As far as Kant was concerned the answer has been given and put to bed.
Well done, above. Also, many still do not understand, even after well over two centuries, that what is found in nature either today or in the past or in the future has no major, altering impact upon his scheme. Kant himself re-directed theoretical philosophy or speculative thought at the empirical world, with the physical sciences continuing as the grunt researcher and tester of "appearances". Giving his full blessing to a tomorrow's uncovering of countless new discoveries, as well as to the inventing of a parade of novel abstract constructs (as projected now upon the conditioned world rather than the supersensible).
Going back to Kant's putative lack of observing "dogs"... We can find Kant mentioning them at least once -- in the Critique of Practical Reason
, pertaining to their potential for arousing love and other emotions -- in the course of a segment about "respect". But he certainly wasn't trying to derive "ought" from the relational inter-dependencies of such phenomena. Knowing well that this unsystematic, variable muddle of feelings, consequences, and social habits which passes for "morality" with many of us today, is one of the products resulting from that.
 "The ought expresses a kind of necessity and connection with causes, which we do not find elsewhere in the whole of nature. The understanding can know in nature only what is present, past, or future. It is impossible that anything in it ought
to be different from what it is in reality, in all these relations of time. Nay, if we only look at the course of nature, the ought has no meaning whatever. We cannot ask, what ought to be in nature, as little as we can ask, what qualities a circle ought to possess. We can only ask what happens in it, and what qualities that which happens has.
" --Critique of Pure Reason
 "The enlarging of our views in mathematics
, and the possibility of new discoveries
, are infinite; and the same is the case with the discovery of new properties of nature
, of new powers and laws
, by continued experience and its rational combination. But limits cannot be mistaken here, for mathematics [and natural philosophy that utilizes it] refers to appearances only
, and what cannot be an object of sensuous contemplation, such as the concepts of metaphysics and of morals, lies entirely without its sphere, and it can never lead to them; neither does it require them
. [...] For these explanations must only be grounded upon that which as an object of sense can belong to experience, and be brought into connection with our actual perceptions and empirical laws." --Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics
 "Hence technically-practical principles belong to theoretical philosophy (natural science)
, whereas those morally-practical alone form the second part, that is, practical philosophy (ethical science)
." --Critique of Judgement
 "Hence the division of philosophy falls properly into two parts, quite distinct in their principles -- a theoretical, as philosophy of nature, and a practical, as philosophy of morals (for this is what the practical legislation of reason by the concept of freedom is called). [...In the garbled past before the critiques, however...] a gross misuse of the terms has prevailed; for what is practical according to concepts of nature has been taken as identical with what is practical according to the concept of freedom, with the result that a division has been made under these heads of theoretical and practical, by which, in effect, there has been no division at all (seeing that both parts might have similar principles)." --Critique of Judgement