Rigid Designators

Presumably, upon discovering it's molecular structure, we would not conclude that some water is not H2O, instead we would treat as we treat fool's gold: it isn't gold.

Also, wouldn't we treat Fool's Nixon the same way upon discovering that he wasn't president? If we reject non-H2O water as water because our water is H2O then shouldn't we reject non-presidential Nixon as Nixon because our Nixon was a president?

No, since Nixon might not have been president. But it is not true that gold might not have had the atomic number 79.

The comment you replied to made no mention of gold or atomic numbers. Could you please provide some more context for your post because right now it doesn't make much sense at all.

A substance could not be water unless it contained Oxygen.

But I suppose I was giving you more credit than I should have done.

Why not?



As usual, you are mostly incoherent and then become abusive when people are perplexed by your sophistry. Stick to the argument.

Because it is necessary condition of water that it contain oxygen.

Why is it a necessary condition of water that it contain oxygen?

There is a theory of natural kinds to support the position that water is necessarily H2O.

I'm aware of that but just pointing to a theory doesn't help me see how it's true.

How could water not contain oxygen?

What's stopping it?

What is stopping an elephant from not being a mammal? Or an alligator from not being a reptile? Well, it is the same thing that is stopping water from not containing oxygen.

An elephant is a member of the set of mammals. An alligator is a member of the set of reptiles. How does this relationship apply to oxygen and water? Water isn't a set and oxygen isn't a member of that set. Also, what is stopping an elephant from not being a mammal? Nothing I suppose.

You mean that an elephant can turn into a reptile and lay eggs? Would this take time, or could it happen all of a sudden, like magic? Hell, maybe he could turn into a settee. Or a bed. Who knows? Have you ever read Sartre's novel, Nausea? His main character talks just like that from an overdose of Hume. I don't suppose you have read it, though.

The example of a rigid designator most commonly offered is that of "Richard Nixon", which identifies a particular person. One descriptive phrase for the person "Richard Nixon" could be "the 37th President of the United States". However, there are possible worlds in which Nixon lost the election or died shortly after birth. In those possible worlds, "the 37th President of the United States" doesn't designate Nixon but some other person, e.g. Hubert Humphrey.

The claim made by Kripke and other proponents of rigid designators is that while the "37th President of the United States" only refers to Nixon in this possible world, the phrase "Richard Nixon" refers to Nixon in all possible worlds, even in worlds where Richard Nixon was assassinated as Vice President, died of pneumonia while serving in the senate, had a different name or was even born with some kind of congenital deformity making him unrecognizable to us.

My problem now is that I don't know how far to take this. At what point do I start identifying someone similar to Nixon as a different person instead of Nixon?

Imagine a possible world in which Nixon has an identical twin brother and are both given up for adoption. However, neither of them are named Richard and they both take on the surname of their adopted parents. One is Frank and the other is Fred. Neither of them enter politics. One becomes an electrician and the other a carpenter. They live until ripe old ages, ending up in the same nursing home and dying a few days apart from each other.

Now, one of these men was Nixon and the other was not. Which one? If we can't tell the difference then what sense does it make to claim such a thing?

It seems that for rigid designators to be viable then we have to establish essential properties for identification, yet what essential property could single out a particular person from a crowd?

Nothing you've said has anything to do with the post you've quoted. Try again.

Also, what is stopping an elephant from not being a mammal? Nothing I suppose.

It is epistemically possible for an elephant not to be a mammal, but it is certainly not biologically possible for an elephant not to be a mammal.