I cannot agree. Evidence from empirical, naturalistic science is very much to the point in a discussion of facticity. Meillassoux's definition of facticity is the ultimate example of question begging, because it assumes as a premise an absence of reason for reality. That is called, in the parlance of inappropriate card players, stacking the deck. Essentially, you have now defaulted to your favorite rhetorical position, which is that if one does not agree with you, it must obviously be because that one is not capable of understanding the subtleties of your religious faith . . . excuse me, your opinion.
Wow. I'm glad somebody else brought up Meillassoux.
Just to further expound on the reference to Meillassoux, in "After Finitude" he uses facticity as a way to turn correlationism on it's head. "Facticity...", as Meillassoux notes, "pertains to those structural invariants that supposedly govern the world..." (pp. 39). These invariants change with different correlationist thinkers, but they all have a general characteristic to them: there can be no reason given to them. Further, and this is pertinent to Setanta's comment:
"What I experience with facticity is not an objective reality, but rather the unsurpassable limits of objectivity confronted with the fact that there is a world; a world that is describable and perceptible, and structured by determinate invariants. It is the sheer fact of the world's logicality, of its givenness in a representation, which evades the structures of logical and representational reason. The in-itself becomes opaque to the point where is is no longer possible to maintain that it exists, so that the term tends to disappear to the benefit of facticity alone.
But Meillassoux isn't using facticity himself as a means to establish a new invariant. Instead, he wants to break through facticity, showing that correlationists, from Kant onward, simply haven't gone far enough in their thinking.
Hope this helps.