WikiLeaks about to hit the fan

I ran across an article in today's LA Times that is similar to the one I read weeks earlier about Manning's incarceration - they don't seem to jive with your linked article:
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-manning-20110110,0,3558552.story

QUESTION: On Iceland, can you talk about the meeting between the U.S. Ambassador in Reykjavik and the foreign ministry in terms of the Justice Department trying to secure information about a parliamentarian’s Twitter account?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we can report that Ambassador Luis Arreaga had a constructive conversation with the ministry of foreign affairs in Iceland and listened attentively to their concerns. We took the opportunity to underscore how seriously the U.S. Government takes the unauthorized disclosure of classified information and the harm it has caused. Our Ambassador assured the Government of Iceland that the Department of Justice investigation is being conducted in compliance with U.S. law and is subject to all of the rule of law and due process norms enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and applicable federal law.

QUESTION: Can you say that this woman is a suspect in terms of helping Julian Assange?

MR. CROWLEY: For all those kind of questions, I’ll defer to the Department of Justice.

QUESTION: Does the State Department believe that there is any justifiable grounds for the Government of Iceland to object to the disclosure of her Twitter messages in response to a Justice Department subpoena?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, again, all I can tell you is that our ambassador was called in. The Government of Iceland expressed its concerns. I’ll leave it to the Government of Iceland to describe those concerns if they have any. We are – and as we’ve indicated, the Department of Justice continues with its investigation.

QUESTION: Did they convey to you – I mean, they have concerns because you say that they expressed their concerns, so it’s not if they have any. I mean, clearly, they do have concerns, right?

MR. CROWLEY: I’ll leave it to Iceland to describe their concerns.

QUESTION: Okay. And whatever were their concerns, did they inform the ambassador of an intent to contest or to move to quash the subpoena?

MR. CROWLEY: Again, Arshad, I can’t answer that question without getting into the investigation, which I will just defer to the Department of Justice.

QUESTION: Well, that doesn’t get into the investigation. It’s just --

MR. CROWLEY: I mean, as to --

QUESTION: -- as to whether they told you, yeah, we’re going to, like, file a motion to quash this.

MR. CROWLEY: Again, as to any legal steps that the government might take or this individual might take, it is up to them.

QUESTION: When you say that the Ambassador listened attentively, did the ambassador offer a kind of rationale for why the subpoena was being sent or referred – did the Ambassador refer the government to the Department of Justice for further explanation, or was this the opportunity for the Ambassador to explain the U.S. --

MR. CROWLEY: I think he gave a general response as I outlined here.

QUESTION: Well, when you say general response, you just – you’re just saying general response of how the U.S. views the WikiLeaks affair and that there is some kind of investigation. But from what you’re saying it doesn’t seem as if the Ambassador offered a kind of explanation for why the subpoena was necessary.

MR. CROWLEY: Again, that’s a matter that – I mean, to – and some may recall – and again, it’s not clear to me the Justice Department actions took place in this country. And – but beyond that, I’ll defer to the Department of Justice.

QUESTION: So just to be clear, did – when the Ambassador went into this meeting and listened attentively, did the Ambassador just offer some general comments about WikiLeaks and say, “I refer you to the Department of Justice for any further explanation?”

MR. CROWLEY: I can’t – I don’t know.

From today's press briefing by State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley:

Quote:

..............................................................
MR. CROWLEY: Again, that’s a matter that – I mean, to – and some may recall – and again, it’s not clear to me the Justice Department actions took place in this country. And – but beyond that, I’ll defer to the Department of Justice.

QUESTION: So just to be clear, did – when the Ambassador went into this meeting and listened attentively, did the Ambassador just offer some general comments about WikiLeaks and say, “I refer you to the Department of Justice for any further explanation?”

MR. CROWLEY: I can’t – I don’t know.

If the procedures and facilities exist to treat the lad as described have they been used previously for others and, if so, were where we then?

