Are Philosophers lost in the clouds?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

As a pointed out, a true belief is one which is true, as contrasted with one that is false.

Are you addicted to tautologies?

kennethamy wrote:

Rather than talk about beliefs, in order to avoid confusion between: 1. the acceptance of a proposition (which is called "a belief", and 2. the proposition which is accepted (which is also called, "a belief", it would be clearer to let 1. be called "a belief", and 2. the proposition.

The acceptance of a proposition is the same as the acceptance of the correspondent belief, and both are only meaningful as the acceptance of their common object, which is whatever they both refer to.

kennethamy wrote:

If I say I believe that the cat is on the mat, the that clause refers to what it is I believe, namely the proposition that the cat is on the mat, and I am saying that what I accept as true (that is, my belief) is the proposition that the cat is on the mat (also a belief).

You continue to replace whatever a statement refers to by that statement itself, as if the sentence "the cat is on the mat" were the real circumstance of the cat being on the mat, which it is not. When you say that you believe that the cat is on the mat, the object of your belief is not the bunch of symbols "the cat is on the mat," but rather the circumstance referred to by them, namely, that the cat is indeed on the mat: what you believe is that whatever that bunch of symbols means is true because the cat is indeed on the mat, without any quotes: you do not believe the syntax of your statements, you believe their semantics - the real circumstances they refer to.

kennethamy wrote:

So, it is true that I believe my belief. But that is not a tautology since there are proposition I do not believe.

Of course if you make your belief become its object as being independent of it - by believing you believe the syntax of your statements instead of their meaning - then you will end up believing your belief. But once you realize that your statements are not the ultimate objects of your belief, since to believe a statement is only to believe whatever that statement refers to or means, which is always beyond it, then you will finally see that to believe your belief is not even a tautology: it is a self-referential absurdity.

kennethamy wrote:

You simply have to recognize that the term, "belief" is ambiguous as I have just explained to you it is. When you see the ambiguity, your confusion will vanish, and you will feel liberated.

The term belief is, indeed, ambiguous, but I have always not only admitted it, but counted on it. A belief means both your act of believing and its object as a believed object, rather than as a belief-independent object. Since you turn your belief in an actual object by objectifying the statements that express it, you end up confusing your act of believing with its object, as if your statements were themselves the circumstances they can only express. This is how the circumstance of believing the resulting belief is for you meaningful. And I don't see how believing in such an absurdity would make me free liberated. Perhaps in the same way that drugging myself would do it.

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@hawkeye10,

If you wanted to understand plants you would consult botany. Right? Now I believe just as botany studies plants sciences like anthropology study the human condition. You can't anwser empirical questions by non empirical means.

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@guigus,

guigus wrote:

What you are missing, and which is the central point he's making, is that all we have to know that a concept has a real object is, well, concepts. If you have ever read Kant, you should know that. We do not have direct access to the objects of our concepts: we have only access to them by means of our concepts, which is why we will never be definitely sure that our concepts have the real objects we believe them to have. We can be sure of that only by forgetting the circumstance that we depend on concepts to be sure of that: again, the dual nature of truth.

But we can still make the distinction between (a) the concept of a concept with a known object and (b) the concept of a concept without a known object.

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@ACB,

ACB wrote:

guigus wrote:
What you are missing, and which is the central point he's making, is that all we have to know that a concept has a real object is, well, concepts. If you have ever read Kant, you should know that. We do not have direct access to the objects of our concepts: we have only access to them by means of our concepts, which is why we will never be definitely sure that our concepts have the real objects we believe them to have. We can be sure of that only by forgetting the circumstance that we depend on concepts to be sure of that: again, the dual nature of truth.

But we can still make the distinction between (a) the concept of a concept with a known object and (b) the concept of a concept without a known object.

Yes we can! A concept with an unknown object in the sense of an object lacking empirical evidence is the concept of a possibility, or the possible concept of an actuality. However, a concept with an unknown object in the sense of an indefinite object is just an indefinite concept.

