How can I understand Derrida's reading of Husserl?

truth
Sorry, Sally. Good luck!

I haven't read Derrida or Husserl, but if you explain what Pheonmenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology are perhaps I could be of more help. Links would also be helpful.

Good point jonny.

The only thing I can think of is that consciousness or subjectivity cannot be observed; is nothing ?'objective' and as such is nothing. This ?'nothing' which is no ?'thing' is not recognized in psychology but is in transcendental phenomenology, I think. And it is not transcendental as nothing is. Meaning transcendent is just a way of saying, "Not This Not That", or non-objective. It does not imply a transcendent realty else where.

This existence as perception and observation requiries a subjectivity that is non-objective or non-observable.

Here's something found:

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DERRIDA-HUSSERL: TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE


SELF-PRESENCE AND RE-PRESENTATION

One final point remains in the parallel that can be drawn between Derrida and Husserl. It concerns the ultimate basis of the subject's openness to language. According to Derrida, "the sub-ject cannot speak without giving himself a representation of his speaking ..." (SP, 57). The fact that he can only indicatively refer to himself points to his nonself-presence. The latter makes pos-sible his openness to linguistic signs. In the Logical Investigations, Husserl takes the opposite position. We have an immediate self-presence. Thus, we need not assert "that in soliloquy one speaks to oneself and employs words as signs, i.e., as indications, of one's own inner experi-ences" (LI, 279). Derrida's critique of Husserl begins with this remark. In his view, it closes off the subject to the possibility of language. In his later years, however, Husserl reversed himself. Abandoning the notion of a direct self-presence, he also came to the position that our objective self-presence occurs through representation. This reversal is demanded by his notion of a self as a nowness defined by a centering temporal environment. To objectively present himself to himself, the subject must represent himself in terms of this environment. Doing so, he objectively repre-sents his nowness, his present functioning, in terms of what is not now.
Husserl's position depends on our distinguishing between our reflective and our prereflec-tive self-awareness. As noted, we have an immediate prereflective self-awareness through our on-going present activity of retention and protention. This awareness is inherent in the self-reference of these processes. Since they are part of our present functioning--being, in fact, the functioning that defines us as temporal centers--this awareness is direct. It is, however, only a background awareness. When we want to focus on ourselves in an explicit manner, we have to reflect on our-selves. The difficulty here is that reflection always splits the self. On the one side there is the re-flecting self, the self that is actively functioning. On the other, there is the self that is reflected on. As Husserl describes this: "Whenever I am occupied with myself and my specific egological func-tions, I have this distinction between myself and what I am occupied with, i.e., between my being actively engaged and that with which I am actively engaged." Given that the latter is the object of my reflection, my "actively engaged" reflecting self is not itself objectively present. For Husserl, this nonpresence is its anonymity. As he states the conclusion, "The actively functioning ?'I do,' ?'I discover,' is constantly anonymous." It cannot be made an object of reflection....
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Though I know little...and I would think sally would be acquainted with this.

I have no idea what sources you have read, but I did find this book:

Derrida and Husserl
The Basic Problem of Phenomenology
Leonard Lawlor

truth
Sally, you must keep in mind that the original insights of Tywvel and any of us who might make some offerings, are not likely to fly with your committee. Your problem has to do with TECHNICAL matters closely connected to the words of Husserl and Derrida. You simply have to track down the relevant statements of those two philosophers and deal in terms of them.
AFTER you have obtained your Ph.D., because of your COMPLIANCE with the rules of your department's game, then you would do well to interact with original thinkers like Tywvel for the jarring thoughts that may stimulate publications by which you will gain tenure in some college or university. A dissertation is no "venue" for daring or original thinking--unless, of course, you should be blessed with a very enlightened dissertation committee. I repeat: good luck.
p.s. I have chaired and served on scores of dissertation committees.