US Embassy: Iceland Wikileaks Probe Legal
(Iceland Review Online, January 11, 2011)

US Ambassador to Iceland Luis E. Arreaga was informed about the parliamentary immunity of MP Birgitta Jónsdóttir at a meeting in the Icelandic Foreign Ministry with the ministry’s undersecretary Einar Gunnarsson and international law expert Tómas H. Heidar yesterday morning.

At the meeting Arreaga was also asked for information about what lies behind the US Ministry of Justice’s demand that social network Twitter release personal information on the Icelandic MP, Fréttabladid reports.

The US Embassy to Iceland maintains that the US authorities’ inquiries into the MPs online communication via Twitter are legal.

“We assured the Icelandic government that the investigation of the United States Department of Justice is in accordance with American law and follows all guidelines on court regulations and a fair trial affirmed in the United States Constitution and the appropriate federal law,” the embassy’s spokesperson Laura Gritz said in an announcement released after the meeting.

A press release from the ministry says that in addition to calling for information, Gunnarsson and Heidar expressed their concern that an Icelandic MP is the subject of a criminal investigation of this nature.

They explained that Jónsdóttir has parliamentary immunity in Iceland and that she cannot be separated from the Icelandic Althingi parliament in this manner.

They stressed that there should be no further disruption to her work as an MP, including her rights to travel and participate in international political discourse.

In the subpoena delivered to Twitter on Friday, information about five persons was requested, in addition to Jónsdóttir, Wikileaks editor Julian Assange, Bradley Manning, the solider who is believed to have leaked a host of documents from the US Foreign Service, and two hackers, one American and one Dutch.

Twitter informed the five individuals about the US authorities’ request. They have until after next weekend to fight the release of information.

Jónsdóttir traveled to Canada yesterday where she will speak at a conference on the freedom of information. She had originally planned to fly through the US but in light of recent events she decided to fly through London instead.

She had originally planned to fly through the US but in light of recent events she decided to fly through London instead.

Quote:

She had originally planned to fly through the US but in light of recent events she decided to fly through London instead.

One has to wonder how many more will do the same.

Since there were only a relative handful of foreign citizens identified in the subpoena, I expect the number who do the same will be rather small.

Too much sharing?
(By Michael Hayden, Samuel Visner and William Courtney, Baltimore Sun OpEd, January 11, 2011)

The disclosure by WikiLeaks of thousands of U.S. diplomatic communications has sparked debate about a key response to the Sept. 11 attacks. Is it wise to share sensitive national security information more widely — including to upwards of a half-million military and civilian defense personnel — to help thwart future terrorism by better "connecting the dots" from fragmentary data? Or is wider sharing an unduly risky ditching of the proven security precept of "need to know?"

We believe wider sharing is wise — but only if aided by sound security practices and advanced technology to protect information. Vital information sharing need not be a victim of WikiLeaks.

The principle of "need to know" requires segmenting information according to sensitivity and topic. Sharing must strike a balance between protecting security and fostering collaboration across all levels of government and, often, the private sector.

This is more important than ever. Terrorism is a greater threat, and defending against it depends on access to a wider array of information than for traditional military threats. Cultural and religious behavior, travel data, financial flows, deceptive websites and remote sensing are among the information sources for actionable intelligence on terrorist plots.

Striking multiple balances is necessary to protect and share sensitive information. Tactical military field units have little need for diplomatic communications, but they do require real-time access to searchable data from multiple government agencies, such as to tell if someone at a road checkpoint is a person of interest. Sensitive information has long been shared among agencies based on "need to know" but without being dumped into vast, poorly monitored databases. Government data on American citizens merits strong privacy protection, but under proper authorities, information sharing with law enforcement makes sense — if this helps uncover foreign espionage or terrorist plans.

Balance is also required in security measures. Disabling thumb and DVD drives on computers averts some kinds of information theft, but on the battlefield it could harm operational effectiveness. Imposing administrative security requirements common to intelligence headquarters or national agencies, such as polygraph exams, on all personnel in military field units would prove unacceptably burdensome.

In striking better balances, we cannot forget the post-Sept. 11 reasons why sharing became a higher priority. Uncovering and foiling terrorist threats requires that many entities work together and share information — often our best weapon.

