Don't you find W's later rejection of the basis of his TLP significant ?
The question was directed to Reconstro who admires TLP. He can therefore legitimately be asked to justify such interest in the light its subsequent rejection by W. If he has not considered its rejection, his continued interest is hard to understand.
The idea that philosophy is not a doctrine, and hence should not be approached dogmatically, is one of the most important insights of the Tractatus. Yet, as early as 1931, Wittgenstein referred to his own early work as dogmatic. Wittgenstein used this term to designate any conception which allows for a gap between question and answer, such that the answer to the question could be found at a later date. The complex edifice of the Tractatus is built on the assumption that the task of logical analysis was to discover the elementary propositions, whose form was not yet known. What marks the transition from early to later Wittgenstein can be summed up as the total rejection of dogmatism, i.e., as the working out of all the consequences of this rejection. The move from the realm of logic to that of ordinary language as the center of the philosopher's attention; from an emphasis on definition and analysis to ‘family resemblance’ and ‘language-games’; and from systematic philosophical writing to an aphoristic style — all have to do with this transition towards anti-dogmatism in its extreme. It is in the Philosophical Investigations that the working out of the transitions comes to culmination. Other writings of the same period, though, manifest the same anti-dogmatic stance, as it is applied, e.g., to the philosophy of mathematics or to philosophical psychology.
To give an example of how bad that 'not knowing and keeping silent' mentality - the Protestant priest noted that the Nazis took in the Gypsies and no one raised his/her voice, then they took in the disabled and no one raised his/her voice, the Jews were next annd still there was silence and then they came for me and no one said anything.
I think pragmatism gets itself into sticky situations, here, so we have to be careful in about what we say (or rather, how we say it) to avoid sounding like lunatics. It would be ridiculous to say something like "Truth is relative to an epoch/culture", or even worse, "The Tractatus was true when Wittgenstein wrote it, but not when he returned to Cambridge and began doing philosophy again", and absolute terms like "right" and "wrong" makes it sound like something like that is being said. Pragmatism should simply adopt vocabulary that doesn't make use of "truth" or "right", and ought to regard them as uninteresting, empty, or useless concepts, and talk of useful theories and beliefs instead of true theories and beliefs. I think this is a much better way of thinking about, for example, the contrast between Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics than traditional ideas of truth and falsehood. Newtonian mechanics got us a long way, and is still pretty useful. Is it false, while quantum mechanics is true? I don't think it matters, perhaps that question doesn't even have an answer.
While I agree that pragmatism is quite attractive, I think even from this point of view, we can still give a pretty definite answer to whether or not the Tractatus was right or wrong without recourse to extreme relativism. This is mainly because Wittgenstein was trying to answer many of the same questions in his later work as in his early work: How is meaning possible? Where do we draw the lines between sense and nonsense?
Is it better to think of the meaning of a sentence as being a picture of reality, or viewing meaning as use? In my view, the philosophy of language more in step with the latter view has been able to do more insightful and interesting things (e.g. McDowell, bits of Quine and Davidson, etc.), but many philosophers would disagree.
They didn't know what was happening just that they were taken away. Many Jews taken didn't know what was at the end of the labor camps. They complied silently and reluctantly went along thinking it was a labor camp. Many Germans didn't know what was happening except the Gestapo was taking them - where? they didn't know. There was a lack of knowledge and so they kept silent. Atrocities were committed bythe Nazis and keeping silent helped it going.
But is it false while the Copernican theory is true? You betcha!
Quote:But is it false while the Copernican theory is true? You betcha!
Oh dear.....naive realism rides again!
A heliocentric model is neither "true" nor "false". It just works better for astronomical purposes. It simplifies the equations and the larger "picture". You still use the geocentric model in everyday thinking, just like you use "up and down", not Newton's "attraction of masses" or Einstein's "space is curved".
I know I am naive, and fail the sophistication test of philosophy
Quote:I know I am naive, and fail the sophistication test of philosophy
Not "the sophistication test"...."the looking further than your conditioning test"!