@fresco,
fresco wrote:
Thanks !
I don't play with Ken and his "truth" games. In fact like Rorty, I find the word "truth" an irrelevance in philosophy since at that level it equates to "social consensus".
I think Rorty's idea of truth, from the limited amount of Rorty that I've read, is a tad more complex than "truth is social consensus". Certainly, in the first chapter of
Contingency, Solidarity and Irony, Rorty says something like, there is a difference between saying that truth is out there, and saying that the world is out there. Truth is a property of sentences, rather than a property of the world, and it does not exist independently of our beliefs, though, there clearly are objects in the world whose effects are completely causally independent of any human mental state. A lot of people are quite keen to say that Rorty subscribes to some kind of pernicious relativism, but in fact, properly elucidated, I think it is a very tame version of linguistic idealism. Some kind of Nietzschean perspective: "There are no facts, only interpretations", or even a Wittgensteinian perspective (if you've read any Rorty, you will know how much he bangs on about Wittgenstein, along with Davidson, Heideggar, and Dewey): "There are no absolutely correct concepts". The idea that he is trying to get at, I think, is that no description is closer to reality than any other, but some are more useful for certain purposes than others (i.e. "the sun rises every morning", and "the earth rotates on its axis once per day"). It's very hard not to be sympathetic with it if you see the flaws in the correspondence theory of truth.
On the original post, I think the point about holding certain beliefs compromising objectivity is a very good one. The point at the heart of Quine's
Two Dogmas is that propositions confront experience not individually, but rather, in clusters. When I believe I leave a book in a draw and come back later not to find it I have a range of beliefs that I may revise: "I left the book in this draw", "Objects always persist in space and time", "Nobody else has been in this drawer", even "1=1". Usually I revise the first or third, but the point is that experience massively underdetermines which is the correct belief to revise. The only options seem to be complete scepticism, or like Rorty and Quine, some kind of pragmatism.