Standingunder Understanding

I have discussed Heidegger's philological method elsewhere this morning (Post nr. 11 in the Astonishment at Being thread). To argue that it is "faux-etymology" seems to imply that there is a "true-etymology" and I suspect most experts in the field would raise an eyebrow at such an assertion, especially the further back one goes in time.
To say that there is not "a shred of evidence" for it implies that there is "evidence" that would be universally accepted by those with expertise in the matter. What kind of evidence would fit this criteria, and would it be such that only one interpretation would present itself?

Rather than use terms like "fairy story" or the more philosophical "crap," it seems the conter-argument would be furthered by an epitome of contrary scholarly interpretations and their discussions of original sources upon which these are based. Until that is presented, one must decide which side is "made up out of whole cloth."

Understanding how to use a Dictionary is not foreign to some of us, and my marked-up Origins: A Short etymological Dictionary of Modern English by Partridge is already a part of my world. And it does not take that long to come across words whose origins and roots are admittedly doubtful (the "?" has its use in scholarly apparatus).

That kind of argument about a supposed whole new world does not erase the fact that articles in scholarly journals in the subject often discuss divergent etymologies and different interpretations of words and word origins. Nor does it go very far in demonstrating that Heidegger was incorrect in his "fairy tale" about "denken" and "danken."

One doesn't have to demonstrate X is correct unless one asserts X is incorrect, and then one seems obliged to present warrants for the contrary assertion, so the argumentum ad ignorantiam doesn't seem to apply.

Obviously from a lack of evidence, no conclusion should be drawn; but this applies to NOT X as well as X since either is as likely. It was not my point that Heidegger is correct, since I am not that well-versed in German or Germanic philology, but that one cannot go around simply saying that he was wrong without providing a foundation for doing so and consider this an argument. I am, however, well-versed in philosophic demonstration enough to ask for grounds for asserting he is spinning "fairy-tales."

one cannot go around simply saying that he was wrong without providing a foundation for doing so and consider this an argument.

One doesn't have to demonstrate X is correct unless one asserts X is incorrect, and then one seems obliged to present warrants for the contrary assertion, so the argumentum ad ignorantiam doesn't seem to apply.

Obviously from a lack of evidence, no conclusion should be drawn; but this applies to NOT X as well as X since either is as likely. It was not my point that Heidegger is correct, since I am not that well-versed in German or Germanic philology, but that one cannot go around simply saying that he was wrong without providing a foundation for doing so and consider this an argument. I am, however, well-versed in philosophic demonstration enough to ask for grounds for asserting he is spinning "fairy-tales."

So, if you say you had a party with extra-terrestrials the other evening, and I ask you for evidence, and you cannot present any, I should conclude that it is about 50/50 whether you had a party with extra-terrestrials the other night? So, when you assert some nonsense and present no evidence, my cognitive attitude should be neutral?

Since "denken" and "danken" only differ by one letter, I would have thought the possibility of their being etymologically related, in the absence of any other evidence either way, was fairly high. Perhaps not as high as 50%, but very much higher than the possibility that jgweed had a party with extra-terrestrials. High enough to require evidence for denying the relation.

Evidence, ACB evidence. Not looks. Why not look up the etymologies of the two terms, rather than rely on Heidegger?

OK, I have.
Look up "think" and "thank" in the Online Etymology Dictionary. You may find the results interesting. :detective:

OK, I have.
Look up "think" and "thank" in the Online Etymology Dictionary. You may find the results interesting. :detective:

There is some distant root connection between "think" and "thank". But not, of course, the kind of semantic connection Heidegger claims (invents) there is. Or any semantic connection, for that matter. So, what is supposed to be interesting about it?

thank (v.) O.E. ?ancian "to give thanks," from P.Gmc. *thankojan (cf. O.S. thancon, O.N. ?akka, Dan. takke, O.Fris. thankia, M.Du., Ger. danken "to thank"), from *thankoz "thought, gratitude," from PIE base *tong- "to think, feel." For sense evolution, cf. related O.E. noun ?anc, ?onc, originally "thought," but by c.1000 "good thoughts, gratitude." The whole group is from the same root as think (q.v.). In ironical use, "to blame," from 1550s. Thank you is attested from c.1400, short for I thank you. To thank (someone) for nothing is recorded from 1703.
think O.E. ?encan "conceive in the mind, think, consider, intend" (past tense ?ohte, p.p. ge?oht), probably originally "cause to appear to oneself," from P.Gmc. *thankjan (cf. O.Fris. thinka, O.S. thenkian, O.H.G. denchen, Ger. denken, O.N. ?ekkja, Goth. ?agkjan); O.E. ?encan is the causative form of the distinct O.E. verb ?yncan "to seem or appear" (past tense ?uhte, pp. ge?uht), from P.Gmc. *thunkjan (cf. Ger. d?nken, d?uchte). Both are from PIE *tong- "to think, feel" which also is the root of thought and thank. The two meanings converged in M.E. and ?yncan "to seem" was absorbed, except for archaic methinks "it seems to me." Jocular pp. thunk (not historical, but by analogy of drink, sink, etc.) is recorded from 1876. Think-tank is 1959 as "research institute" (first ref. is to Center for Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, Calif.); it had been colloquial for "the brain" since 1905.

---------- Post added 02-17-2010 at 12:11 AM ----------



The Online Etymological dictionary is not the last word, but it strengthens H's case. As far as the German goes, I'm no expert.

But besides the actual derivation, it's just as important to understand WHY Heidegger is associating thought and gratitude. Let's not lose sight of his intention. He saw metaphysics since Plato as an ungracious power trip. Man saw his environment as contingent trash. His "ontotheology" led him to as obsession with epistemology, one that ultimately leads to pragmatism. How? Because the skeptic cannot be answered well except by pragmatism. The only thing we can know with certainty is our desires. Nietzsche is the inversion of Plato, in H's eyes. Hidden eternal truth is flipped until truth is an army of metaphors in the service of an imperious Will.

It does not strengthen Heidegger's case, which, insofar as it is a case at all*, is that there is some kind of conceptual and semantic connection between "thanking" and "thinking". The dictionary does not support that at all.

By the way, do you claim to be an expert concerning English etymology? Just speaking English is not a qualification.

1. A relationship has already been demonstrated.
2. It doesn't really matter that much, because Heidegger felt/expressed a relationship between thinking and thanking, no matter the etymology.
3. To harp on this is to trumpet your neglect of his intent and significance.

The hot air of prejudice.

This thread has lost its way. Too bad, it was a good theme. The investigation of investigation. I have had my fun arguing. Arguing is sometimes an entertaining sport. But I always end up disappointed that I spend my time that way. I want to talk about the good stuff, not this petty crap which I admit sometimes ensnares me.

To riff on/from Heidegger via George Steiner:

To think well is to think from astonishment. To understand is to stand under.
Western Man likes to rip Nature's dress off. If not that, then some other dress or curtain. The intellectual is conceived of as a person with x-ray vision who "sees through." It's the same with reading for subtext or between the lines.
I cannot deny the attractiveness of this conception, and perhaps I will never escape it. But..

To stand under and look up. To become a permeable listener rather than a piercing gaze. We associate knowing with seeing, and this is understandable (standunderable), but it's not the only way to conceive of knowing.

Pythagoras concerned himself with harmony. Is harmony a better metaphor for wisdom than seeing-thru? I like both.

Vision seems to penetrate. Hearing allows penetration. Is phallogocentrism tied up with visual metaphors for thinking?

I'm not against "phallogocentrism" on principle. I just against denying myself a multitude of perspectives (visual metaphor).