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@ACB,

ACB wrote:

guigus wrote:
What you are missing, and which is the central point he's making, is that all we have to know that a concept has a real object is, well, concepts. If you have ever read Kant, you should know that. We do not have direct access to the objects of our concepts: we have only access to them by means of our concepts, which is why we will never be definitely sure that our concepts have the real objects we believe them to have. We can be sure of that only by forgetting the circumstance that we depend on concepts to be sure of that: again, the dual nature of truth.

But we can still make the distinction between (a) the concept of a concept with a known object and (b) the concept of a concept without a known object.

Or between a concept with an object, and a concept that has no object. Why must we know whether or not the concept has an object? We can distinguish between being checkmated and not being checkmated whether or not we know whether or not we are checkmated. So, why can't we distinguish between a concept with, and a concept without an object, without having to know which it is?

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

ACB wrote:

guigus wrote:
What you are missing, and which is the central point he's making, is that all we have to know that a concept has a real object is, well, concepts. If you have ever read Kant, you should know that. We do not have direct access to the objects of our concepts: we have only access to them by means of our concepts, which is why we will never be definitely sure that our concepts have the real objects we believe them to have. We can be sure of that only by forgetting the circumstance that we depend on concepts to be sure of that: again, the dual nature of truth.

But we can still make the distinction between (a) the concept of a concept with a known object and (b) the concept of a concept without a known object.

Or between a concept with an object, and a concept that has no object. Why must we know whether or not the concept has an object? We can distinguish between being checkmated and not being checkmated whether or not we know whether or not we are checkmated. So, why can't we distinguish between a concept with, and a concept without an object, without having to know which it is?

A concept having an object that is only a possibility still has an object: you cannot even talk about being checkmated if you don't know what being checkmated is, at least as a possibility. The object of the "checkmate" concept is always a real checkmate, regardless of whether that real checkmate is an actuality or only a possibility: an at least possible checkmate is the real meaning of the "checkmate" concept, without which it ceases to be a concept, by having - only then - nothing to refer to. A concept without an object is a concept without a meaning.

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@guigus,

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

ACB wrote:

guigus wrote:
What you are missing, and which is the central point he's making, is that all we have to know that a concept has a real object is, well, concepts. If you have ever read Kant, you should know that. We do not have direct access to the objects of our concepts: we have only access to them by means of our concepts, which is why we will never be definitely sure that our concepts have the real objects we believe them to have. We can be sure of that only by forgetting the circumstance that we depend on concepts to be sure of that: again, the dual nature of truth.

But we can still make the distinction between (a) the concept of a concept with a known object and (b) the concept of a concept without a known object.

Or between a concept with an object, and a concept that has no object. Why must we know whether or not the concept has an object? We can distinguish between being checkmated and not being checkmated whether or not we know whether or not we are checkmated. So, why can't we distinguish between a concept with, and a concept without an object, without having to know which it is?

A concept having an object that is only a possibility still has an object: you cannot even talk about being checkmated if you don't know what being checkmated is, at least as a possibility. The object of the "checkmate" concept is always a real checkmate, regardless of whether that real checkmate is an actuality or only a possibility: an at least possible checkmate is the real meaning of the "checkmate" concept, without which it ceases to be a concept, by having - only then - nothing to refer to. A concept without an object is a concept without a meaning.

But the possibility of checkmate is not checkmate, and the object of the concept checkmate is, obviously, checkmate. I think you must be thinking of the concept of the possibility of checkmate. Now, the object of the concept of the possibility of checkmate is (yes, you guessed it) the possibility of checkmate. So, the object of the concept of checkmate is, checkmate. And the object of the concept of the possibility of checkmate is (not checkmate) but the possibility of checkmate.

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@kennethamy,

A possible object does not an object make... Waste all the words you have extra of on infinites and they will not in the least become finite for your efforts.

The concept of an object tells us something about the object... A moral form, as concepts without objects are, only tell us something about ourselves... We talk of justice, and justice is no object but a moral prerequisite, if I spell that correctly, and the fact that justice is our concern says something of our character... If justice is not your moral object the subject never comes up...

