I didn't put every single country we've intervened in, O'Bill, just in the interests of time, but I was hoping others would do that, and also add their thoughts/beliefs on what the purpose was for each.
Panzade, I don't think you missed it, if you were there! Here's one page that tells a bit about it: (
Note that many of these countries are being made to close down privately-owned businesses and privitize stuff that rightly belongs to the public, too)
Military dictatorships ruled Argentina from June 1966 to 1983. Although agriculturally a prosperous and thriving economy, Argentina's foreign debt grew from $8 billion to $43 billion because the military needed money to purchase arms for the
suppression of leftist parties, including students, labor, and others-
a policy backed and supported by the U.S.-culminating in 30,000 "disappeared ones" and torture and killing of thousands more; and, secondly, to fight the Falkland Island (Malvinas Islands) war against England in 1982.
Debt continued to grow to $143 billion by the end of 2001, while the interest owed between 1992 and 2001 amounted to $82 billion. Inflation escalated, goods became extremely expensive because wage increases did not keep up with the inflation rate, and people lost their purchasing power.
With high inflation and unstable economic conditions,
in 1991 Argentina borrowed money from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF). To obtain the loan,
Argentina had to institute the WB/IMF Structural Adjustment Program that requires, (1) control of inflation, (2) privatization of state-owned enterprises, (3) opening up the country to foreign imports and investments, (4) no tariffs on imports, (5) freedom for corporations to expatriate profits, (6) suppression of labor.
Public sector enterprises were sold to MNCs and private owners and almost all social gains were eliminated. Poverty and inequality grew, tens of thousands of state workers lost their jobs, and unemployment rose from 6 percent to over 15 percent (late to 25 percent). Through the sale of the state (public) enterprises the government had collected $49 billion, which maintained an ersatz of a relatively prosperous economy and
Argentina was touted as a WB/IMF "success story."
To control inflation in 1991, Argentina pegged its peso to the U.S. dollar-a fixed exchange rate-plus it put restraints on the issuance of money to control hyper inflation.
Because the country on its own did not generate enough dollars, the domestic money supply of dollars had to be backed by dollar inflow from outside. Parity between dollar and peso
assured investors that they would not lose capital due to possible devaluation of the Argentina peso.
Foreign money poured in during the 1990s ($70,000 million). Sixty percent of such investment was aimed at acquiring public entities or already existing private companies.
Development of new industries and creation of new jobs was low.
Argentina's currency was at par with the dollar (one peso equals one U.S. dollar) and hence strong; other countries had devalued their currencies and the exchange rate against the dollar was much lower, that is, weak currency.
This situation caused Argentinean goods to be overpriced in the international market because the same goods were sold cheaper by other countries. Furthermore, when Argentina eliminated tariff barriers, as required by WB/IMF loans, a flood of cheaper imported goods from developed countries brought Argentinean industry almost to a standstill and recession began.
In June 2000 the Argentine government announced an austerity plan to fulfill the country's commitment to the IMF, which was to reduce the budget deficit from $7.1 billion to $4.5 billion. This would be achieved by reducing public spending by $938 million,
cutting employees salaries by 12 percent; closing some of the government offices, eliminating labor benefits, suspending public work projects, and increasing taxes on the middle class. Industrial production had slipped in January 2001 by 4.2 percent and it was predicted that it would shrink by 8 percent in 2002.
Argentina's economy continued to shed 80,000 jobs per month and showed a 20 percent decline in industrial production during the first quarter of 2002. Tens of thousands lost their jobs and by June 2002 the unemployment rate was estimated to be 25 percent. People lost their purchasing power, exacerbating the existing recession and depression set in.
The new finance minister warned that without layoffs and other spending cuts the fiscal deficit would reach $8.5 billion instead of the $6.5 billion required by the IMF as a condition for the $40 billion credit line granted by international lending groups.
By November 2001 the country was finding it impossible to meet the $19 billion dollars annually in interest payment on the foreign debt. In December 2001 Argentina failed to make interest payment of $1.3 billion on foreign debt and defaulted on its loan payment.
On February 21, 2001 thousands of unemployed marched from La Matanza-an industrial town 28 kilometers from Buenos Aires with the highest unemployment rate in the country-to the capital. The same day Children of the People marched from La Quiaca (a town in the far north) demanding work for their parents and schools for themselves. Another group of marchers arrived in the capital asking for "bread and work." Twenty months later, on November 8, 2002, a group of children reached the capital in a "March for Life and Against Hunger" after traveling 4,500 kilometers from the Misiones province.
Workers unions called a national strike that affected transportation, health care, education, and the judicial system. Protesters blocked roads and railway lines. In May 2001, 22 major roads running through the Buenos Aires province to the federal capital were blocked, and since then, on any given day, as many as 50 blockades of highways and roads occur throughout the countryside.
The final collapse of the Argentina government under President De la Rua began on December 17, 2001 when the economy minister Cavallo announced $9 billion in spending cuts for the 2002 budget.
A wave of food riots led by thousands of poor families, joined by middle-class women, made poor by inflation and unemployment took to the streets banging empty pots and pans, called "cacerolazos." By December 19 massive looting, especially of food stores, spread to many parts of the country, along with anti-government riots. Violence erupted and by December 22 the death toll had mounted to 31, primarily due to police shootings. About 2,000 were arrested and thousands were injured. President De la Rua resigned on December 21 and left the presidential palace, along with Cavallo. In the coming weeks three other presidents were installed, but resigned. Duhalde-the fifth president-who had lost the presidential election to De la Rua in 1999 accepted the presidency to serve out the rest of De la Rua's term.
People began to withdraw money from banks. A report from the Central Bank confirmed that in November 2001, $4.9 billion was withdrawn.
Rich depositors who had more than $250,000 in the bank withdrew 47.4 percent of their money, whereas small depositors who had up to $10,000 were allowed to withdraw only 9 percent of their funds." The state, fearing its bankruptcy, closed the banks and blocked withdrawals. It had two reasons for blocking withdrawals.
Depositors had lost confidence in the peso and hence would create a run on the banks, leaving little money for the government to pay its WB/IMF debt. Second, because Argentina's peso was tied to the U.S. dollar at par, depositors wanted their money in dollars, not pesos. By March 2002 the government devalued the peso to 50 percent, which gutted the savings and slashed the living standard of most Argentineans.
Foreign banks withdrew hundreds of millions of dollars and put them in offshore banks.
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/South_America/Unstable_Argentina.html