WhoodaThunk wrote:Nimh's comment, "It should also be clear that there's a little more to this than just more Islamist killing in the name of God" was provoking. Let's say the school murders were entirely political and sparked by pent-up hatred against the Russian iron fist. Shouldn't this action (targeting children) be so distasteful to any Chechan of a religious persuasion to deflate support for the separatist cause?
Should hope so, eh. Its hard to gauge what the Chechen popular opinion is like - after all, outsiders (whether media or NGO) have little chance to get in and do independent research without overseeers and stuff.
I think anecdotal evidence shows that though the Russian soldiers are pretty universally loathed, that does not necessarily mean the rebels are liked ... especially since they've gotten to use ever more extreme actions, for which the Chechen population overall then is punished again. I'm sure they'll find enough recruits still, but what the general population thinks ...
Plus, there's always been plenty of sectarianism and rivalries among the Chechen rebels. When extremists like Basayev resorted to ever more violent terrorism it was not at all clear whether it was approved or agreed by people like former President Maskhadov - or whether it wasn't even rather part of his own rival grab for more power and "prestige" among the Chechen militants.
WhoodaThunk wrote:BTW, what IS the case for keeping Chechnya in the Russian federation? Is it merely a matter of preserving national pride for the Russians? Are they afraid of setting a precedent for other breakaway groups
Good question, eh. Yes to both I guess. And more.
Precedence would be pretty fierce - the entire Northern Caucausus consists of small, ethnic-based republics that could then also want to break away from the Russian Federation - not to mention other republics much closer to the Russian centre, like Tatarstan. Still, I dunno. There are few of these Northern-Caucasus republics that have anything like as large an "ethnic" majority as Chechnya, where Chechens make up the overwhelming majority of the population (and did so already before the war). In others, Russians are a huge minority or even a majority, with often a firm hold on political power. Plus the main "wave" of autonomy declarations et cetera dates from the early nineties, decentralisation has pretty much been reversed under Putin.
Another argument would be not so much precedence, but consequence. Chechen rebels have struck in neighbouring Dagestan before, and Dagestan is a veritable mosaic of various ethnic groups. If Chechnya would be an independent state, it could well meddle in Dagestan affairs to the extent where the already extremely tenuous status quo there would fracture along a dozen lines and collapse into chaos. That seems a more serious threat at the moment than that of other republics also massively declaring independence.
Then there is Putin. He came to power on a platform of restoring Russian dignity, prestige, power. He is still very popular as a 'strong' leader. Both times he was elected president, it was partly because of mysterious Chechen terrorist attacks wrecking havoc just before. Promising to fight back is how he made his name.
Even if that fight becomes unpopular, Putin himself, a former KGB man with severe and long-standing loyalties to the concept of a strictly led, powerful Russian state, can be counted on acting on principle here, too.
Even with all that tho, it remains a good question. The Northern Causasus has caused trouble for the Russian empire for, what, two, three centuries now? Why not just give up? National pride (or the political manipulation of such), perhaps.
Plus, its a strategically important area - not perhaps Chechnya itself, but the Caucausus as a whole. Its the gate to Russian influence in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Those countries, again, are in a pivotal location regarding the Caspian Sea, its oil, and the oil's transportation northwards (to Russia) or westwards (to Turkey and the West).
Finally, in as far as Muslim zealotism plays a role, there might be the fear of it bleeding through to other areas with Islam-inspired rebels that Russia considers its "near abroad": Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan.
But whether any of that makes it all worth it? And isn't it just working counterproductively?