Agent causation theory

In the case of an action that is free, it must not only be such that it is caused by the agent who performs it, but also such that no antecedent conditions were sufficient for his performing just that action. In the case of an action that is both free and rational, it must be such that the agent who performed it did so for some reason, but this reason cannot have been the cause of it... When I believe that I have done something, I do believe that it was I who caused it to be done, I who made something happen, and not merely something within me, such as one of my own subjective states, which is not identical with myself. If I believe that something not identical with myself was the case of my behavior---some event wholly external to myself, for instance, or even one internal to myself, such as a nerve impulse, volition, or whatnot---then I cannot regard that behavior as being an act of mine, unless I further believe that I was the cause of that external or internal event. (Taylor p. 51; see also Kane pp. 44ff.)