@jgweed,
jgweed wrote:
It might be the case that some things are "predetermined" at least in the sense that we can understand the causal chain of events that lead to a certain event. This certainly applies to rather simple examples of physical events.
But from this assumed fact, can one legitimately assert that every event is "predetermined?" And how would one present evidence for the assertion? Moreover, would this universal rule allow us to predict every event in the future?
I don't know what the difference between "predeterminism" and "determinism" is supposed to be (except that the former is a religious doctrine associated with Calvinism and other religions). But the the philosophical view of determinism is that every event has a cause, and every cause is, itself an event. According to physicist who specialize in quantum theory, this is empirically false for micro-events, for (according to them) some micro-events have no causes. Since I know nothing worth knowing about the matter, I am prepared to take the word of those who do know about it. As for macro-events, we certainly do think that when something occurs, there is some cause for that occurrence. Determinism alone does not allow us to predict anything at all. For that we would require information about the laws of nature applicable, and the initial conditions. When we have that information we may be able to make sound predictions. The evidence for determinism is that we have nearly always found causes for what occurrences (except in the case of micro-events where the experts say there are no causes). The question whether every event has a cause is often confused with a somewhat different question: whether every event
must have a cause. As Hume and Kant pointed out, although we may have evidence that every event has a cause, there can be no evidence for the proposition that every event
must have a cause. There is no empirical evidence for necessary truths. And, as Hume pointed out, it may be false that some events have no causes, but that propositions does not imply a contradiction.
Whether determinism is true largely (but not solely) interests philosophers because of its supposed implications for free will. It is held by many that determinism is incompatible with free will. But Hume (among others) has argued that this is a confusion. But that is a different matter.