I've been mostly quiet on this thread lately, because, since SerSo is from Russia himself, he has much to say of interest to all of us, and noone is waiting for a "Besserwessi", as they call them in post-unification Germany (a "better-knower from the West"). But now I feel I have to provide a counterpoint.
Adding emphases to SerSo's post:
SerSo wrote:As to the trend that now exists in the Russian politics, my opinion is that all democracy in Russia ended up in 1993 when Yeltsin proclaimed the parliament an outlaw though he was not entitled to dissolve it according to the constitution. [..]
What surprises me, is that the west applauded Yeltsin's actions and declared his victory to be a victory of democracy over communism. He used to be "a good guy" then. I see absolutely no difference between him and Putin who was practically nominated by Yeltsin and enjoys all those "president-does-whatever-he wants" laws, which had been pushed by Yeltsin. Both of them are neither democratic nor liberal. What made Putin to be "a bad guy" now?
I wont argue the point of Yeltsin being neither a democrat nor a liberal. After 1991 he had the opportunity to build a genuiniely democratic movement, and he didnt, preferring instead to play divide and rule with many factions, each based on personal loyalty rather than coherent ideology, and enriching "The Family" through corruption.
I do personally think, however undemocratic a move it was, that the 1993 dissolution of parliament was unavoidable. Rutskoy and Khasbulatov were creating a positively parallel state structure, and when the point came that they started having their own armed militias in the streets, something had to be done. (Not to mention Rutskoy's dangerous revanchism, which focused on restoring the Soviet Union.)
Furthermore, I cant look up details right now, but I do think there are
some glaring differences between the Yeltsin era of chaos and corruption and the Putin era of tightening authoritarianism.
For example,
the media. Under Yeltsin, the media were not always professional, not always independent, but they were diverse. Though Yeltsin did momentarily bolster all propaganda means for his re-election ("Ne dai Bog!"), overall the national radio and newspaper landscape offered a place for every political current.
By now, there is not a single national broadcasting media that doesn't submit to the Putin line, with independent criticism restrained to the scope of local radio (Moscow Echo). And freedom of media is, beyond the basic litmus test of free elections, widely used as "measuring stick" for a country's democratic calibre in the West.
Secondly, administrative
centralisation. For better or worse, Yeltsin implemented a wide-scale decentralisation of administrative power. District governors started wielding significant powers, and those of republics like Tatarstan basically had a carte blanche for a while. Yeltsin did start the process of limiting freedom by assigning gradually more power to the governors (who were easier to control), and less to the district parliaments, but still the system had independent-minded, empowered regional authorities in place for a while.
Putin, in his turn, started by recentralising administrative power incrementally, gradually emasculating district authorities. The crown on the process was spectacularly put just last month (?), when a new law was tabled that simply makes governors
appointed, rather than elected, taking the electorate out of the equation altogether.
Parliament, which as you rightly point out was already made largely powerless after '93 by Yeltsin, nevertheless provided various opposition groups with a platform to organise and voice their demands. For sure, we may not have been glad with an opposition that consisted mostly of communists and fascists, but there was pluralism and there were liberal opposition groups too (notably Yabloko).
All thats gone now. The communists have become even more toothless tigers, all the more since Putin is largely implementing their program anyway. There are all of seven liberals left in the 450-member parliament. Zhirinovsky's clownesque fascists remain easily bought off. What is left is a parliament mostly dominated by Putin's personal party, "Unity", which has little in the way of political programme except for loyalty to his leadership; and its satellite party "Fatherland", founded as a regime stooge for the nationalist communists. (It's a classic post-Soviet strategy, used in the Ukraine too: found parties with the same kind of rhetorics as the main opposition parties - a communist-like party, a nationalist-like party - but controlled by people you trust, and ultimately loyal to your Presidency). The last elections were even
boycotted by Yavlinsky's liberals because they saw no way to meaningfully compete in a political and media environment that had become so unfree.
Then there's
the Chechen war. The fact that Putin started it up again in full violent force, where Yeltsin had eventually reached a ceasefire status quo, perhaps in itself does not fall in the category of his democratic credentials. Democratic countries violently deal with separatist movements too - just look at Northern Ireland. But the way in which the "rewind" of the Chechen war takes place speaks volumes.
Human rights organisations have practically all been forced out of the region. International observers get practically no chance to enter, let alone independently gather information anymore. Independent media coverage from Chechnya is now practically non-existent.
It's the difference, one could argue, between "Vietnam" and "Cambodia". In Vietnam, American soldiers committed many atrocities - but they were chronicled, brought out in the open, protested against. Compare Yeltsin's Chechnya war. In Pol Pot's Cambodia, the same and much worse horrors took place - but 99% of it noone even found out about until years later, since they'd been committed sealed in the secrecy of regime control. I'm not saying Chechnya equates with Pol Pot's Cambodia - but thats the difference between Yeltsin's war there and Putins war.
And yes, then there is the
economic recentralisation. Of course we are aware that Khodorkovsky was a corrupted crook, like most all of the oligarchs that took over the reins of the Russian private economy in the 90s. And so its easy to imagine the public sympathy for Putin's clampdown on them.
But it's not a clampdown in the name of transparency, fairness or anti-corruption. Oligarchs who are loyal to Putin, no matter how fraudulent their past (or present, for that matter), can sleep safely, their business interests will not be harmed - let alone their personal safety. Its the odd oligarch that dared still fund an opposition newspaper or TV station, that dared still agitate against Putin's personal power, who is clamped down on, threatened with prison sentences. Whose businesses are basically, and rather unceremoniously, dispossessed by the state, if not one way (directly), then another (by having an obscure, never-heard-of-before, office-less "Baikal" company suddenly buy much of his entire conglomerate).
All the above is by heart, hence no stats or data. But I'd say just a simple run-down like this already shows clearly why one can see a distinct difference between the Yeltsin and Putin regimes even when one
does fully acknowledge that Yeltsin was hardly a democrat either.
While under Yeltsin, Russia was hurtling forward into a corrupt, chaotic, unjust future without much vision whatsoever, Russia now is on a dangerous, and seemingly all too pre-planned track back into the past. I find that more scary, as do many here.
, but please know we appreciate and enjoy your posts. I've noticed that Americans have many more questions for Russians than Russians do for Americans. Still, if we can reciprocate in any way you have only to ask the question. 
