bio-naturalism (Searle) vs. "dual properties"

I can't find a reference to "dual properties theory", but bio-naturalism is monist (no separation of "mind"/"brain"....i.e. no isomorphism).

hi"fresco" .
I'm afraid I (too much) freely called "dual properties" what is usually known as "property dualism" .
At my low level of philosophical understanding, , an excelent discussion on this type of non-reducible physicalism can be found in Wiky , under
"property dualism"

In his excellent book "Mind" J. Searle, describing his bio-naturalism, tries to find differences from the "property dualism' .There are these differences
I can't understand , whichexplains my question here!

He has a paper specifically devoted to defending his distinction of the two.

Why I Am Not A Property Dualist: http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/searle-final.pdf

Excerpts:

"To many people biological naturalism looks a lot like property dualism. Because I believe property dualism is mistaken, I would like to try to clarify the differences between the two accounts and try to expose the weaknesses in property dualism. This short paper then has the two subjects expressed by the double meanings in its title: why my views are not the same as property dualism, and why I find property dualism unacceptable. . . ."

". . . The property dualist and I are in agreement that consciousness is ontologically irreducible. The key points of disagreement are that I insist that from everything we know about the brain, consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes; and for that reason I deny that the ontological irreducibility of consciousness implies that consciousness is something ‘over and above’, something distinct from, its neurobiological base. No, causally speaking, there is nothing there, except the neurobiology, which has a higher level feature of consciousness. In a similar way there is nothing in the car engine except molecules, which have such higher level features as the solidity of the cylinder block, the shape of the piston, the firing of the spark plug, etc. ‘Consciousness’ does not name a distinct, separate phenomenon, something over and above its neurobiological base, rather it names a state that the neurobiological system can be in. Just as the shape of the piston and the solidity of the cylinder block are not something over and above the molecular phenomena, but are rather states of the system of molecules, so the consciousness of the brain is not something over and above the neuronal phe- nomena, but rather a state that the neuronal system is in. . . ."

"... Both materialism and dualism are trying to say something true, but they both wind up saying something false. The materialist is trying to say, truly, that the universe consists entirely of material phenomena such as physical particles in fields of force. But he ends up saying, falsely, that irreducible states of consciousness do not exist. The dualist is trying to say, truly, that ontologically irreducible states of consciousness do exist, but he ends up saying, falsely, that these are not ordinary parts of the physical world. The trick is to state the truth in each view without saying the falsehood. . . ."

Hi GH, I have no knowledge when it comes to 'dual properties' theories or any neurobiological learning but I wanted to ask if there was any literature concerning these issues on consciousness on a quantum level?

There's a sizable bibliography at the bottom that comes with this SEP entry on the subject: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/

Henry Stapp papers: http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/stappfiles.htm

A Penrose / Hameroff overview: http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html

Koch and Hepp's take: http://www.klab.caltech.edu/refweb/paper/528.pdf

Only about Michael Lockwood's book, since papers by him are in short supply: http://www.hedweb.com/lockwood.htm

From Scaruffi's site: http://www.scaruffi.com/science/qc.html

I suppose some recent developments should be appended, since part of the criticism has been that quantum effects aren't possible at the higher scales and temperatures of biotic systems.

Scientists find quantum mechanics at work in photosynthesis: http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2010-02/uot-sfq020110.php

The dawn of quantum biology: http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110615/full/474272a.html

"On the face of it, quantum effects and living organisms seem to occupy utterly different realms. [...] Or so everyone thought. But discoveries in recent years suggest that nature knows a few tricks that physicists don't: coherent quantum processes may well be ubiquitous in the natural world. Known or suspected examples range from the ability of birds to navigate using Earth's magnetic field to the inner workings of photosynthesis..."

Re Quantum Biology
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orch-OR

Thanks for the info guys. It kinda makes me think how far can we take it and be able to say 'that' is consciousness.

Thanks !
I Read your referred Searle answer , relevant and clear in a “Searleish” way.
But, I cannot refrain from the impression that the distinction he makes between the “Property Dualism” and his “Biological Naturalism “ implies a too much fine resolution than the current state of knowledge , both in neurology and philosophy , could justify.
As it is, the “Dual Property” presents the advantage of an easier analogy with some well-known models in physics, as for instance, the particle/wave dual property of atomic and nuclear particles (see ,for instance, the diffraction of electrons !).Meaning, such dual descriptions have to be accepted in our material universe.
More or less similarly, the field concept is ,un-controversially, accepted in the physics understanding of the different types of interactions of “material” particles.,the gravitational field being an example.
It is amusing to see that physics is more liberal with its concepts ,than the philosophy is. In fact, this doesn’t come as a surprise, given the current poor definition of what has to be considered as matter !

Yes, whether or not he succeeds in making his case is another matter. It probably depends on the presuppositions one is already carrying around as to whether or not one is swayed.

Is the notion of dual properties illustrated in the concept of "wavicles"?

Is the notion of dual properties illustrated in the concept of "wavicles"?

Am I allowed to observe that "wavicles" are not a concept, but just a model ?
It is just an effort, another effort, not the first, probably not the last, to understand a phenomenon existing before and continuing to exist after the wavicles model: the dual aspect of matter.
When I try to find an analogy between this dual aspect of the matter and the dual property model of mind , the wavicles model is ,really, without any relevance !

I know. It's one of my favorite jokes, a transcendence of the dualism between particle and wave theory, both of which I do not understand.