Schopenhauer on freedom of the will.

kennethamy wrote:

chai2 wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

Man can do what he wants but he cannot want what he wants.

The question is this: how (or why) does it follow from the premise (even supposing the premise is true) that we cannot want what we want,

I took this to mean that the thought of wanting something changes the wanted object, so it is no longer what was initially wanted.

When one does not express what they want, the wanted object is in its initial state.

Why would you think it meant that? It certainly does not say that.

Well, in my interpretation, it certainly does.

To quote from Einstein's "Credo" (part I):

Quote:

... 'Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills,' accompany me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others, even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of free will keeps me from taking myself and my fellow men too seriously as acting and deciding individuals, and from losing my temper.

Walter Hinteler wrote:

To quote from Einstein's "Credo" (part I):

Quote:

... 'Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills,' accompany me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others, even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of free will keeps me from taking myself and my fellow men too seriously as acting and deciding individuals, and from losing my temper.

"... [the quote's sentiment] reconciles me with the actions of others": This is a wise sentiment to bear in mind as we observe the decisions and acts of others - that even those come from a place of deep motivation the 'actor' likely doesn't fully comprehend. It doesn't relegate responsibility - not one iota - but it might help in our interpretation, judgments and interaction.

The second part, "... [this] lack of free will keeps me from taking myself and my fellow men too seriously" swings a couple of directions. While I'd hold it needful and productive that we each understand that many of our wants aren't consciously formulated (that they work behind the scenes, to a large extent), the idea that it might free one from responsibility from actions and decisions can lead to a wee bit troublesome conclusion. On the other hand, as taking it to heart can allow one to be more patient with themselves - and by extension, less volatile in temper - it is in that way a positive outlook

Good quoteage, thanks.

Khethil wrote:

Walter Hinteler wrote:

To quote from Einstein's "Credo" (part I):

Quote:

... 'Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills,' accompany me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others, even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of free will keeps me from taking myself and my fellow men too seriously as acting and deciding individuals, and from losing my temper.

"... [the quote's sentiment] reconciles me with the actions of others": This is a wise sentiment to bear in mind as we observe the decisions and acts of others - that even those come from a place of deep motivation the 'actor' likely doesn't fully comprehend. It doesn't relegate responsibility - not one iota - but it might help in our interpretation, judgments and interaction.

The second part, "... [this] lack of free will keeps me from taking myself and my fellow men too seriously" swings a couple of directions. While I'd hold it needful and productive that we each understand that many of our wants aren't consciously formulated (that they work behind the scenes, to a large extent), the idea that it might free one from responsibility from actions and decisions can lead to a wee bit troublesome conclusion. On the other hand, as taking it to heart can allow one to be more patient with themselves - and by extension, less volatile in temper - it is in that way a positive outlook

Good quoteage, thanks.

The supposed consequences of believing in free will are one thing. Whether the belief is true is a very different thing. We should not mix them up, nor think that because we think the consequences of the belief are useful that the belief is true. That is called, "wishful thinking". That Einstein mixed up the two issues, and that, moreover, he believes that because he consequences of the belief are useful is only more evidence (if more were needed) that he should have stuck to physics.

kennethamy wrote:

Khethil wrote:

Walter Hinteler wrote:

To quote from Einstein's "Credo" (part I):

Quote:

... 'Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills,' accompany me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others, even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of free will keeps me from taking myself and my fellow men too seriously as acting and deciding individuals, and from losing my temper.

"... [the quote's sentiment] reconciles me with the actions of others": This is a wise sentiment to bear in mind as we observe the decisions and acts of others - that even those come from a place of deep motivation the 'actor' likely doesn't fully comprehend. It doesn't relegate responsibility - not one iota - but it might help in our interpretation, judgments and interaction.

The second part, "... [this] lack of free will keeps me from taking myself and my fellow men too seriously" swings a couple of directions. While I'd hold it needful and productive that we each understand that many of our wants aren't consciously formulated (that they work behind the scenes, to a large extent), the idea that it might free one from responsibility from actions and decisions can lead to a wee bit troublesome conclusion. On the other hand, as taking it to heart can allow one to be more patient with themselves - and by extension, less volatile in temper - it is in that way a positive outlook

Good quoteage, thanks.

The supposed consequences of believing in free will are one thing. Whether the belief is true is a very different thing. We should not mix them up, nor think that because we think the consequences of the belief are useful that the belief is true. That is called, "wishful thinking". That Einstein mixed up the two issues, and that, moreover, he believes that because he consequences of the belief are useful is only more evidence (if more were needed) that he should have stuck to physics.

I couldn't agree with you more and am unable to find in that quote anything that suggests Einstein mixed up the two.

Man can do what he wants but he cannot want what he wants.

This famous quote is often adduced as an argument against free will

The question is this: how (or why) does it follow from the premise (even supposing the premise is true) that we cannot want what we want, although we can often do what we want, that we do not sometimes have free will? (Which is, I think, Schopenhauer's argument)? Schopenhauer seems to be assuming here that if (or even, "because") it is not up to us what it is we want, but only up to us to do what we want, that we are compelled to want what we want, so that even if we are not compelled to do what we want, we still do not have free will. But how does that follow?

kennethamy wrote:

Man can do what he wants but he cannot want what he wants.

