MOSCOW DISPATCH
Secret Society
by Masha Gessen
Post date 03.11.04 | Issue date 03.22.04
For the Western press, the good news from Russia just keeps coming. After President Vladimir Putin appointed Mikhail Fradkov as his new prime minister last week, the Los Angeles Times gushed about his choice, highlighting Fradkov's history as a trade minister and diplomat, and noting that Fradkov "could help head off increasing friction with Europe over such issues as the war in the separatist republic of Chechnya, Russian troops in Georgia and Moldova, and Russia's failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on global warming." The New York Times, in an editorial earlier this month, called Fradkov "a promising choice" who has "been doing what Russia needs to do: reform the administration, get the books in order, combat corruption, halt capital flight and work on Russia's international standing." Only The Washington Post, in a piece titled "russians' fears of kremlin reemerge; influence of putin is discerned behind strong-arm tactics," noted that Fradkov's appointment did nothing to alleviate the fear of government repression spreading through Russia, a fear that has driven 33,000 Russians to seek political asylum in industrialized countries in the past year.
What do these refugees know that both Times do not? For one thing, they may know who Mikhail Fradkov is. Both The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times called him "a little-known bureaucrat," and the BBC went so far as to call him an "enigma"--clichés that have been the stock and trade of Russia coverage since Putin became president four years ago. When the Western media calls Putin "enigmatic," it implies that his administration has few consistent principles, no governing ideology, and unclear political loyalties.
That's wrong. While Putin doesn't have a political ideology, he does govern according to a clear set of beliefs about how things should be. Putin, who once served in the KGB, has stacked the Kremlin with former KGB officers. Unsurprisingly, these appointees believe in government dominance over business, civil liberties, and nearly every other aspect of Russian society. Their ascent has been matched by increasingly militant political rhetoric--toward Chechnya or anyone who runs afoul of the Kremlin--and correspondingly heavy-handed action. And, while Fradkov may be portrayed in the West as a "reformer"--in part because he speaks English and Spanish, and has lived in Western Europe as a diplomat--he has close KGB links. And he has already shown himself to be as thuggish as the other former secret police in Putin's Cabinet.
Fradkov is not as powerful as some of Putin's other Cabinet appointees with KGB backgrounds, such as Viktor Ivanov, the deputy head of the presidential administration. But Fradkov has been a civil servant his entire adult life, and he has held a series of Cabinet-level posts in the last dozen years. He is, in other words, very much a known quantity--to anyone who cares to look into his past. In fact, Fradkov appears to have had a classic KGB career. At age 23, he was posted to India as an economic adviser working for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. During the Soviet period, this organization existed in part to procure hard currency and put it into the coffers of Communist organizations overseas--activities illegal under most countries' laws. Since the work was highly sensitive, and staffers lived abroad for long stretches of time, they were required to cooperate to some extent with the KGB. In Fradkov's case, the cooperation appears to have been close. There is a year missing from his resumé--between finishing college and going to India--that, in Soviet times, was a telltale sign of KGB training. Nor, during Soviet times, was there any chance that someone of his age and background--he hailed from a provincial Jewish family with no particular party connections--would have received such a lucrative posting if he was not in fact working for the KGB.
Like Putin's other KGB-associated appointees, Fradkov, who is intensely inarticulate in public, combines a love of undercover operations with a penchant for strong-arm tactics. Between 2001 and 2003, Fradkov headed the Russian tax police, where he obtained a reputation as a "reformer" because he tried to close tax loopholes. Yet, under his leadership, the agency adopted a mafioso enforcement style. Tax raids featured masked policemen, and businessmen were forced to lie facedown on the floor while their offices were searched. In early 2003, Fradkov even issued an order directing tax police officers to gather intelligence on "potential violators," a category so broad it defied definition.
In his public statements since being appointed, Prime Minister Fradkov has promised to fight corruption. Yet anyone familiar with Fradkov's past will shudder at the thought. In the past, Fradkov has used the anti-corruption mantle to strike fear into enemies. When he ran the tax police, Fradkov investigated many prominent businessmen, and the tax police turned into a gang of marauding bandits. Worse, when he worked for the Foreign Trade Ministry in the mid-'90s, Fradkov showed that he was not immune to graft himself: In 1995, Russian newspapers reported that he was at the center of a scandal involving the theft of nearly five billion rubles (more than a million dollars) from the Foreign Trade Ministry's budget, which was distributed to ministry employees, including Fradkov himself. The investigation into the scandal was halted when many documents conveniently burned. What's more, the new Prime Minister Fradkov has influential friends, who may try to use his power to settle their own scores. For example, he has close ties to Peter Aven, one of Russia's most powerful bankers. And, though The New York Times praised Fradkov because he "was not involved in the corrupt privatization schemes under Boris Yeltsin," in actuality Fradkov was a key player in privatizing numerous companies in 1994 and 1995.
Fradkov's appointment also coincides with a reorganization of the government eerily reminiscent of Soviet times. Fradkov and Putin are abolishing nearly half the Cabinet portfolios and replacing them with figurehead ministers responsible for huge areas of policy. Actual policy will be made by largely invisible deputies unaccountable to the public. What's more, the Cabinet will essentially be run from the Kremlin: Putin has announced that he is taking personal control of the Foreign Ministry, the Justice Ministry, and several others. Even social and economic policy, supposedly Fradkov's brief, will be managed by the Kremlin: Putin is sending down an aide to take control.
Fradkov's appointment also contains a chilling message about the future of Russian politics. Putin dismissed his former prime minister and named Fradkov just three weeks before a presidential election--a strange move, since it behooves a candidate, even an incumbent assured of victory, to act as though the election results are not preordained. And the law requires that the government resign right after the election, so Putin will have to renominate Fradkov literally days after his confirmation by parliament. The dismissal and appointment showed that Putin no longer even pretends that he could lose office, that he is no longer willing to observe the normal etiquette of the electoral process. The reshuffle is also intended to show that Putin is a man of action. One of the weird but consistent features of Putin's popularity is that Russians are generally unhappy with their lives and with the government's policies. But polls show that they just love Putin. To ensure that this love continues to flower, someone in government has to be ritually sacrificed on occasion. In the long run, however, Putin is sacrificing all of Russia.
Masha Gessen is a Moscow-based journalist who is currently a Nieman fellow at Harvard University.