@Cyracuz,
Wittgenstein said "meaning is use". If we look how the word "reality" is used in normal (non-philosophical discourse) it refers to disputes about what is
contextually the case.
e.g. "She thinks she can cook but in reality her meals are awful". or "Food aid in famine areas seems to alleviate a problem, but in reality it is only a temporary solution which exacerbates the long term problem".
But when philosophers "take that word on holiday" (Wittgenstein phrase for out of normal context) it can differentially refer to Kant's
noumena, or Heiddeger's
Sein (being) or indeed to any number of concepts whose significance is embedded in whole and often unstated philosophical positions which have evolved over time as offshoots and contrasts with each other. This point is reinforced by GH's Benjamin Lee Whorf citation above.
The problem here is that we have a claim about "facticity" which is antithetical to views associated with the technically defined position "naive realism" ...a position which we
all pragmatically tend take on a daily basis, because we parochially gloss over the distinction between functional persistence and structural permanence Attempts are then made to remove or reduce that (uncomfortable) antithesis by suggesting for example that the claim is about "description of reality", not "reality" itself. But for those (like you and I) who argue, contrary to dictionary/lay useage, that what we call "reality" is culturally experiential and ephemeral rather than independently ontological, there
is no antithesis. On the contrary, there is a justification of our position.