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@Fido,

Fido wrote:

A possible object does not an object make... Waste all the words you have extra of on infinites and they will not in the least become finite for your efforts.

The concept of an object tells us something about the object... A moral form, as concepts without objects are, only tell us something about ourselves... We talk of justice, and justice is no object but a moral prerequisite, if I spell that correctly, and the fact that justice is our concern says something of our character... If justice is not your moral object the subject never comes up...

But I never said there were possible objects. There are, at least according to Plato, moral forms, and I suppose those can be said to be moral concepts. But wherever did you get the idea that all concepts are moral concepts? The concept of an elephant is not a moral concept. Justice is a moral object (if an object at all) But elephants are not moral objects.

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

ACB wrote:

guigus wrote:
What you are missing, and which is the central point he's making, is that all we have to know that a concept has a real object is, well, concepts. If you have ever read Kant, you should know that. We do not have direct access to the objects of our concepts: we have only access to them by means of our concepts, which is why we will never be definitely sure that our concepts have the real objects we believe them to have. We can be sure of that only by forgetting the circumstance that we depend on concepts to be sure of that: again, the dual nature of truth.

But we can still make the distinction between (a) the concept of a concept with a known object and (b) the concept of a concept without a known object.

Or between a concept with an object, and a concept that has no object. Why must we know whether or not the concept has an object? We can distinguish between being checkmated and not being checkmated whether or not we know whether or not we are checkmated. So, why can't we distinguish between a concept with, and a concept without an object, without having to know which it is?

A concept having an object that is only a possibility still has an object: you cannot even talk about being checkmated if you don't know what being checkmated is, at least as a possibility. The object of the "checkmate" concept is always a real checkmate, regardless of whether that real checkmate is an actuality or only a possibility: an at least possible checkmate is the real meaning of the "checkmate" concept, without which it ceases to be a concept, by having - only then - nothing to refer to. A concept without an object is a concept without a meaning.

But the possibility of checkmate is not checkmate, and the object of the concept checkmate is, obviously, checkmate. I think you must be thinking of the concept of the possibility of checkmate. Now, the object of the concept of the possibility of checkmate is (yes, you guessed it) the possibility of checkmate. So, the object of the concept of checkmate is, checkmate. And the object of the concept of the possibility of checkmate is (not checkmate) but the possibility of checkmate.

The object of the concept of checkmate must be a checkmate, otherwise the concept renders meaningless. Hence, if it is not an actual checkmate, then it must be a possible checkmate. There is no concept of checkmate without an at least possible checkmate as its object, contrarily to your "concept that has no object" (remember?).

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@guigus,

guigus wrote:

The object of the concept of checkmate must be a checkmate, otherwise the concept renders meaningless. Hence, if it is not an actual checkmate, then it must be a possible checkmate. There is no concept of checkmate without an at least possible checkmate as its object, contrarily to your "concept that has no object" (remember?).

But is the object of the concept of four-sided triangle, a four-sided triangle? And if there is no actual four-sided triangle, must the referent be a possible four-sided triangle? You think that although there are no four-sided triangles, that there are possible four-sided triangles? As long as we are at this nonsense, let me ask you what is the object of the concept of an impossible object? An impossible object. And, if there are no impossible objects (which seems likely) if the object of the concept of an impossible object a possible impossible object?

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

The object of the concept of checkmate must be a checkmate, otherwise the concept renders meaningless. Hence, if it is not an actual checkmate, then it must be a possible checkmate. There is no concept of checkmate without an at least possible checkmate as its object, contrarily to your "concept that has no object" (remember?).

But is the object of the concept of four-sided triangle, a four-sided triangle? And if there is no actual four-sided triangle, must the referent be a possible four-sided triangle? You think that although there are no four-sided triangles, that there are possible four-sided triangles? As long as we are at this nonsense, let me ask you what is the object of the concept of an impossible object? An impossible object. And, if there are no impossible objects (which seems likely) if the object of the concept of an impossible object a possible impossible object?

