@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil Albuquerque wrote:
Its simple, in mathematics is framed with two words either infinity or finity.
I think the word you're looking for is finite... I don't believe there is such a word as finity but I understand what you mean.
I've already given you an alternative... which is that both are wrong... a prime mover has more than just the lack of infinity to define what it must be... and the definition would make it impossible for itself to be a cause of anything... I'll try to show you why... unless you believe it causes things using some magic or is outside all understanding... that would make you no different from a religious person... is that what you are? ... because if so there is no point in continuing further. You already believe in something just because you don't believe in its apparent only alternative... sounds to me like you haven't even examined to see if a prime mover is logically possible... yet you base your thesis on it existing???
Here is where I examine the notion of a prime move... by asking some questions and answering them, let me know if you disagree:
If an uncaused cause exists then this prime mover... must have always existed... true or false? It must be true because nothing caused it to start therefore it must have always existed.
As it has always existed it is unchanging because there isn't anything that can cause an uncaused prime mover to change.
If it can't change then how can it change from a time when it hadn't caused into something that can be the cause of something? It can't.
Also, it would have to be one indivisible entity because parts would 'cause' the whole entity to exist and that would be a cause which the prime mover cannot have... by definition. Therefore this partless entity is impossible because all entities must have parts... a partless entity is impossible.
If you don't agree Fil then just explain in a detailed reasoned way how a prime mover e.g. has parts or can change from not being a cause to being a cause of something other than itself.
I have more arguments against a prime mover (an uncaused causer).
For example (read it all not just the highlighted section):
At the heart of Jñānagarbha's argument against the tenability of causality is his argument that none of the possible ways of looking at the relation of conditions and their effects are workable. There are four possibilities. Either many conditions produce a single effect, or many conditions produce many effects, or a single condition produces many effects, or a single condition produces a single effect.
His presentation of an explanation for why each of these possibilities is untenable is in places terse and difficult to decipher. A single thing, such as vision, cannot be the effect of many conditions, such as the eye, visible color, an attentive mind and so forth, he says, because the effect has the feature of being one, while the causes are many, but there is nothing to account for what causes the reduction of many things to one. Without some coherent account of how a manifold can be reduced to a singularity, this hypothesis ends up being merely an assertion. If one imagines that a manifold set of causes produces a complex multiplicity of effects, then one is saying in effect that each component of the complex cause is producing one component of the complex effect, and this amounts to saying that there are many instances of one cause producing one effect. On the other hand, if one thinks that each aspect of the complex effect is a single effect of the totality of features within the complex cause, then one is saying that a single effect has many conditions, which has already been ruled out.
Moreover, one faces the problem of explaining how the same totality of causes can have many distinct effects, each of which is a feature of the complex effect putatively arising from the causal complex.
If one imagines that a multiplicity, such as the manifold universe, arises out of a single cause, such as God or Brahman or consciousness, then one must provide a coherent account of what causes the differentiation among the many effects. What one would expect is that some auxiliary condition combines with the single cause to produce different effects; but if that is the case, then a single cause plus an auxiliary condition is not really just a single cause.
Finally, one might imagine that a single cause produces a single effect, such as when one momentary phenomenon perishes and in the act of perishing gives rise to a subsequent momentary phenomenon of the same kind. That, however, is impossible, since the putative cause must go entirely out of existence before its successor can takes its place, and once the preceding phenomenon has ceased to exist, there is nothing to cause its successor to arise. Since none of the possible ways of explaining causality turns out to survive close analysis, one can only conclude that the very ideas of causality, and of arising and perishing, and of unity and multiplicity cannot correspond to reality.
Causality and arising and perishing and all the various relations that furnish the framework of conventional truth may be indispensable to conventional truth, but they cannot be features of reality. Jñānagarbha, like the Mādhyamikas who came before him, sees conventional truth as a kind of screen or obstacle to the reality that becomes apparent only to an awareness that is unencumbered by concepts and narratives.