there is a fundamental reality

@Setanta,

I have consistently pointed anybody who has the stamina and mental ability to the plethora of literature and evidence with respect to these views on cognition and perception, which have gained the high ground largely due to the spectacular and expensive failure of "naive realism" in AI. I do not intend to give an exposition here.
As an introduction I would recommend this:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/

1 Reply

@Cyracuz,

What a beautiful thread this has turned out to be. I agree that FUNDAMENTAL reality when approached as the goal of a Grand Reductionism, something sought "all the way down to the bottom" is a form of religious foundation. But as far as I'm concerned it is harmless compared to the foundationalism of theistic religion in which our empirical world is denigrated as unreal and worthless compared to the terrain of the Divine Afterlife.
I reject theoretical efforts to get to a "bottom" not because I believe there is no bottom; I cannot know that. My rejection rests on the presumption that the bottom is INTELLECTUALLY impossible. How will we know when we have arrived at it? At the same time I presume that mystics experience or realize a kind of transcendent reality (actually a refined version of our mundane world) beyond which they sense there is no need to continue.
I am assuming that even when theoretical physicists determine they cannot go further the more philosophically inclined among them will suffer a haunting regret that they cannot imagine how to proceed. They will remain with a feeling of need, what Buddhists call Dukkha or the discontent of craving.

1 Reply

@wandeljw,

I think you guys are missing my point. I am not saying that Ptolemy was correct, only that his ideas had some practical value.

This is a significant point, especially when we consider that the practical usefulness of our modern ideas is to a large extent what decides their "correctness".

If a system as flawed as Ptolemy's could be used to successfully navigate distances that took weeks or months to travel, it is likely that at least some of what we know today is some gimped half-truth that at some point in the future will turn out to be a serious mistake.

2 Replies

@Setanta,

I did not say that Ptolemaic astronomy was used for navigation. I said that it can be used for navigation. Other methods are much more precise, but that is beside the point. The point is that something fundamentally flawed can simultaneously be useful, which can lead us to believe that it is actually not flawed.

1 Reply

@JLNobody,

Quote:

I agree that FUNDAMENTAL reality when approached as the goal of a Grand Reductionism, something sought "all the way down to the bottom" is a form of religious foundation. But as far as I'm concerned it is harmless compared to the foundationalism of theistic religion in which our empirical world is denigrated as unreal and worthless compared to the terrain of the Divine Afterlife.

I agree. But that might be because of my (and perhaps you) cultural assumptions. Our values seem to determine the course our evolution takes. Since the industrial revolution the world has taken a turn that we now have learned is harmful to our environment and to ourselves. And yet this development continues, perhaps because in our system of priority the immediate gains outweigh the long term losses.

0 Replies

@Cyracuz,

Quote:

I think you guys are missing my point. I am not saying that Ptolemy was correct, only that his ideas had some practical value.

That is the key issue, and possible the only issue worth discussing.
The extrapolation to why things work is doomed to an infinite regress if that quest is for an ultimate or "fundamental level". There may be "deeper" levels in which extended confidence resides, but no bed-rock.

0 Replies

@Cyracuz,

Cyracuz wrote:

I think you guys are missing my point. I am not saying that Ptolemy was correct, only that his ideas had some practical value.

This is a significant point, especially when we consider that the practical usefulness of our modern ideas is to a large extent what decides their "correctness".

If a system as flawed as Ptolemy's could be used to successfully navigate distances that took weeks or months to travel, it is likely that at least some of what we know today is some gimped half-truth that at some point in the future will turn out to be a serious mistake.

Okay, I see your point. I only objected earlier to the statement that Ptolemy's system "works." For centuries, many knew that Ptolemy's system had major problems. Science may not arrive at absolute truth, but strives to find more accurate explanations.

1 Reply

@Cyracuz,

How?

0 Replies

@fresco,

I'm sure you don't intend to give an exposition, because, in fact, you cannot justify accepting "embodied cognition" on the one hand, while rejecting an external, absolute reality on the other hand. If you reject a reality independent of cognition, upon what basis can you reasonably allege that a brain exists, never mind any other physical organs? If you assert that a brain and other physical organs exist, especially those which have a sensory function, upon what reasonable basis do you then assert that it is only the action of those organs which create reality?

Essentially, your argument is bankrupt, because you insist on conflating descriptions of reality with reality itself. You won't acknowledge that you are dealing only in descriptions of reality because you've got your academic career invested in that pathetic dog and pony show.

1 Reply

@Setanta,

I see...you mean you don't have the ability or the inclination to tackle the article...I quite understand. Wink

1 Reply

@wandeljw,

Quote:

Science may not arrive at absolute truth, but strives to find more accurate explanations.