The concept of an impossibility is an impossible concept with an impossible object (we can imagine either a four-sided something or a triangle, but not a four-sided triangle), just like the concept of a possibility is a possible concept with a possible object. And what holds for a four-sided triangle holds for all impossible objects and their concepts. However, you hinted on something important: that even an impossibility must be possible, but this is another story.

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

But is the object of the concept of four-sided triangle, a four-sided triangle?

There is no concept of a four-sided triangle, since a four-sided triangle is logically impossible. "Four-sided triangle" does not denote anything that can be conceived. There is a concept of four-sidedness and a concept of a triangle, and a concept of their mutual incompatibility, but not of their combination in a four-sided triangle.

kennethamy wrote:

what is the object of the concept of an impossible object? An impossible object.

There can be no concept of an impossible object, in the sense of a mental representation of such an object. But there can be a concept of the impossibility of an object. And the object of that concept is, of course, the impossibility of an object.

There can be a concept of a unicorn, since a unicorn is logically possible. But what is the object of that concept, given that unicorns do not exist?

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:
The object of the concept of checkmate must be a checkmate, otherwise the concept renders meaningless. Hence, if it is not an actual checkmate, then it must be a possible checkmate. There is no concept of checkmate without an at least possible checkmate as its object, contrarily to your "concept that has no object" (remember?).

But is the object of the concept of four-sided triangle, a four-sided triangle? And if there is no actual four-sided triangle, must the referent be a possible four-sided triangle? You think that although there are no four-sided triangles, that there are possible four-sided triangles? As long as we are at this nonsense, let me ask you what is the object of the concept of an impossible object? An impossible object. And, if there are no impossible objects (which seems likely) if the object of the concept of an impossible object a possible impossible object?

There is a sense in which you can consider a four-sided triangle a possible concept: any random combination of words - like "four-sided triangle" - is an either possible or impossible concept. So you can consider the possible random combination result "four-sided triangle" as a possible concept, just like any other possible result is a possible concept. But here the possibility consists in the concept as a whole, taken up from its materiality - up from a bunch of words - and not in its as-yet-nonexistent object - or meaning - alone. This is the only way for a possible concept (a random combination of words) and an impossible (meaningless) concept to be the same, as also how even an impossibility (an impossible concept) must be possible (a possible random words combination result).

1 Reply

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
But is the object of the concept of four-sided triangle, a four-sided triangle?

There is no concept of a four-sided triangle, since a four-sided triangle is logically impossible. "Four-sided triangle" does not denote anything that can be conceived. There is a concept of four-sidedness and a concept of a triangle, and a concept of their mutual incompatibility, but not of their combination in a four-sided triangle.

kennethamy wrote:
what is the object of the concept of an impossible object? An impossible object.

There can be no concept of an impossible object, in the sense of a mental representation of such an object. But there can be a concept of the impossibility of an object. And the object of that concept is, of course, the impossibility of an object.

There can be a concept of a unicorn, since a unicorn is logically possible. But what is the object of that concept, given that unicorns do not exist?

The concept of an impossibility is just the concept of your being unable to conceive of something, which is a very concrete object: an impossibility always remembers you of your being subject to something beyond yourself.

Regarding unicorns, they are just possibilities: non-actual possibilities. Yes, they exist, precisely, as possibilities, and perhaps genetic engineering will make their possibility an actuality some day.

1 Reply

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

ACB wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
But is the object of the concept of four-sided triangle, a four-sided triangle?

There is no concept of a four-sided triangle, since a four-sided triangle is logically impossible. "Four-sided triangle" does not denote anything that can be conceived. There is a concept of four-sidedness and a concept of a triangle, and a concept of their mutual incompatibility, but not of their combination in a four-sided triangle.

kennethamy wrote:
what is the object of the concept of an impossible object? An impossible object.

There can be no concept of an impossible object, in the sense of a mental representation of such an object. But there can be a concept of the impossibility of an object. And the object of that concept is, of course, the impossibility of an object.

There can be a concept of a unicorn, since a unicorn is logically possible. But what is the object of that concept, given that unicorns do not exist?

