By "epistemological pessimists" you are referring to skeptics? If so I would include Hume but not Kant, except for the latter's belief that we can know nothing of the realm of noumenal reality other its bare existence.
Partly yes, in this being used rather than "skeptics" because of Kant. "epistemological pessimist - one who holds that we cannot know or discover whether theories are true, but only which ones are compatible with the data, and of these, which are preferable on grounds such as simplicity and/or other pragmatic criteria."
-- Susan Haack's definition, provided second-hand in Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics
As I've indicated frequently, I precariously hold that we cannot know the ultimate "metaphysical" nature of Reality by means of the intellect (by means of language, logic, mathematics, etc) which is limited by our own physiological/neurological nature. I guess that makes me a skeptic. I "feel" that the world is a unity and that we cannot uncover it's "secrets" dualistically which makes me also a monist (but not what you call a "mind monist". I cannot adopt an either-or bias when it comes to the contrast-set, materialism vs. idealism. Mind seems to be a function of brain and "brain" is a mental conception--here the arrows of causation, such as they are, point both ways). Enough about me, now let's talk about your ideas: what do you think about what I've just said?
I have a practical attitude of latching onto whatever "view" seems to better work for or fit a situation. This may even include dualism upon occasion, since I'm a participant in everyday life and its traditions; and just as suddenly I could switch to reductive physicalism if I encounter a driver on the road whose behavior is altered by the influence of alcohol. But I don't mistake the "local" effectiveness as proof that any overarching scheme my coping tool selection belongs to is the Truth of Truths. Primitive peoples survived in ancient times without the current knowledge we have today -- that is, just treating a spear as a spear, rather than a structure of strange quantum stuff or part of a planet revolving around a star, actually did work. Likewise, Tandar the Mighty lacked the benefit of a mobile phone to take on his lengthy hunting trips away from the tribe.
So we're probably close to the same territory when it comes to "ultimate". On average I tend toward reluctant belief in what I call an impartial level
, which vacillates between something like an unknown neutral monism and Kant's noumenal world (though I see no reason for attaching "world" to a lack of space, time, relation, etc; things without a world).