Beginning in 1637, René Descartes began a quest to essentially tear down the foundations of traditional philosophy and build a new solid foundation on which to base his beliefs.
He begins this project by first examining his beliefs and then calling everything into question. Those things which can be doubted are systematically excluded from the metaphysical material that will compose the new foundation.
Descartes’ purpose and overall agenda is to build the philosophical groundwork on certain truth beyond all doubt.
This may seem as an intimidating and perhaps even an impossible task, but Descartes confronts this problem head-on, understanding the importance of truth. In Discourse on Method, written as an informal explanation of his proposal for this project, Descartes describes knowledge as a house that must be torn down and rebuilt upon a solid and sturdy foundation (Part Three, 23).
And so begins the reconstruction of Descartes’ metaphysical dwelling place.
This reformation of thought comes through extreme hyperbolic doubt that is seemingly beyond reason.
However, Descartes does this with the intent of finding supreme truth that cannot be doubted. Is it necessary, or even possible, to call everything into question as Descartes does in both Discourse on Method and Meditations on the First Philosophy? In essence, the philosophical house that Descartes burns to the ground leaves behind very little to salvage. However, it is through the cogito ergo sum, “I think, therefore I am,” that Descartes finds clear and distinct truth of which he uses as his foundation and begins to rebuild.
This analytic truth leads Descartes in his attempts to prove God and essentially end his cycle of doubt.
By looking at both Discourse on Method and Meditations on the First Philosophy, it is clear to see that this hyperbolic doubt is reasonable and necessary to Descartes’ project. This extreme call to question can be followed in order to gain analytic truth back after its disposal in the Cartesian Method. However, it is not reasonable to go beyond this truth in the foundation of knowledge. In this paper I hope to show how though Descartes’ doubt does lead to certain truth in the cogito, it is not possible to recuperate anything further.
Prompt: How far can radical doubt really go? Read the passages concerning doubt in both the Discourse and the Meditations and follow Descartes into the vortex. Do you find that you can call everything into question as he claims he is able to do? If you can, in fact, pursue this doubting as far as Descartes does, then do you also discover the same means for recuperating something more than the "I think"? Remember that Descartes is arguing for a productive form of doubt rather than a form that cannot be stopped once it has been unleashed. What power keeps Descartes from falling into a cycle of doubt from which he cannot escape?
However, Descartes does this with the intent of finding supreme truth that cannot be doubted.
This extreme call to question can be followed in order to gain analytic truth back after its disposal in the Cartesian Method.
In this paper I hope to show how though Descartes’ doubt does lead to certain truth
How far can radical doubt really go? Read the passages concerning doubt in both the Discourse and the Meditations and follow Descartes into the vortex. Do you find that you can call everything into question as he claims he is able to do? If you can, in fact, pursue this doubting as far as Descartes does, then do you also discover the same means for recuperating something more than the "I think"? Remember that Descartes is arguing for a productive form of doubt rather than a form that cannot be stopped once it has been unleashed. What power keeps Descartes from falling into a cycle of doubt from which he cannot escape?
Hey guys. First paper in my Epistemology class, I could use a good proof read of my introduction, especially since the bolded portion of the prompt confused the hell out of me. Please and thank you fellow philos.
Prompt: How far can radical doubt really go? Read the passages concerning doubt in both the Discourse and the Meditations and follow Descartes into the vortex. Do you find that you can call everything into question as he claims he is able to do? If you can, in fact, pursue this doubting as far as Descartes does, then do you also discover the same means for recuperating something more than the "I think"? Remember that Descartes is arguing for a productive form of doubt rather than a form that cannot be stopped once it has been unleashed. What power keeps Descartes from falling into a cycle of doubt from which he cannot escape?
Remember, it's a rough draft and it's just the intro.
Intro to essay:
Beginning in 1637, René Descartes began a quest to essentially tear down the foundations of traditional philosophy and build a new solid foundation on which to base his beliefs. He begins this project by first examining his beliefs and then calling everything into question. Those things which can be doubted are systematically excluded from the metaphysical material that will compose the new foundation. Descartes’ purpose and overall agenda is to build the philosophical groundwork on certain truth beyond all doubt. This may seem as an intimidating and perhaps even an impossible task, but Descartes confronts this problem head-on, understanding the importance of truth. In Discourse on Method, written as an informal explanation of his proposal for this project, Descartes describes knowledge as a house that must be torn down and rebuilt upon a solid and sturdy foundation (Part Three, 23).
And so begins the reconstruction of Descartes’ metaphysical dwelling place.
This reformation of thought comes through extreme hyperbolic doubt that is seemingly beyond reason. However, Descartes does this with the intent of finding supreme truth that cannot be doubted. Is it necessary, or even possible, to call everything into question as Descartes does in both Discourse on Method and Meditations on the First Philosophy? In essence, the philosophical house that Descartes burns to the ground leaves behind very little to salvage. However, it is through the cogito ergo sum, “I think, therefore I am,” that Descartes finds clear and distinct truth of which he uses as his foundation and begins to rebuild. This analytic truth leads Descartes in his attempts to prove God and essentially end his cycle of doubt. By looking at both Discourse on Method and Mediations on the First Philosophy, it is clear to see that this hyperbolic doubt is reasonable and necessary to Descartes’ project. This extreme call to question can be followed in order to gain analytic truth back after its disposal in the Cartesian Method. However, it is not reasonable to go beyond this truth in the foundation of knowledge. In this paper I hope to show how though Descartes’ doubt does lead to certain truth in the cogito, it is not possible to recuperate anything further.