The concept of an impossibility is just the concept of your being unable to conceive of something, which is a very concrete object: an impossibility always remembers you of your being subject to something beyond yourself.

Regarding unicorns, they are just possibilities: non-actual possibilities. Yes, they exist, precisely, as possibilities, and perhaps genetic engineering will make that possibility an actuality some day.

I'll take your word fort whether there is a concept of an impossibility, but I would feel happier if you had an argument for it. Of course, to say that unicorns exist as possibilities is only to say (in philosophese) that it is (logically) possible for unicorns to exist. Not that there are possible unicorns. In other words, the philosophese "Unicorns exist as possiblities" does not imply that possible unicorns exist. There are no possible unicorns.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

ACB wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
But is the object of the concept of four-sided triangle, a four-sided triangle?

There is no concept of a four-sided triangle, since a four-sided triangle is logically impossible. "Four-sided triangle" does not denote anything that can be conceived. There is a concept of four-sidedness and a concept of a triangle, and a concept of their mutual incompatibility, but not of their combination in a four-sided triangle.

kennethamy wrote:
what is the object of the concept of an impossible object? An impossible object.

There can be no concept of an impossible object, in the sense of a mental representation of such an object. But there can be a concept of the impossibility of an object. And the object of that concept is, of course, the impossibility of an object.

There can be a concept of a unicorn, since a unicorn is logically possible. But what is the object of that concept, given that unicorns do not exist?

The concept of an impossibility is just the concept of your being unable to conceive of something, which is a very concrete object: an impossibility always remembers you of your being subject to something beyond yourself.

Regarding unicorns, they are just possibilities: non-actual possibilities. Yes, they exist, precisely, as possibilities, and perhaps genetic engineering will make that possibility an actuality some day.

I'll take your word fort whether there is a concept of an impossibility, but I would feel happier if you had an argument for it. Of course, to say that unicorns exist as possibilities is only to say (in philosophese) that it is (logically) possible for unicorns to exist. Not that there are possible unicorns. In other words, the philosophese "Unicorns exist as possiblities" does not imply that possible unicorns exist. There are no possible unicorns.

Take my word? You can do better than that. At least you got one thing right: saying that unicorns are logical possibilities is the symbolic-logical way of saying they are possible. But it is just amazing that for you "there are possible unicorns" has a different meaning than "unicorns exist as possibilities." In English they mean exactly the same thing. The reason why for you they have different meanings is that for you the sentence "possible unicorns exist" reads as "possible unicorns exist as actual unicorns," which is another sentence entirely. And you read it that way because for you "existence" can only mean "actual existence," and never "possible existence." You simply refuse to conceive of possibilities as what they are (A = A, remember?). As a consequence, you simply refuse to include yourself in the world: your world is an absolute actuality, so you are never already there conceiving it like that - which would make the world also a possibility. Then, such an absolute actuality - which is just (secretly) you - makes you no less than the creator of that world. Wow! I want some of that drug too!

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@jeeprs,

jeepers, I think you've touched on a good answer to what philosophy is or should be. To bring a bit of clearity to this topic, I've copied from Wiki the following statement: "Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems concerning matters such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language.[1][2] It is distinguished from other ways of addressing fundamental questions (such as mysticism, myth, or the arts) by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on rational argument.[3] The word "philosophy" comes from the Greek φιλοσοφία (philosophia), which literally means "love of wisdom".[4][5][6]"

On my recent visit to Greece, I learned that the Greeks made their gods in the human form before other religions were "created." If we can discuss the reasons for this change from human-form gods to the Christian or Hebrew God, it might address the fundamental philosophical issues that bind many humans today to their own religious beliefs - and about our own existence.

Philosophy is a difficult subject to comprehend. When I studied Philosophy in college, I had to read my textbook several times before the idea about existence and reality began to sink in. My younger son who graduated college cum laude had difficulty with his Philosophy course, and dropped it after reading his textbook several times.

I'm open to discuss philosophy with anybody interested in doing so; but I must confess my knowledge is based on my own readings and experience in world travel.

