What is knowledge?

i've always heard that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing

but, i'm assuming it took a lot of knowledge to build the first atomic bomb

this thinking thing can be hard work

So the question is: do you agree that knowledge is justified true belief? If not, why not?

i tend to leave the justifying, truthifying and beliefication to the sort of folks who like that kind of thing

Oh. I just got a bit of knowledge. If I down-vote my own thread, it doesn't show up on the list of new topics anymore. If I down-vote a post... it disappears. Hmm...

Philosophers have often differentiated between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', which is reflected by different verbs in other languages. Both are concerned with 'the ability to predict' (or post-dict). The only difference between 'belief' and 'knowledge' is degree of of confidence in 'successful' prediction, and that degree is subject to social consensus in shifting contexts. Such consensus is always involved in 'the justification process' even if the 'social element' is an internal 'argument' in the mind of a single individual.

A wrong prediction wouldn't suggest the existence of knowledge, so you're saying that knowledge is concerned with the ability to accurately predict. Correct?

And you distinguish belief from knowledge by saying belief requires no justification. Knowledge does, though the means of justification varies.

One among many possible definitions on what knowledge entails is to know how to make sensible, adequate, good questions. Questions that shred a new light on the possible pleiade of answers to any old problem. Straight forward intelligible answers are born of learning how to make proper questioning.

Yes. That is what I am saying. Of course successful predictions do not imply 'truth' except in a transient or temporary manner which is subject to revision or modification.

Why is the addition of a subjective belief required? Can I be said to "know" a given proposition on the basis that I believe, with justification, that it is "true" but refuse to "believe" it? Can I really be said to "believe" that a given proposition is "true," if, for example, I refuse to acknowledge or adhere to it in practice?

Socrates (Plato) answered that question this way: You don't really "know" that it is wrong to steal if you nonetheless steal something. If you actually "knew," then you wouldn't do it.

Is that accurate, ya think?

When it comes to the question of whether a person really "knows" something, I think the best measure, to that person at least, kinda comes down to this.

The more cocksure I am, the more I can say I "know."

Edit: In this post I meant to say:

Can I be said to "know" a given proposition on the basis that I acknowledge [not "believe"] , with justification, that it is "true" but refuse to "believe" it?

Funny...you know alot about "free will"...

Generally speaking, if you acknowledge that a statement is true, it follows that you are willing to assert it. It follows from that that you believe it.

I agree, but my question wasn't about what follows "generally speaking." I was asking if the B part of JTB was really required.

Suppose JTB was changed to JTA (justified true assertion)? Would that make any difference in the analysis of what "knowledge" is? For Plato it would, as I have already noted.