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Wed 23 Feb, 2011 03:02 pm
According to Kant, an act can be “in conformity with duty” while not being done “from duty.” This distinction between conforming to duty and being from duty plays an important role in establishing whether or not an act has moral worth. Which of these is required for an action to have moral worth? How does this relate to an account of morality that intimately involves the passions? (For example, an Aristotelian virtue ethics) Do you agree with Kant’s account of what gives acts moral worth? Why or why not?
@ojog16,
That one is actually easy to distinguish...“in conformity with duty”(no meaningful moral intent) statistically, in the long run, won´t imply a coherent behaviour in a way we can even start to speak in a moral code of conduct...aside that, the classical explanation suffices...an act which conforms to duty is at best amoral...
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