1 Reply

ACB wrote:

There is no concept of a four-sided triangle, since a four-sided triangle is logically impossible.

If there is no concept of a four-sided triangle, then what are you saying there is no concept of? If you respond with, "A four-sided triangle", then doesn't that seem strange? The concept of a 4-sided triangle, is a triangle with 4 sides.

If we say an idea of X doesn't exist, aren't we always wrong? For our saying X idea doesn't exist, expresses X idea.

ACB wrote:

There can be no concept of an impossible object, in the sense of a mental representation of such an object

If by "mental representation"you mean something that we can "see" in our minds (think of the concept of a spoon, and the referent we "see" in our minds), then a "mental representation" is not a concept, is it? We can have a concept of "justice", for instance, and there need not be any mental representation associated.

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@guigus,

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

ACB wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
But is the object of the concept of four-sided triangle, a four-sided triangle?

There is no concept of a four-sided triangle, since a four-sided triangle is logically impossible. "Four-sided triangle" does not denote anything that can be conceived. There is a concept of four-sidedness and a concept of a triangle, and a concept of their mutual incompatibility, but not of their combination in a four-sided triangle.

kennethamy wrote:
what is the object of the concept of an impossible object? An impossible object.

There can be no concept of an impossible object, in the sense of a mental representation of such an object. But there can be a concept of the impossibility of an object. And the object of that concept is, of course, the impossibility of an object.

There can be a concept of a unicorn, since a unicorn is logically possible. But what is the object of that concept, given that unicorns do not exist?

The concept of an impossibility is just the concept of your being unable to conceive of something, which is a very concrete object: an impossibility always remembers you of your being subject to something beyond yourself.

Regarding unicorns, they are just possibilities: non-actual possibilities. Yes, they exist, precisely, as possibilities, and perhaps genetic engineering will make that possibility an actuality some day.

I'll take your word fort whether there is a concept of an impossibility, but I would feel happier if you had an argument for it. Of course, to say that unicorns exist as possibilities is only to say (in philosophese) that it is (logically) possible for unicorns to exist. Not that there are possible unicorns. In other words, the philosophese "Unicorns exist as possiblities" does not imply that possible unicorns exist. There are no possible unicorns.

Take my word? You can do better than that. At least you got one thing right: saying that unicorns are logical possibilities is the symbolic-logical way of saying they are possible. But it is just amazing that for you "there are possible unicorns" has a different meaning than "unicorns exist as possibilities." In English they mean exactly the same thing. The reason why for you they have different meanings is that for you the sentence "possible unicorns exist" reads as "possible unicorns exist as actual unicorns," which is another sentence entirely. And you read it that way because for you "existence" can only mean "actual existence," and never "possible existence." You simply refuse to conceive of possibilities as what they are (A = A, remember?). As a consequence, you simply refuse to include yourself in the world: your world is an absolute actuality, so you are never already there conceiving it like that - which would make the world also a possibility. Then, such an absolute actuality - which is just (secretly) you - makes you no less than the creator of that world. Wow! I want some of that drug too!

I don't think that "unicorns exist as possibilities" or "there are possible unicorns" make much sense. What makes sense is, that the proposition, "there are unicorns" is not self-contradictory, that that implies nothing at all about what exists. There are no more possible unicorns than there are unicorns, indeed, if it even made sense to say it, even less so. Neither are there possible elephants, nor is it true that elephants exist as possibilities. What is true is that there are elephants, and so, it follows that it is possible that there are elephants, in the modal sense that the statement that there are elephants is not self-contradictory. Quine's classic paper, "On What there Is" begins with a discussion of the notion of "quantifying over possibilities". You might want to look up what your teacher's father-in-law has to say about that. The attempt to infer from, "there are unicorns" to that there are possible unicorns, is an excellent example of philosophers being lost in the clouds. It is exactly the kind of thing meant by that expression. The world is not populated with elephants and also possible elephants. And the world does not have possible unicorns prancing around, but no unicorns, as you seem to think. In Bertrand Russell's phrase, you seem to "lack a robust sense of reality".

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Are Philosophers lost in the clouds?

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