Maturana's expositions, that this circularity is not the kind of slip it would be in most traditional systems of our Western philosophy. It is, on the contrary, a deliberately chosen fundamental condition that arises directly out of the autopoietic model. According to Maturana, the cognizing organism is informationally closed. Given that it can, nevertheless, produce descriptions; i.e., concepts, conceptual structures, theories, and eventually a picture of its world, it is clear that it can do this only by using building blocks which it has gleaned through some process of abstraction from the domain of its own experience. This insight, which Maturana expresses by saying that all cognitive domains arise exclusively as the result of operations of distinction which are made by the organism itself, was one of the points that attracted me to his work the very first time I came across it.
On the basis of considerations, far from those that induced Maturana to formulate the biological idea of autopoiesis, I had come to the same conclusion. My own path (some-what abbreviated and idealized) led from the early doubts of the Pre-Socratics via Montaigne, Berkeley, Vico, and Kant to pragmatism and eventually to Ceccato's "Operational School" and Piaget's "Genetic Epistemology". This might seem irrelevant here, but since Maturana's expositions hardly ever refer to traditional philosophy, it seems appropriate to mention that quite a few of his fundamental assertions can be substantiated by trains of thought which, from time to time, have cropped up in the conventional history of epistemology. Although these trains of thought have occasionally irritated the official discipline of philosophy, they never had a lasting effect and remained marginal curiosities. I would suggest, that the reason for this neglect is that throughout the occidental history of ideas and right down to our own days, two requisites have been considered fundamental in any epistemological venture. The first of these requisites demands that whatever we would like to call "true knowledge" has to be independent of the knowing subject. The second requisite is that knowledge is to be taken seriously only if it claims to represent a world of "things-in-themselves" in a more or less veridical fashion'
Although the sceptics of all ages explained with the help of logical arguments that both these requisites are unattainable, they limited themselves to observing that absolute knowledge was impossible. Only a few of them went a step further and tried to liberate the concept of knowledge from the impossible constraints so that it might be freely applied to what is attainable within the acting subject's experiential world. Those who took that step were branded outsiders and could therefore be disregarded by professional philosophers.
..that psychological construction we call 'time'.