Beginning in 1637, René Descartes began a quest to essentially tear down the foundations of traditional philosophy and build a new solid foundation on which to base his beliefs. He begins this project by first examining his beliefs and then calling everything into question. Those things which can be doubted are systematically excluded from the metaphysical material that will compose the new foundation. Descartes’ purpose and overall agenda is to build the philosophical groundwork on certain truth beyond all doubt. This may seem as an intimidating and perhaps even an impossible task, but Descartes confronts this problem head-on, understanding the importance of truth. In Discourse on Method, written as an informal explanation of his proposal for this project, Descartes describes knowledge as a house that must be torn down and rebuilt upon a solid and sturdy foundation (Part Three, 23).
And so begins the reconstruction of Descartes’ metaphysical dwelling place.
This reformation of thought comes through extreme hyperbolic doubt that is seemingly beyond reason. However, Descartes does this with the intent of finding supreme truth that cannot be doubted. Is it necessary, or even possible, to call everything into question as Descartes does in both Discourse on Method and Meditations on the First Philosophy? In essence, the philosophical house that Descartes burns to the ground leaves behind very little to salvage. However, it is through the cogito ergo sum, “I think, therefore I am,” that Descartes finds clear and distinct truth of which he uses as his foundation and begins to rebuild. This analytic truth leads Descartes in his attempts to prove God and essentially end his cycle of doubt. By looking at both Discourse on Method and Mediations on the First Philosophy, it is clear to see that this hyperbolic doubt is reasonable and necessary to Descartes’ project. This extreme call to question can be followed in order to gain analytic truth back after its disposal in the Cartesian Method. However, it is not reasonable to go beyond this truth in the foundation of knowledge. In this paper I hope to show how though Descartes’ doubt does lead to certain truth in the cogito, it is not possible to recuperate anything further.
NOTE:
I have put some questionable or confusing words or phrases in Boldface.
Comment:
The introduction seems meandering, and if the thesis of the paper is that the cogito provides a clear and distinct model for absolute truth that cannot be applied to other things (i.e., that is not a model at all), then very little of the introduction seems to pertain to it.
Please criticize me!! I'm looking for an A on this paper!
to clear up the direction my paper is headed, although I do hope it clearly put in my thesis...
anyway,
I plan to argue that Descartes does not apply the same method of Cartesian doubt to the idea of perfection. He simply accepts the attributes of God (infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, etc, etc) and perfection as a definition without applying any analytic doubt.
comments? what do you guys think? Please criticize me!! I'm looking for an A on this paper!
to clear up the direction my paper is headed, although I do hope it clearly put in my thesis...
anyway,
I plan to argue that Descartes does not apply the same method of Cartesian doubt to the idea of perfection. He simply accepts the attributes of God (infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, etc, etc) and perfection as a definition without applying any analytic doubt.
comments? what do you guys think? Please criticize me!! I'm looking for an A on this paper!
If God is a perfect being, then what properties would you ascribe to God? It will not do to say that Descartes does not doubt whether these are the properties of a perfect being unless you say why he should doubt they are. The standard criticism of Descartes definition of God here is that one of the properties he ascribes to God is that of existence. In other words, he defines God so that God exists, "by definition". And the question is whether anything can exist by definition, which is to ask whether existence can be a property of anything. (By the way, the best was to ensure not getting an A for the paper-besides not writing it, of course- is to write it with getting an A primarily in mind).
Dosed wrote:
to clear up the direction my paper is headed, although I do hope it clearly put in my thesis...
anyway,
I plan to argue that Descartes does not apply the same method of Cartesian doubt to the idea of perfection. He simply accepts the attributes of God (infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, etc, etc) and perfection as a definition without applying any analytic doubt.
comments? what do you guys think? Please criticize me!! I'm looking for an A on this paper!
What is this supposed to show? That Descartes doesn't establish the truth of empirical propositions? You need to make your argument clearer; say what you are actually arguing for. Two other points: Descartes has two arguments for the existence of God. If the ontological argument fails he can still rely on the causal argument in the third meditation.
Secondly, Descartes' is a nativist; that is to say he thinks that we have innate ideas. Moreover, he thinks that the idea of God is innate, so by merely reflecting upon it I can read off the content, so to speak. Thus, God's properties (infinity, omnipresence, perfection, etc.) are supposed to be like the properties of other clear and distinct innate ideas such as that of a triangle (e.g. that it's angles add up to 180 degrees). Descartes thinks that he can no more doubt that God is perfect and infinite than he can doubt that the angles in a triangle add up to 180, and you need to say why you think he is wrong about this. Is it possible to argue strongly that he is wrong about this without applying the same criticism to mathematical truths or without undermining his entire system? I'm not sure, it's been a while since I read Descartes, but probably not.
In short, you need to rethink your argument. Sit down for a bit and really think about Descartes arguments, their premises and conclusions. It will be easier to pick holes in them when you have a firmer understanding of his system.
Quote:If God is a perfect being, then what properties would you ascribe to God? It will not do to say that Descartes does not doubt whether these are the properties of a perfect being unless you say why he should doubt they are. The standard criticism of Descartes definition of God here is that one of the properties he ascribes to God is that of existence. In other words, he defines God so that God exists, "by definition". And the question is whether anything can exist by definition, which is to ask whether existence can be a property of anything. (By the way, the best was to ensure not getting an A for the paper-besides not writing it, of course- is to write it with getting an A primarily in mind).
Interestingly, it is fairly easy to conceive of a necessarily existing being using possible world semantics (whether or not this is a good conceptual model is another matter), which is normally a good test for whether or not something is possible. However, if Descartes God is possible then he actually exists, as he would exist in every possible world, including the actual world, which also means that if Descartes God does not actually exist, then he doesn't exist in any possible world, and is thus impossible. Seemingly, a bit of sense can be given to the notion of necessary existence, but we end up with a rare gap between conceivability and possibility.