@fresco,
You always talk about "naïve realism," and you always make it out to be an issue of "epistemology."
Realism aint that. Fun aside, Sokal is making a "realist" claim as a matter of ontology, NOT epistemology. To quote wiki (from among many possible):
Quote:Contemporary philosophical realism is the belief that some aspect of our reality is ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc....Realism can also be promoted in an unqualified sense, in which case it asserts the mind-independent existence of a visible world...
If you don't like that, you can go with solipsism (as you do). You made this clear in your first post in this thread:
Quote: Ostensibly these terms refer to potentially independent (objective) ontological entities. But a transcendent position might be that all "things" are evoked by that form of communicative process termed "language"...
Sokal is clearly referring to an ONTOLOGICAL stance. You seem to think epistemology IS ontology. Hence you set up straw men when you try to change the topic, then argue against "it."
At the same time, you shift your OWN position to one of epistemology, after presenting it as an ontological question (all "things" are evoked..."reality as a social construction").
This old bait and switch tactic gets tiresome, and your attempt to reduce Sokal's (insincere) statements to epistemological statements is typical of you. It does not even address the question at hand, let alone answer it.
Sokal posed a question for your ilk: You want to jump out of his 21st story apartment to see if "reality is a social construction" and that "things" are NOT actually (as opposed to merely "ostensibly") "independent (objective) ontological entities?"
Well, do ya? Answer the question for once, rather than ducking it.