Not quite. Schopenhauer wrote: "der Mensch könne tun, was er will, aber er könne nicht wollen, was er will." That can be translated as "man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wants" or as "man can do what he will, but he cannot will what he will." Although the verb "wollen" can be translated as "want," in the context it's pretty clear that Schopenhauer meant "will."

kennethamy wrote:

This famous quote is often adduced as an argument against free will

It should be. It is.

kennethamy wrote:

The question is this: how (or why) does it follow from the premise (even supposing the premise is true) that we cannot want what we want, although we can often do what we want, that we do not sometimes have free will? (Which is, I think, Schopenhauer's argument)? Schopenhauer seems to be assuming here that if (or even, "because") it is not up to us what it is we want, but only up to us to do what we want, that we are compelled to want what we want, so that even if we are not compelled to do what we want, we still do not have free will. But how does that follow?

Because we act in accordance with our will. If a thief sees a pile of unattended money in a place where he is certain no one will see him, he can always walk away. But he won't, because he wouldn't even consider that to be an option. Instead, he'll grab the money because he wants to grab it, but he doesn't get to decide whether he'll be the kind of guy who will grab unattended piles of money.

If the thief does what he wants to do (takes the money) and does not even consider not doing so, why does he not take the money of his own free will. Are you supposing that he is somehow compelled to take the money?

joefromchicago wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

Man can do what he wants but he cannot want what he wants.

Not quite. Schopenhauer wrote: "der Mensch könne tun, was er will, aber er könne nicht wollen, was er will." That can be translated as "man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wants" or as "man can do what he will, but he cannot will what he will." Although the verb "wollen" can be translated as "want," in the context it's pretty clear that Schopenhauer meant "will."

kennethamy wrote:

This famous quote is often adduced as an argument against free will

It should be. It is.

kennethamy wrote:

The question is this: how (or why) does it follow from the premise (even supposing the premise is true) that we cannot want what we want, although we can often do what we want, that we do not sometimes have free will? (Which is, I think, Schopenhauer's argument)? Schopenhauer seems to be assuming here that if (or even, "because") it is not up to us what it is we want, but only up to us to do what we want, that we are compelled to want what we want, so that even if we are not compelled to do what we want, we still do not have free will. But how does that follow?

Because we act in accordance with our will. If a thief sees a pile of unattended money in a place where he is certain no one will see him, he can always walk away. But he won't, because he wouldn't even consider that to be an option. Instead, he'll grab the money because he wants to grab it, but he doesn't get to decide whether he'll be the kind of guy who will grab unattended piles of money.

If the thief does what he wants to do (takes the money) and does not even consider not doing so, why does he not take the money of his own free will. Are you supposing that he is somehow compelled to take the money? What reason is there for that supposition? Now, it is true that there are people called "kleptomaniacs" who have the compulsion to steal, and who steal even when they have no reason to steal, and even if they think there is an excellent chance of their being caught. They are not deterred by the prospect of being caught, and will sometimes even steal in plain sight. Now, such kleptomaniacs are very different from ordinary thieves, for when they steal they cannot help themselves, and indeed, they express the experience of stealing contrary to their will. They do not do what they want. In fact, they do what they do not want to do. Now, such people do not fall under Schopenhauer's description of doing what they want to do, but not wanting to do what they want to do. Instead, they don't want to do what they do. They have an inner compulsion. You should not confuse ordinary thieves with kleptomaniacs.

Can you gives us a hand and developed that comment a bit further ?

kennethamy wrote:

joefromchicago wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

Man can do what he wants but he cannot want what he wants.

Not quite. Schopenhauer wrote: "der Mensch könne tun, was er will, aber er könne nicht wollen, was er will." That can be translated as "man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wants" or as "man can do what he will, but he cannot will what he will." Although the verb "wollen" can be translated as "want," in the context it's pretty clear that Schopenhauer meant "will."

kennethamy wrote:

This famous quote is often adduced as an argument against free will

It should be. It is.

kennethamy wrote:

The question is this: how (or why) does it follow from the premise (even supposing the premise is true) that we cannot want what we want, although we can often do what we want, that we do not sometimes have free will? (Which is, I think, Schopenhauer's argument)? Schopenhauer seems to be assuming here that if (or even, "because") it is not up to us what it is we want, but only up to us to do what we want, that we are compelled to want what we want, so that even if we are not compelled to do what we want, we still do not have free will. But how does that follow?

Because we act in accordance with our will. If a thief sees a pile of unattended money in a place where he is certain no one will see him, he can always walk away. But he won't, because he wouldn't even consider that to be an option. Instead, he'll grab the money because he wants to grab it, but he doesn't get to decide whether he'll be the kind of guy who will grab unattended piles of money.

If the thief does what he wants to do (takes the money) and does not even consider not doing so, why does he not take the money of his own free will. Are you supposing that he is somehow compelled to take the money? What reason is there for that supposition? Now, it is true that there are people called "kleptomaniacs" who have the compulsion to steal, and who steal even when they have no reason to steal, and even if they think there is an excellent chance of their being caught. They are not deterred by the prospect of being caught, and will sometimes even steal in plain sight. Now, such kleptomaniacs are very different from ordinary thieves, for when they steal they cannot help themselves, and indeed, they express the experience of stealing contrary to their will. They do not do what they want. In fact, they do what they do not want to do. Now, such people do not fall under Schopenhauer's description of doing what they want to do, but not wanting to do what they want to do. Instead, they don't want to do what they do. They have an inner compulsion. You should not confuse ordinary thieves with kleptomaniacs.

In context, Schopenhauer's comment is neither an argument for nor against "free will". Arguments for "free will" (and/or determinism) are not part of Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Both terms are relatively meaningless within that philosophy.

Prize Essay On The Freedom Of The Will (1839)

Does the fact that the quote is from an essay on the freedom of the will make you have second thoughts about whether Schopenhauer is presenting an argument about freedom of the will?