@fresco,
I think pragmatism gets itself into sticky situations, here, so we have to be careful in about what we say (or rather, how we say it) to avoid sounding like lunatics. It would be ridiculous to say something like "Truth is relative to an epoch/culture", or even worse, "The Tractatus was true when Wittgenstein wrote it, but not when he returned to Cambridge and began doing philosophy again", and absolute terms like "right" and "wrong" makes it sound like something like that is being said. Pragmatism should simply adopt vocabulary that doesn't make use of "truth" or "right", and ought to regard them as uninteresting, empty, or useless concepts, and talk of useful theories and beliefs instead of true theories and beliefs. I think this is a much better way of thinking about, for example, the contrast between Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics than traditional ideas of truth and falsehood. Newtonian mechanics got us a long way, and is still pretty useful. Is it false, while quantum mechanics is true? I don't think it matters, perhaps that question doesn't even have an answer.
While I agree that pragmatism is quite attractive, I think even from this point of view, we can still give a pretty definite answer to whether or not the Tractatus was right or wrong without recourse to extreme relativism. This is mainly because Wittgenstein was trying to answer many of the same questions in his later work as in his early work: How is meaning possible? Where do we draw the lines between sense and nonsense?
Is it better to think of the meaning of a sentence as being a picture of reality, or viewing meaning as use? In my view, the philosophy of language more in step with the latter view has been able to do more insightful and interesting things (e.g. McDowell, bits of Quine and Davidson, etc.), but many philosophers would disagree.