Thus, policy on information sharing and security should improve along three paths:

•Personnel security. If Army Private Bradley Manning — suspected of leaking the WikiLeaks documents — had psychological problems, as alleged, should he have had access to sensitive information? When indications merit, personnel should undergo psychological testing to assess vulnerabilities that might raise security risks. Personnel clearances ought to be based on the type of information to which a person has access, not — as now — according to which agency employs someone.

•Security procedures. Although some "insider threats" arise from malicious intent, nearly all are abetted by sloppy execution of routine security procedures or perceptions that they are bothersome or unimportant. National security organizations should elevate security as a management priority, enforce rules more consistently and offer better training.

•Cyber tools. Cybersecurity techniques can detect much anomalous behavior, such as downloading, copying or printing numerous documents, seeking to access information in unusual ways or information not normally accessed, and transferring sensitive information to others. That such tools were not employed on the battlefield in Afghanistan is understandable but in retrospect imprudent.

More advanced cyber tools are being developed, such as to sift through huge volumes of seemingly disparate data and correlate findings. This need is a key lesson from the 2009 Christmas Day bombing attempt. New tools must address potential threats from mobile devices and social media and better detect and resolve suspicious exfiltrations. Improving analytic tools to better understand global information environments and characterize the behavior of systems remains a pressing challenge.

Reacting to the WikiLeaks disclosures by clamping down on information-sharing would risk failing to detect hard-to-predict or increasingly diverse threats. More prudent is to employ sound security practices and advanced technology while leveraging the advantages of information sharing and collaboration. National security and technology professionals have worked hard to gain these advantages, and they ought not to be hastily discarded.

to help thwart future terrorism

International Terrorism: Image and Reality
Noam Chomsky
In Alexander George (ed.), Western State Terrorism, Routledge, December, 1991

There are two ways to approach the study of terrorism. One may adopt a literal approach, taking the topic seriously, or a propagandistic approach, construing the concept of terrorism as a weapon to be exploited in the service of some system of power. In each case it is clear how to proceed. Pursuing the literal approach, we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of the phenomenon -- concentrating on the major examples, if we are serious -- and try to determine causes and remedies. The propagandistic approach dictates a different course. We begin with the thesis that terrorism is the responsibility of some officially designated enemy. We then designate terrorist acts as "terrorist" just in the cases where they can be attributed (whether plausibly or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be ignored, suppressed, or termed "retaliation" or "self-defence."


It comes as no surprise that the propagandistic approach is adopted by governments generally, and by their instruments in totalitarian states. More interesting is the fact that the same is largely true of the media and scholarship in the Western industrial democracies, as has been documented in extensive detail.1 "We must recognize," Michael Stohl observes, "that by convention -- and it must be emphasized only by convention -- great power use and the threat of the use of force is normally described as coercive diplomacy and not as a form of terrorism," though it commonly involves "the threat and often the use of violence for what would be described as terroristic purposes were it not great powers who were pursuing the very same tactic."2 Only one qualification must be added: the term "great powers" must be restricted to favored states; in the Western conventions under discussion, the Soviet Union is granted no such rhetorical license, and indeed can be charged and convicted on the flimsiest of evidence.

http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199112--02.htm

Since there were only a relative handful of foreign citizens identified in the subpoena, I expect the number who do the same will be rather small.

Quote:

Since there were only a relative handful of foreign citizens identified in the subpoena, I expect the number who do the same will be rather small.

Maybe that's true and maybe it isn't.

The riots began after an educated but jobless 26-year-old committed suicide when police confiscated the fruits and vegetables he was selling without a permit.

The official death toll in the riots is 23, but opposition leaders put the figure at three times that, and medical workers on Friday reported another 13 new deaths and over 50 injuries from late Thursday alone.

U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks have described the corruption in Tunisia, and social networks like Facebook have helped spread the comments. Many ordinary Tunisians who have complained of corruption for years felt vindicated to see the U.S. cables. Source