You see, that right there is to be a problem...internal to what ? Whom ?
Internal to the accessible-to-many public appearance of either the robotic computer or a human brain (how some of its operations exist to themselves as visual images, odors, etc, as opposed to how they exist to or are described by external observers/scanners).
If materialism or a "non-mental monism" is today the favorite ontological view in philosophy of mind, then there should actually be no need for me to even specify "manifestations" with "internal, private, intrinsic, etc.", as where the hell else would there be the possibility of such displays except with "what it's like be certain brain processes or their artificial slash extraterrestrial equivalents"? But I suppose one must make the distinction for commonsense realists who apparently believe in a phenomenal-like presence of the world even if said world was devoid of qualitative-perceiving entities who can generate that experience of it, despite many of those commonsense realists probably being materialists who should instead view the universe (as in itself) being like the non-experience they encounter after death: That is, manifesting as nothing at all -- existing in a non-phenomenal manner that abstract technical methods may ATTEMPT to describe.
The only thing problematic about "manifestations" arising in or with correlation to brain processes is the radical emergence of them, a brute add-on to the physical sciences. Doesn't have precursors, doesn't follow from pre-existing explanatory frameworks. There are fringe developments like "process physics" that may remedy that by supplying proto-stages of experience in the generic interactions throughout the cosmos, but they are just that: Not mainstream yet.
Where is the "I" in the machine ? Not that I don´t believe that we can get there eventually...
Memory. "I" is a new story level or concept for unifying all bodily activities under, a time-saver (China wouldn't want to refer to China each time by naming each citizen and what they're doing and how they're connected). Memory is normally there to tell its 40-year old Bob story that he is somehow the same Bob that was alive at age 6 --he's descended from the latter. Empirically, the "self" of Bob is just his body, the fact that in our human experiences he is individuated from the rest of the world in terms of his behaviors and workings (regardless of how he might be assimilated into a background monism either behind appearances or in some reason-spawned scheme that challenges everyday experience).