RP:
I am not sure that you can claim that simply because an opnipotent being gives 'freedom' to another being that that being does not have freedom.
I think you are confusing two types of contingency:
1) Contingent for its being: As in the Aritotilean efficient cause.
2) Contingent for its existence: a sort of continual contingency - like sun light for the continual existence of plant life.
These do not necessarily coexist. God, even myself, can create a being, such as my son, who is dependant on me for his existence, but not dependant on me for his continual existance. (Say after he learns to feed himself anyway
)
However, the problem you seem to be grappeling with is theodicy - or lack of theodicy as it were. Evil is a serious problem for the theist and one that seems at least very difficult to get rid of, if not impossible logically for the theist to rid his beliefs of.
The beliver must see natural disasters as either not evil or as an amount of evil that can be outwighed by other portions of nature that can retain God'd omnibenevolence.
One way is Augustines lack of natural evil, where evil is only in the intentions of man. Natural disasters and accidents are not evil because they are intentionless. Hunger and starvation can be seen as evil only in the action (or inaction) of others. Because there is evil in the world can be seen as the natural results of others. God, then, to retain our ability to be free, must allow these evils.
However, one step the theist misses is that free will and free good must be better than unfree or determined good. However, I can see when I coerce my son into good, it is not as good as when he does things of his own accord and decisions.
I am not saying this is air tight - nor easy (18000 deaths per day can't be easy) just possible to defend.
TF