That is true. I think that the most successful scientists are the ones who don't mind being wrong. After all, progress is sometimes achieved by correcting past mistakes. That means that if those mistakes weren't made, progress would perhaps not be made either. In that sense, mistakes pave the way to success.

0 Replies

@fresco,

I read the article, clown, and was as unimpressed by the temporizing, the selective, inferential recognition of some kind of reality, as i am with your silliness.

1 Reply

Cyracuz, i'm still waiting for you to explain to me how Ptolemaic astronomy was used for navigation.

0 Replies

@Setanta,

You read it ? ...Oh good ! Then perhaps you can explain what you find problematic about this bit which is an introduction to the research of Varela, Thomson et al.

Quote:

Varela, Thompson and Rosch argued that the standard division between pre-given, external features of the world and internal symbolic representations should be dropped, as it is unable to accommodate the feedback from embodied actions to cognition via the actions of a situated cognitive agent. The fundamental differences between their perspective and classical views lies in the answers to the questions of what cognition is, how it works, and when a system functions adequately.

Traditional accounts basically state that there are no computations without representations, and view cognition as successfully functioning when any device can support and manipulate symbols to solve the problem given to the system. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch introduced the concept of enaction to present and develop a framework that places strong emphasis on the idea that the experienced world is portrayed and determined by mutual interactions between the physiology of the organism, its sensorimotor circuit and the environment. Their emphasis on the structural coupling of brain-body-world constitutes the kernel of their program of embodied cognition, building on the classical phenomenological idea that cognitive agents bring forth a world by means of the activity of their situated living bodies. As the metaphor of “bringing forth a world” of meaningful experience implies, on this view knowledge emerges through the primary agent's bodily engagement with the environment, rather than being simply determined by and dependent upon either pre-existent situations or personal construals.

One implication of this view is that only a creature with certain features—e.g., eyes, hands, legs, and skills—can possess certain kinds of cognitive capacities. This is because cognition is a dynamic sensorimotor activity, and the world that is given and experienced is not only conditioned by the neural activity of the subject, but is essentially enacted in that it emerges through the bodily activities of the organism. This general approach encourages a view of enaction as essentially distinct from computation, as it is traditionally conceived. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch's most detailed illustration of their perspective is contained in their discussion of color experience and categorization, a discussion that received much attention in other venues

If you understand it (and I have my doubts), I assume you are merely disagreeing with the empirically supported argument I have highlighted. i.e. you are taking the layman's (pre-Wittgenstein)view of the "representational nature of language". That is equivalent to saying "Sod their research, and sod Wittgenstein...I say they are wrong ! "

2 Replies

@fresco,

Sure, that it assumes a reality (brains, sensory organs providing stimuli to said brains), which relies upon a consensus about how that reality functions--after which point, you go on to deny the consensus of practitioners of naturalistic science about the results of the application of their metrics to the investigation of other phenomena. In essence, you want to have your cake, and eat it, too. You want to assert a reality . . .

Quote:

One implication of this view is that only a creature with certain features—e.g., eyes, hands, legs, and skills—can possess certain kinds of cognitive capacities.

. . . while denying any other assertions of reality. Eyes, hands, legs and skills (that's a pretty hilarious list) are a reality which you are willing to accept, while denying others.

1 Reply

By the way, when you sneer at me to suggest that i'm too stupid or lazy to read and understand any particular screed which you favor as a statement from authority(-ies), you can expect that i will continue to refer to with such terms as clown. If you insult me, i'll insult you in return. Sauce for the goose makes sauce for the gander, Bubba.

0 Replies

@fresco,

You read it ? ...Oh good ! Then perhaps you can explain what you find problematic about this bit which is an introduction to the research of Varela, Thomson et al.

Quote:

... the whole blinking bit would have benefitted from the assistance of a good editor ...

0 Replies

The obfuscation of linguistic overelaboration is essential to the constuction and maintenance of the smoke and mirrors.

0 Replies

I honestly do not see why cognitive science should dictate the issue of reality. Reality has a much longer history than cognitive science.

0 Replies

@Setanta,

No it does NOT assume a "reality". It uses "physiological findings" as one temporary starting point from which linguistic behaviour and its exchange tokens (i.e.words like "reality") can be studied. That is what you do not understand. From such a viewpoint neither "reality" nor any other noun has status in its own right. The value of a token like the word "reality" is always contextual and never absolute, and linguistic behaviour cannot be divorced from bodily behaviour, perceptual behaviour, or other cognitive processes.

It's a subtle point, and one need not necessarily classify themselves as stupid if they don't understand it.

4 Replies

there is a fundamental reality

Related Topics

Quick Links

My Account

able2know