Precognition and the Big Bang

From personal experience I don't doubt that we can see things or feel things before they occur, among other curiosities. This means getting rid of old agencies like Time and Space and, without introducing new agencies or forces, replacing them with something that allows the natural order but also lets in another, where things are related by association and not by continua like space or time. Earlier I gave a suggestion of how this could be done on analytic or logical/grammatical grounds.

Materialists who need a lot more persuasion to let precognition and other "mumbo-jumbo" into a physical universe may be inspired by the unplaced-ness of quantum events; while cosmologists may want to re-look at the way they define dimension, which need not always manifest spatially (spatiality may be a cognitive requirement, not necessarily or even logically a physical one). Three dimensions appears spatially, while one dimension might manifest as the singularity of identity, such as we find in "I". This treatment is a sort of integrative dualism.

Associating the singularity of the "I" with the singularity of the Universe links us to all events. Such a nonsense gains a small measure of credibility when we consider that the singularity or beginning of the universe is, at least in one respect, with us now (us=the "I")- for particles or items travelling at the speed of light. This is a dualism, though not a strict dualism of two independents - mind and matter.

To help to forge a more complete link or association between the singularity of the "I" with the apparent physical singularity of the Universe requires a different treatment of what appears to be two entirely different concepts - the cognitive "I" and a physical singularity. Such an association is gained on two fronts
1) when we consider the place of being, where an identity is placed or unified with its object - unavoidable in a singularity. This isn't merely a physical co-incidence.
2) The mooted behaviour of the physical singularity corresponds with the behaviour of the "I" singularity. Both vanish and appear a-causally, that is, without physical cause. Materiality, it seems, comes after them.

There are at least two popular alternatives to the treatment given here. Both alternatives privilege one set of object behaviours over another in an attempt to get rid of one of them. Materialisms of various sorts would get rid of mind or "I" (described as a fleeting hallucination or other under-privileging term), while idealists would get rid of matter. These treatments diminish the conceptual profile of the unfavoured term by reducing all of its descriptions to its otherwise co-incident partner (such as in "all mind is matter") ....

...such alternatives fall foul of either extreme animism or logical nihilism.

Extreme animism, because in the absence of any conditions that help to identify the limits of objects, objects must somehow identify their own limits. For example, in the absence of a cognitive ("mind") requirement like "entertainment" a material TV is indistinguishable from the carpet it stands on. The alternative is that "entertainment" is bound within the TV itself - this is extreme animism.
Logical nihilism, because in the denial of extreme animism the alternative is to have no conditions for setting boundaries - no objects at all.

This latter discussion does not add anything to the arguments I posed in the first half of this post, but it does give us pause for thought before turning to some of the standard alternatives presented later.