Customary Law

I am quite interested in customary law and its relatives (the Law Merchant, Germanic tribal law), including modern works on customary law (such as those by Anthony de Jasay and Lon L. Fuller). Contrary to modern legal positivism (and to absolutism, which is generally no longer advanced) it seems to me that common law is in fact the origin of real jurisprudence and, as a market phenomena that reflects the actual interests of involved party is both more equitable and more effective.
I am something of an anarchist (or I would be, if so many crazies didn't call themselves anarchists) and it has always seemed to me that governments are just as bad at producing law and order as they are at shoes and bread.

And if you could present another option for producing law and order, I am sure we would all be grateful to you. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist Papers, if men were angels, we would need no governments or laws.

I am quite interested in customary law and its relatives (the Law Merchant, Germanic tribal law), including modern works on customary law (such as those by Anthony de Jasay and Lon L. Fuller). Contrary to modern legal positivism (and to absolutism, which is generally no longer advanced) it seems to me that common law is in fact the origin of real jurisprudence and, as a market phenomena that reflects the actual interests of involved party is both more equitable and more effective.
I am something of an anarchist (or I would be, if so many crazies didn't call themselves anarchists) and it has always seemed to me that governments are just as bad at producing law and order as they are at shoes and bread.

And if you could present another option for producing law and order, I am sure we would all be grateful to you. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist Papers, if men were angels, we would need no governments or laws.

Anarchist texts tend to idealize the egalitarian state and in that idealization forget that egalitarianism was never ideal when it was practiced and not suitable for a population size that exceeds more than a couple hundred.

As we study cross culturally to populations larger than band size we notice that the rule of law changes.

The advent of classes etc.. require a political structure that is less and less egalitarian as the population grows.

on a mass cultural scale the relationship the average person has with the morals they have, many of which have been codified due to the above reasons, changes.

I am not an egalitarian. I am a propertarian.

As it should. Differences in local custom suit the people actually involved, and at the points of contact people will use arbitration and solutions that suit their interactions. This is an advantage, not a disadvantage. The State system of 'justice' is not only inexcusably expensive, but it actually interferes with restitution and commercial activity. This is why most commercial agencies use private arbitration and settle out of court.

'Classes' are a Marxist myth, outside of a political organization (in politics there are the Rulers and the Ruled). As I said, I am not an egalitarianism - egalitarianism is a fantasy.

Which is irrelevant. If you read de Jasay and Fuller, the first is a non-cognitivist and holds that justice is different than morality and formed by self-interest. The second holds that the morality of justice has nothing to do wit the morality of personal conflict.

without some sort of express or implied executive force

In smaller communal circles, customary law is not only possible but also inevitable as that which itself forms cohesion within that circle, and to a degree defines it. In such a situation laws are borne out of mutual understanding and inevitability; with each member being aware of his/her responsibility and contribution to the group. In that sense, the law is not only Law proper, but also custom as properly defined; it is inherently not imposed but rather a notion to which one voluntary submits precisely because this notion is what defines the person as a member of the group (for which one wishes to become).

In such a situation, a centralized power structure still exists, but due to the size of the group, the structure is not removed from the individual, but is rather formed from it, because of a certain notion of codependency felt among all members of the group. This perhaps still exists to a lesser degree in any 'clique' or 'group', in which it can be observed that when a disagreement arises, an attempt is made by all members to resolve the dispute and not immediately assert their authority qua power structure, but rather assert their codependency and evoke it as such.

In larger, more developed societies where there is place for stratification to occur on a larger level, the role of the individual in the smaller societies is transferred over to larger representatives and such etc. etc. because this stratification creates hierarchical membership, with the individual still assuming a role of codependency in a given society, but that society only being itself an individual itself in terms of larger societies and circles. The individual qua subject is not in the capacity to delegate and properly balance this codependency with multiple power structures properly without having it delegated linearly, hierarchically.

It is essentially this stratifying tendency which makes customary law possible in smaller circles, and makes it impossible in larger circles, precisely because custom is valid only insofar as it applies within a group that has a mutual codependency and identification.

You should read about Iceland, or tribal Germany (very similar). They have exercise of force based on private arbitration and personal responsibility. 'Executive force' just mean 'irresponsible force'.